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Is party identification highly stable or regularly updated?  Is party identification an 
impediment to democratic accountability or a helpful shortcut?  Political scientists have 
debated the answers to these questions for fifty years.  This dissertation incorporates 
intuition from both of the two dominant camps in this debate, arguing that partisan 
dynamics are shaped by competing motives.  This theory is tested through a series of four 
original experiments and analysis of survey data from the American National Election 
Studies.  By bringing partisans’ attitudes and party identities into conflict with one 
another, I am able to observe the methods that partisans use to reconcile their motives and 
defend their identities.  By inhibiting partisans’ ability to deploy these defenses, I am able 
to induce party identification change among the most vulnerable partisans.  Through a 
survey experiment, I observe how salient political evaluations can create identity pressure 
during surveys and how respondents go about resolving this pressure.  Finally, by 
x 
priming instrumental concerns versus expressive concerns, the motivational 
underpinnings of partisan responsiveness are clarified.  Specifically, party identification 
change results from the desire to appear pragmatic—a norm of civic duty—and not from 
the drive to attain policy benefits. Implications for partisan dynamics, the responsiveness 








Sports analogies are virtually omnipresent in American politics.  From the start of 
the “race to the White House” to the “passing of the baton,” each campaign is one leg of 
an ongoing competition between parties.  Along the way, fans cheer for their team, wave 
signs, and even paint their faces, while, in an awesome barrage of mixed metaphors, 
candidates “duke it out in the ring,” “throw Hail Mary passes,” “swing for the fences,” 
and “play hardball.”  Each side has a mascot—elephants versus donkeys—and a team 
color—red versus blue.  Like box scores, the latest tracking polls appear in the morning 
paper, and political pundits, like ESPN personalities, spend the day on cable television 
endlessly debating which team will come out on top at the end of the campaign season.  
The “horse race” is never ending, and despite the occasional stodgy academic critique, 
this seems to be just the way we, the voters, like it.  After all, parties and political 
consultants live and die by their ability to get candidates elected, and in an increasingly 
competitive media industry, each outlet must attract consumers to survive.  In short, you 
have to give the fans what they want, and we like the game. 
Of course, this should probably not surprise us.  After all, is politics really that 
different from sport?  At its basis, politics is a competition, and political parties are 
essentially teams.  Therefore, in politics, as in sports, citizens get swept up in 
competition, rallying behind the Red Elephants or the Blue Donkeys just as they rally 
behind the Red Sox or the Blue Jays.        
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Of note, however, is that the quintessential civics class analogy is not democratic 
politics as sport, but rather democracy as a marketplace of ideas, wherein the best ideas, 
as determined by the citizenry, become policy.  Of course, a marketplace and a sports 
arena are two very different venues.  When given a choice between two products of equal 
price, marketplace consumers will naturally gravitate toward the product of higher 
quality.  But, in the sports arena, quality is often much less important than loyalty.  While 
some “fair weather fans” may gravitate toward whichever team is better, most fans abide 
by the norm of loyalty to one’s hometown team.  Of course, if American democracy is, in 
important respects, more like a sports area than a marketplace, what are the implications 
for our understanding of American government? 
Scholars should consider how political competition plays out in the mind of the 
voter and how our assumptions about the mind of the voter shape our understanding of 
the democratic process.  Do team loyalties get in the way of voters’ objectivity and 
willingness to hold parties and candidates accountable for their policy positions and 
performance?  If so, under what conditions does this occur?  And under conditions when 
it does not occur, what motivates objectivity?   
From 2000 to 2009, we witnessed a shift away from identification with the 
Republican Party (Etheridge 2009).  But will this change lead to an enduring realignment, 
or will Republicans return to their party?  The key to answering this question may lie in 
these voters’ motivation to remain loyal to their “team” despite their disagreements and 
frustrations.   
To provide an example of how team loyalties can shape our motivations and 
behavior, imagine a fairly typical sports fan who is loyal to a terrible franchise.  Fans 
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have the option to root for any team they choose, and while some “fair weather fans” 
gravitate toward winning teams, many others maintain lifelong loyalties to teams with 
long losing traditions.  If you grew up on the North side of Chicago, you probably root 
for the Cubs like your parents before you and your children after you—despite the Cubs’ 
century long losing steak.  If you grew up in Michigan, you probably root for the Detroit 
Lions despite the fact that they recently set an NFL record by going 0-16 in the 2008 
season.   
Such fans often find rival teams to possess more attractive qualities—more 
exciting players, a more stimulating style of play, greater physical or mental toughness, 
etcetera.  But their team loyalties are not rooted in these evaluations.  Instead, their 
allegiances develop out of regional, cultural, and familial tradition.  At the end of every 
season, many frustrated fans of teams like the Chicago Cubs and the Detroit Lions 
proclaim that they are finally giving up on their team.  Yet the next year, when the time 
comes, they are back in the stands cheering for their team once more.  Their family and 
friends are all fans of the team, so they grew up as fans of the team, and they will 
probably always root for their team despite their annual declarations to the contrary.  It is 
not about positively evaluating the team, but rather feeling that they are somehow 
connected to the team.  When their team occasionally wins a game, it feels like a win for 
them, and when they lose a game, it feels like a personal loss.  The team’s 
embarrassments are their embarrassments, and when they discuss sports with others, they 
refer to the team as “we,” as in “we lost again.”  
Readers familiar with identity research may recognize these attributes.  To refer to 
one’s group as “we,” to feel wins and losses for one’s group as wins and losses for the 
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self, and to experience group embarrassments as personal embarrassments are all tell-tale 
signs of social identification (Greene 1999; Mael and Tetrick 1992).  In other words, part 
of these fans’ identity is wrapped up in their sense of association with their team.  These 
fans may actually evaluate rival teams more positively than their own, yet they simply 
cannot bring themselves to root for the other team.      
Like identification with a sports team, identification with a political party entails 
much more than liking or agreeing with a party.  It means seeing one’s self as a 
Republican or a Democrat.  While the concepts of attitude and identity are often used 
interchangeably in the political science literature, attitudes toward parties are nonetheless 
conceptually distinct from identification with a party (Green et al. 2002).  While attitudes 
are evaluative in nature (Eagly and Chaiken 1993), identities are rooted in self-
conceptualization (Monroe et al. 2000).  In short, an important distinction exists between 
being and liking.  In fact, this was the reason for conceptualizing partisanship as an 
identity in the first place (see Campbell et al. 1960 Chapter 6; Campbell et al. 1954 
Chapter 7). 
“In characterizing the relation of individual to party as a psychological 
identification we invoke a concept that has played an important if somewhat 
varied role in psychological theories of the relation of individual to individual or 
of individual to group.  We use the concept here to characterize the individual’s 
affective orientation to an important group object in his environment . . . We have 
not measured party attachments in terms of the vote or evaluation of partisan 
issues because we are interested in exploring the influence of party identification 
on voting behavior and its immediate determinants.  When an independent 
measure of party identification is used it is clear that even strong party adherents 
at times may think and act in contradiction to their party allegiance” (Campbell et 
al. 1960, pp. 112-123).   
 
The distinction between attitude and identity plays out in important ways as we 
observe public opinion and political behavior.  Being part of one’s self-concept, an 
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identity is something we are motivated to defend.  Like our sports team loyalties, we tend 
to inherit our party identities from our families and our communities, and party images 
are often interwoven with our understanding of local culture and history.  For many 
years, being a “true Southerner” meant being a Democrat almost regardless of one’s issue 
positions, and this is certainly not the only example of party identity becoming 
interwoven with other identities.  One can certainly think of examples in which racial, 
religious, and occupational identities have become entwined with party as well.  Because 
party identity has such deep roots, change does not come easily.  Like the sports fans 
described above, partisans may find their political attitudes increasingly in conflict with 
their identity, yet they continue to feel a pull toward their party.  Still, party identification 
does change, and it is the objective of this dissertation to determine under what 
conditions this change occurs.  
As voters evaluate politics and develop attitudes toward candidates and policies, 
occasional conflicts between attitudes and identities are inevitable.  Often, our party 
identities guide our attitudes—either by serving as objective heuristics or by facilitating 
motivated reasoning—so disagreements are avoided.  But this is not always the case.  
When an individual discovers that his or her attitudes and identity conflict, one or the 
other must be changed, or the discrepancy must be justified in order to maintain cognitive 
consistency.  To change one’s attitude to be consistent with one’s identity constitutes 
partisan bias, and we have strong norms against such bias in our society.  Throughout 
American history, political institutions and civic culture have been shaped by tensions 
between party loyalty and the ideals of objectivity and pragmatism (Schudson 1998).  In 
order to be a good citizen, it is necessary to be—or at least appear—reasoned and 
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pragmatic.  Of course, to change one’s party identity is also psychologically costly.  
Therefore, partisans have a strong incentive to come up with some justification for 
continued identification despite any disagreements they may have with their party. 
Like sports fans, partisans do not always agree with their team, but they are 
motivated by their loyalties.  And, in politics, justifications for continued identification 
come prepackaged as “talking points” from party elites.  Partisans only need to turn on 
cable news to hear the latest justification for every move their party makes—particularly 
those that fail.  And when they are really on the ropes, pointing out the other party’s 
failures often works just as well.  In the heat of competition disagreements tend to 
dissipate quickly, and as long as the rival team is more hated, loyalty to one’s own party 
can be justified.  In large part, party identity change occurs when justification for 
continued identification can simply not be found. 
If the recent decline in Republican identification has occurred because 
Republicans have had a difficult time justifying their identities in the current political 
climate, then there is a good chance that they will eventually return to the party.  
However, if these voters have lost the motivation to justify identification with the 
Republican Party, then the change will likely endure.  For now, the most we can do is 
attempt to gain a better understanding of how motivations shape partisan dynamics in 
general while paying particular attention to patterns observed recently among Republican 





Plan of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized around a series of predictions—each of which will 
be the focus of a chapter.  These predictions are derived from a dual motivations theory 
of party identification which I develop in Chapter 1.  The dual motivations theory posits 
that two competing psychological forces shape party identification—partisan motivation 
and responsiveness motivation.  On one hand, partisans are driven to maintain party 
loyalty, but on the other hand, they are motivated to be responsive to their political 
environment.  When individuals disagree with their party, they will attempt to develop 
justifications for maintaining their party allegiance despite that disagreement.  Party 
identification change occurs when a justification cannot be found or if responsiveness 
motivation is simply too high.   
Chapter 2 attempts to uncover evidence of partisan motivation.  While verification 
of partisan stability is easy to come by, there is relatively little evidence to suggest that 
this stability is actually driven by partisan motivated reasoning (Green et al. 2002).  I 
look for evidence of party identity justification as an indicator of the influence of partisan 
motivation.  If individuals attempt to rationalize away disagreement with their party, we 
can be assured that partisan motivation does exist.  Otherwise, there would be no reason 
to produce such justifications.   
Chapter 3 then considers whether partisan stability is actually contingent on one’s 
ability to justify his or her party identity.  If partisan stability is contingent on one’s 
ability to justify maintaining her party identity, then absent the ability to justify one’s 
identity, we should see evidence of party identification change.   
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Chapter 4 considers what psychological pressures might increase responsiveness 
motivation to the point where it is high enough to overcome partisan motivation and 
produce changes in party identification.  This should occur when evaluations are made 
salient to partisans prior to reporting their party identification.  While much of the 
existing literature on party identification debates whether partisans update their identities 
to reflect their evaluations or whether such findings result from measurement error, 
Chapter 4 seeks a partial reconciliation.  It is hypothesized that survey respondents update 
their identities to reflect their evaluations, because they are driven by the need for 
cognitive consistency.  However, these changes are undone as individuals rationalize 
away this inconsistency and seek new justifications for their original identity.  Therefore, 
variation that might be called measurement error, offers important insights into the 
dynamics of party identification.   
Chapter 5 asks, to whatever degree people are motivated to change their party 
identities, what is the root of this motivation?  Do partisans change their identities 
because they wish to identify with the party that offers them the most policy benefits, or 
do people update their identities in order to conform to norms of civic duty and 
pragmatism?  In other words, is partisan updating instrumental to the attainment of policy 
benefits, or does partisan updating result from the need to express one’s pragmatism?  
Finally, in the conclusion, I discuss the implications of the dual motivations 
theory for our understanding of party identification’s role in democracy.  Particular 
attention is paid to the efficiency of party identification as a voting heuristic and the 
implications for parties’ institutional role.  The chapter concludes by considering 














If we know one thing about voter behavior, it is that most citizens vote their party 
identity most of the time.  By and large, Republicans vote for Republican candidates, and 
Democrats vote for Democratic candidates.  And studies show that party identification is 
the single most powerful predictor of Americans’ voting behavior (Converse and Markus 
1979; Campbell et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008).  However, the implications of this 
empirical regularity continue to vex scholars of political behavior.  Does partisan 
identification act as a useful heuristic, guiding people to the “correct” choice given their 
interests, or is it a filter that biases perceptions of the world in favor of one’s previous 
party preference? 
On one hand, political parties simplify politics by narrowing down the set of 
choices for democratic citizens.  In this way, party identification may serve as an efficient 
shortcut for voters.  From this point of view, when faced with political decisions, citizens 
are reasonably safe in assuming that their party’s candidates and policy positions are 
favorable relative to those of the opposing party.  Since individual voters have relatively 
little time or incentive to gather information about politics, such a shortcut or “heuristic” 
may play an important role in supplementing voter competence.  In other words, even 
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without perfect information, party identification may allow citizens to vote as if they 
were well-informed.   
However, while voters need not be particularly attentive to politics for party 
identification to function as an efficient heuristic, they must be motivated to vote for the 
candidate who best represents their policy interests and, therefore, willing to accept 
relevant information when it comes their way.  If party identification prevents citizens’ 
from accepting relevant new information and updating their identities accordingly, 
partisanship ceases to function as an efficient heuristic, because it no longer serves as an 
accurate approximation of voters’ “true” policy interests.  At the theoretical extreme, 
where citizens deflect all information that is inconsistent with their partisanship, party 
identification impedes voter competence, causing ostensibly competent citizens to favor 
candidates and policy positions that they would otherwise oppose.  In short, we must 
understand what motivates partisans if we hope to understand whether this most powerful 
predictor of political behavior helps or hinders voter competence.  The stakes of this 
debate could not be higher.  After nearly fifty years, the question remains whether party 
identification facilitates policy driven voting or whether it threatens voter competence. 
 
The Nature and Stability of Party Identification 
The dispute over the nature and stability of party identification is long standing.  
For years, scholars have debated whether partisanship is better characterized as a highly 
stable socialized identity (Campbell et al. 1960; Green et al. 2002; Green and Palmquist 
1994, 1990; Miller and Shanks 1996; Miller 1991) or a readily updatable summary 
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measure of political attitudes
1
 (Brody and Rothenberg 1988; Franklin and Jackson 1983; 
Franklin 1984; Jackson 1975; MacKuen et al. 1989; Page and Jones 1979; Achen 1992, 
2002; Fiorina 1981; Allsop and Weisberg 1988; Franklin 1992).  Originally, party 
identification was assumed to be exogenous to political attitudes and voting behavior 
(Campbell et al. 1960).  According to the original theory, party identification develops 
early in life and remains highly stable as a result of partisans’ motivation to defend their 
identities.  More recently, however, revisionist research has shown that individuals’ 
policy positions (Highton and Kam 2008; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Jackson 1975; 
Franklin 1992; Carsey and Layman 2006), retrospective performance evaluations (Fiorina 
1981), candidate evaluations (Page and Jones 1979), and past votes (Markus and 
Converse 1979) affect individuals’ party identities.  Such findings are bolstered by 
studies showing variation in party identification over time at the individual (Allsop and 
Weisberg 1988; Brody and Rothenberg 1988) and aggregate level (MacKuen et al. 1989; 
Box-Steffensmeier and Smith 1996).  “Revisionist models” tend to characterize party 
identification as a “running tally” of political evaluations (Fiorina 1981).  To the degree 
that party identification appears stable, this stability is thought to result from Bayesian 
updating (Achen 1992, 2002; Franklin 1984; Gerber and Green 1998).  Under this model, 
the stability of party identification increases as individuals gain confidence in their 
understanding of the parties’ positions relative to their own.  In other words, and perhaps 
counter-intuitively, partisan stability results from a willingness to update one’s identity in 
                                               
1 Throughout this dissertation the terms “attitude” and “evaluation” will be used interchangeably, but as 
will be discussed in the pages that follow, both of these terms are considered distinct from “identity.”  
Attitudes are, by definition, evaluative in nature (Eagly and Chaiken 1993), while identities are rooted in 
self-conceptualization (Campbell et al. 1954; Monroe et al. 2000; Campbell et al. 1960; Green et al. 2002). 
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response to new information.  As more and more knowledge is accumulated about the 
parties’ positions, each additional piece of information matters less.   
However, other work demonstrates that short-term influences on party 
identification disappear when random measurement error is taken into account (Green 
and Palmquist 1990, 1994; Green et al. 2002).  Green and colleagues argue that party 
identification is much more stable than revisionist scholars claim.  These authors stress 
the vital distinction between evaluation and identification.  Citizens certainly evaluate the 
political world around them, but, like Campbell et al. (1960), they argue that party 
identification is rooted in one’s self-concept rather than his or her political evaluations.  
Therefore partisanship is better characterized as a socialized identity than a “running 
tally” of evaluations (Green et al. 2002).   
Despite their endorsement of certain aspects of the classic model of party 
identification, Green and colleagues stop short of arguing that partisan stability results 
from motivational biases as Campbell et al. (1960) originally suggested.  Instead, they 
contend that partisan stability stems from the persistence of symbolic imagery associated 
with rank-and-file partisans.  In other words, party identification is thought not to be 
rooted in evaluation, but rather partisan symbolism.  Because individuals begin to 
develop partisan stereotypes during childhood, they tend to hold strong beliefs (priors) 
about what the parties symbolize.  Therefore, despite a willingness to update their party 
identities, little party identification change is expected under this model, except in cases 
when party symbolism is dramatically altered—resulting in massive partisan 
realignments.  For instance, despite their ideology, many southern conservatives 
identified with the Democratic Party into the 1960’s, because they were socialized to 
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view the Democratic Party as the party of the Confederacy and the Republican Party as 
the party of the Union.  However, once parties took clear and opposing positions on civil 
rights legislation, this party imagery finally changed, and a partisan realignment occurred 
in the American South (Green et al. 2002).     
Theories such as these, which provide accounts for partisan stability even in the 
absence of partisan bias, have given rise to debate over the degree to which partisan bias 
plays any significant role at all in political perceptions (Gerber and Green 1999).  
Nonetheless, there does exist a good deal of evidence to suggest that party identification 
biases individuals’ views of the world (Bartels 2002).  For instance, party identification 
moderates the influence of character weakness on candidate evaluations, suggesting that 
partisans hold candidates of the opposing party to higher character standards than they 
hold their own party’s candidates (Goren 2002, 2007).  Partisans also tend to take the 
issue positions of their party even when those positions conflict with their ideology 
(Cohen 2003).  Partisan cues even influence which values citizens endorse (Goren 2005; 
Goren et al. 2007).  And these micro-level processes appear to bias mass opinion in 
predictable ways (Bartels 2002; Zaller 1992).   
For the most part in political science, “rational choice” and “biased reasoning” 
models are considered to be at odds with one another, and the debate over party 
identification is no exception.  At the heart of this controversy lie specific but distinctive 
motivational assumptions.  Are partisans driven to reap psychological rewards through 
loyal identification?  Are partisans motivated to identify with the party that offers them 
the most preferable policies?  I ask whether the answer might be conditional on the 
information environment and individual characteristics of the voter.  Perhaps the classic 
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and revisionist theories of party identification each explain a significant piece of the 
“truth.”  The dual motivations approach, proposed here, offers a framework through 
which “rational choice” and “biased reasoning” models can be reconciled.  And more 
importantly, it generates falsifiable hypotheses illuminating the conditions under which 
partisans are likely to defend their identities versus the conditions under which they 
change their identities in accordance with new information.   
In moving beyond the language of absolutes and recognizing that partisan 
stability may be conditional, I attempt to build an integrated model of the party 
identification process.  If party identification is viewed as an ongoing process, we can 
generate hypotheses about what factors shape it—increasing or decreasing the probability 
of partisan change and shedding new light on the implications of party identity’s massive 
behavioral influence.   
Specifically, I characterize one’s current party identification as the outcome of a 
process through which individuals attempt to reconcile their competing motivations.  On 
one hand, individuals are motivated to make accurate evaluations, but they are also often 
motivated to arrive at particular evaluations (Kunda 1990, 1999; Lodge and Taber 2000; 
Taber et al. 2001).  Just as it is a mistake to assume that partisan consistent outcomes 
must be driven by partisan bias (Gerber and Green 1999), it is also dangerous to assume 
that citizens are driven to reach “correct” or unbiased evaluations.  In order to understand 
whether party identification helps or hinders voter competence, it is essential to 
understand the motivations governing partisan dynamics.   
In the pages that follow, I will lay out a dual motivations model in which partisans 
must justify their biases or else update their party identities in order to conform to social 
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norms against overt partisan bias.  According to the theory, partisan stability hinges on a 
person’s motivation and ability to justify maintaining her party identity relative to her 
motivation to hold her party accountable for its actions.  Therefore, the key to 
establishing the conditions under which party identification change occurs is to 
understand the interplay between an individual’s motives.  This dual motivations 
approach facilitates investigation of the central normative question—does party 
identification facilitate voter competence, undermine voter competence, or is the answer 
conditional?   
This approach may provide new insights into other related empirical phenomena 
as well.  For instance, why do partisan strength and stability increase with age (Jennings 
and Niemi 1981; Converse 1969, 1976; Franklin and Jackson 1983)?  On one hand, 
partisan stability may result from the accumulation of information about what the parties 
stand for (Achen 1992, 2002; Franklin 1984; Gerber and Green 1998).  On the other 
hand, party identities may simply crystallize with age and experience (Converse 1969, 
1976; Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Sears and Levy 2003; Brader and Tucker 2001) as 
individuals are exposed to campaigns (Valentino and Sears 1998; Sears and Valentino 
1997).  The proposed theory suggests another potential stabilizing mechanism—partisans 
may become better at justifying their identities as they mature and gain experience with 
politics.  If true, this leads to the counterintuitive and perhaps distressing conclusion that 
democratic accountability hinges disproportionately on the least experienced or “most 
impressionable” citizens.   For these are the ones among us who are least equipped to 
rationalize away disagreements they may have with their party. 
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  The ambiguity surrounding party identification also raises concerns over model 
specification.  Given that party identification appears in virtually every contemporary 
explanation of vote choice, this is no minor issue.  If party identification precedes issue 
positions and candidate evaluations in the funnel of causality (Campbell et al. 1960; 
Miller and Shanks 1996; Goldberg 1969), then it must be controlled for if one hopes to 
isolate the independent effects of these downstream forces on vote choice.   However, if 
party identification mediates between attitudes and vote choice, then controlling for party 
identification means systematically underestimating the effect of issue opinions and 
candidate evaluations on behavior. 
 
Motivated Reasoning 
 Psychologists have long been interested in how motivation affects attitudes.  Early 
research spoke to the potential for attitudinal durability even when individuals face 
massive countervailing evidence (Festinger et al. 1956).  These studies revealed that 
individuals are innately driven to maintain cognitive consistency (Festinger 1957).  More 
recently, research into cognitive dissonance has been incorporated into a larger theory of 
motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990).  Motivated reasoning theory posits that individuals 
are driven by two competing forces:  accuracy motivation and directional motivation (see 
Kunda 1990, 1999; Lodge and Taber 2000; Taber et al. 2001).  Often times, individuals 
have a vested interest in arriving at a particular conclusion.  For example, when 
evaluating sports teams, fans tend to be motivated to see qualities in their favored team 
and faults in the opposition.  This is known as directional motivation.  However, this 
drive may be offset by a competing motivation to reach an accurate evaluation—
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particularly if there is something at stake.  For instance, if an individual is evaluating 
sports teams in order to decide on which team to place a wager, the motivation to see 
one’s favored team in a positive light would almost certainly be tempered by the 
incentive to win the wager. 
 While material incentives such as this provide a clear example of when accuracy 
motivation is likely to exert influence, research has also shown that accuracy motivation 
can be triggered when people expect to have to justify their beliefs to their peers.  Studies 
show that, given the expectation that they will be held accountable for the positions they 
take, individuals engage in more thorough processing (Tetlock and Kim 1987) and 
prevent their biases from having much influence (Kunda 1990).  Such results indicate that 
there is value in the appearance of pragmatism.  Individuals need to prove to themselves 
and their audience that their positions are well reasoned.  “Failure to behave in ways for 
which one can construct acceptable accounts leads to varying degrees of censure—
depending, of course, on the gravity of the offense” (Tetlock et al. 1989).  Therefore, just 
as material incentives may increase accuracy motivation, the incentive to conform to 
societal norms of pragmatism may increase accuracy motivation as well.   
Mutz (1998) expands on this accountability effect by suggesting that individuals 
engage in “internalized conversations with perceptions of collective opinion” (p. 23).  In 
an era of twenty-four hour news and constant public opinion polling, social pressures can 
be felt even without interpersonal communication.   
When they [citizens] learn that a particular candidate or issue is popular or 
unpopular, their implicit interaction with these generalized others prompt them to 
alter or refine their own political views (p. 23).   
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In short, individuals may feel social pressure to conform to norms of pragmatism even if 
they do not anticipate having to directly discuss their opinions with their peers.   
However, experimental research also shows that, once individuals commit to a 
position on a political issue, they will devote the bulk of their mental effort to justifying 
that position rather than reexamining it (Tetlock et al. 1989).  People are motivated to 
defend their positions because they “do not want to appear to lack the courage of their 
convictions” (p. 633).  In other words, once an individual commits to a particular 
position, directional motivation seems to take hold and individuals dedicate cognitive 
resources to justifying their original position rather than reconsidering it.  This strategy 
allows individuals to appear pragmatic and justified in their position without “flip-
flopping.”   
One might expect this directional motivation to be particularly potent in the realm 
of politics because, not only do individuals have an incentive to appear consistent, but 
much of the debate is enmeshed in partisan competition.  Therefore, changing one’s 
position, and certainly changing one’s party identity, constitutes an act of disloyalty in 
the mind of the devout partisan.  Recent work in neuroscience supports the idea that 
directional motivation influences the way people process political information.  When 
individuals encounter information threatening to their favored candidate, brain regions 
associated with emotion and motivation become activated, while regions associated with 
“cold” reasoning and emotion regulation are not (Westen et al. 2006).   
Similarly, social psychologists have found that directional motivation biases the 
cognitive processes involved in judgment formation.  For example, when led to believe 
that a particular self-concept (introversion or extroversion) was related to academic 
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success, subjects in a series of experiments came to see themselves as possessing the 
desired trait (Kunda and Sanitioso 1989).  Analysis of memory-listing and response time 
data showed that these self-assessments resulted from biased memory search (Sanitioso et 
al. 1990).  The same process may be at work when it comes to stereotyping.  After having 
their self-images threatened by negative performance feedback, individuals become more 
likely to derogate a stereotyped outgroup in order to facilitate a favorable social 
comparison.  Derogation of this stereotyped group raises self-esteem back up to the 
baseline level (Fein and Spencer 1997).   
In short, research shows that the need to see one’s self in a favorable light leads 
individuals to unconsciously access memories and stereotypes that support the desired 
conclusion.  These directional biases should be most evident when accuracy motivation is 
low.  However, directional motivation can exert an influence even when accuracy 
motivation is high as long as it can be justified.  “When one wants to draw a particular 
conclusion, one feels obligated to construct a justification for that conclusion that would 
be plausible to a dispassionate observer” (Kunda 1990).  In other words, the influence of 
directional motivation is capable of exerting a powerful influence on reasoning, but this 
influence is contingent on one’s capacity to justify or rationalize that judgment.   
 
Competing Motivations Underlying Party Identification 
By applying motivated reasoning theory to the literature on party identification, it 
is easy to see how a dual motivations theory of party identification may help us to 
understand the conditions under which party identification changes or remains stable.  In 
The American Voter (1960), party identification is portrayed as a source of directional 
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motivation.  Party identification is thought to provide symbolic and expressive rewards.  
A victory for the group is felt as a victory for the self as well (Greene 2004).  Given the 
present context, I will refer to this specific type of directional motivation as partisan 
motivation. 
In contrast to the classic model of party identification, revisionist models assume 
that party identification is driven largely by accuracy motivation—or the desire to hold an 
identity that accurately reflects one’s positions relative to those of the respective parties.  
Identification with the “correct” party is considered to be instrumental to the 
maximization of policy benefits, and therefore desirable.  Under such models, individuals 
identify with the party that offers the most favorable policy proposals and vote for that 
party in order to increase the likelihood that those policies will be implemented.  In some 
formulations of the model, partisan bias is explicitly assumed to play no role at all 
(Gerber and Green 1998; Achen 1992, 2002).  While there is significant variation in the 
scholarship generally considered under the umbrella of “revisionist work,” scholars of the 
revisionist camp share the view that partisans are responsive to their information 
environment.  I will therefore, refer to the drive for accuracy in party identification as 
responsiveness motivation.   
Again, it is worth calling attention to the contrasting portraits of the American 
voter drawn by the classic and revisionist models of party identification.  On one hand, 
we have the partisan citizen who appears hopelessly blinded by his own biases, while on 
the other hand we have the responsive citizen, whose party identity is merely a reflection 
of her ongoing political evaluations—the ideal democratic citizen.   
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Both images seem caricatured.  The dual motivations theory of party 
identification attempts to meld insights from the two approaches.  In this model, partisans 
have both responsiveness motivation and partisan motivation.  The probability of 
changing one’s party identity to reflect a given evaluation is modeled as a function of 
one’s responsiveness motivation relative to her partisan motivation. 
 
A Dual Motivations Model  
   While it is important to maintain the conceptual distinction between identities 
and attitudes (Green et al. 2002; Groenendyk 2008a, 2008b; Rosema 2006), individuals 
may nonetheless feel psychological pressure to maintain consistency between their 
attitudes and identities when discrepancies between them become salient (Campbell et al. 
1960; Groenendyk 2008a).  In its simplest form, party identification at a given time (t) 
can be modeled as a function of past party identification ( 1−tP ) and attitudes or 
evaluations ( tE ) based on party performance and issue positions.   
tttt uPBEBBP +++= −1210  
  It is important to note that the central question is not whether political attitudes 
cause changes in party identification, but whether inconsistencies between evaluations 
and party identification weaken party identification.  This is an important distinction 
because it is not disputed that agreement with one’s party may strengthen party 
identification.  The crux of the debate pertains to whether party identification acts as a 
“filter” for disagreeable information or whether disagreement with one’s party weakens 
party identification (Campbell et al. 1960).  Even in a perfectly biased world where 
partisans filter out all information that conflicts with their party identity, individuals may 
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nonetheless update their identities to reflect their attitudes when they agree with their 
party.  This fits the known pattern whereby party identification becomes stronger with 
age and experience (Converse 1969, 1976; Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Sears and Levy 
2003; Brader and Tucker 2001).  In short, to demonstrate that party identification changes 
with attitudes is not necessarily evidence against partisan filtering.  In fact, given that the 
standard scale runs from strong Republican to strong Democrat, shifts in party 
identification may result from weakening identification with one party, strengthening of 
identification with the other, or both.  Therefore, the key question is not just whether 
party identification changes with attitudes, but when individuals become aware of 
inconsistencies between their attitudes and identities, do they report weaker identities?  
To this end, party identification (P) is replaced with strength of party identification (S) in 
the model, and partisans who crossover from one party to the other are coded as having 
zero strength.
2
  Evaluation ( tE ) is replaced with agreement ( tA ) and disagreement ( tD ) 
with one’s party. 
ttttt uSBDBABBS ++++= −13210  
Turning to the motivational element of the model, individuals have both 
responsiveness motivation (R) and partisan motivation (M).  When a partisan agrees (A) 
with her party, partisan motivation (M) only serves to reinforce responsiveness 
motivation (R).  However, when disagreements arise, partisan and responsiveness 
motives come into conflict.  The amount of influence exerted by partisan motivation is 
subject to one’s ability to justify (J) her party identity.  In other words, individuals must 
                                               
2 By crossing over from one party to the other, I mean those partisans who report identifying with or 
leaning toward one party at time t-1 and then report identifying with or leaning toward the other party at 
time t. 
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be able to rationalize their biases.  While the M-term accounts for an individual’s 
motivation to maintain her party identity, the J-term accounts for her ability to justify 
acting on that motivation.
3
  While partisan motivation may be a powerful thing, 
individuals must be able to maintain their sense of pragmatism (Campbell et al. 1960; 
Kunda 1990).  Adding in the motivational components, party identification strength ( tS ) 
can be modeled as follows: 
ttttt uSBMJRDBMJRABBS ++−+++= −13210 )()(  
Since motivations cannot be measured directly, there are no coefficients 
associated with these terms in the model.  They only serve to inflate or deflate the effects 
of agreement and disagreement on party identification strength.  However, reasonable 
proxies for the J-term (one’s ability to justify her partisanship) do exist, such as 
experience with politics, political sophistication, and other indicators of cognitive 
resources.  Since the influence of partisan motivation (M) is contingent on the ability to 
justify partisan outcomes (J), explicit inclusion of J in the model makes it possible to 
estimate the effects of agreement (A) and disagreement (D) when J, and therefore M, are 
equal to zero.   
tttttttt uJSBSBMRJDBMRJABRDBRABJBBS +++−++++++= −− 1716543210 )()()()(
 
If partisan stability turns out to be contingent on one’s ability to justify 
maintaining his or her identity, we will know that partisan motivation has an important 
role to play in stabilizing party identification.  Evidence of identity defense suggests a 
                                               
3 The author remains agnostic with regard to whether or not such processes must be conscious.  
Presumably, with rehearsal, justifications become automatic and occur outside of consciousness (Bargh and 
Chartrand 1999).  This may help to explain why we observe increased partisan stability and partisan 
strength with age.  Still, this issue remains outside the scope of the current paper. 
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motivation to defend.  Another way to think about this is that such a result would indicate 
a cost to partisan updating, specifically, the cost of forgoing benefits flowing from loyal 
partisanship.
4
  Interestingly, this frame suggests a familiar concern for those acquainted 
with the “paradox of voting.”  If there is a cost to updating one’s party identity, are the 
benefits of updating sufficient to outweigh this cost?   
To answer this question, we must consider what the possible benefits of partisan 
updating may be.  In other words, what incentives underlie responsiveness motivation?  
While partisan motivation clearly stems from the value of expressing partisan loyalty, 
responsiveness motivation is potentially rooted in both instrumental incentives and 
expressive incentives.  Shively (1979) theorizes that party identification is instrumental to 
attaining policy benefits, and this assumption seems to underlie much of the revisionist 
scholarship on party identification.  As long as citizens are willing to update party 
identities when they receive credible information, party identification may serve as an 
efficient heuristic—aiding individuals who posses incomplete information to vote 
approximately as if there were well informed about the candidates’ positions (Huckfeldt 
et al. 1999; Popkin 1991; Shively 1979; Schaffner and Streb 2002; Tomz and Sniderman 
2005; Brady and Sniderman 1985).   
In considering the degree to which responsiveness motivation stems from such 
instrumental concerns, it is essential to consider the expected benefit of one’s actions 
relative to their costs.  Anthony Downs (1957) famously points out that the probability of 
a given individual casting the decisive vote in any major election is approximately zero.  
                                               
4 These costs are not necessarily constant across changes in party identification.  To shift from a weak 
identifier to an Independent leaner may be more costly than shifting from a strong partisan to a weak 
partisan or a partisan leaner to a pure independent.  This amounts to different sized intervals between levels 
of party identification and is accounted for in the analyses that follow by using ordered probit regression.        
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Therefore, the policy benefits to be gained from voting “correctly” approach zero.  It also 
follows that, if the expected policy benefits of “correct” voting approach zero, the 
expected policy benefits to be gained from responsive partisanship are also vanishingly 
small.  If there are costs associated with partisan disloyalty, it stands to reason that 
partisan responsiveness is not driven by the quest for policy benefits.  This raises the 
question of whether responsiveness motivation should lead to any amount of party 
identification change.  Yet, even the most ardent proponents of stable party identification 
acknowledge that it would be folly to argue that party identification never changes 
(Campbell et al. 1960; Green et al. 2002).  What then might explain these instances of 
party identification change?  
I hypothesize that responsiveness motivation is driven by the need to express 
one’s pragmatism and lack of bias, thereby conforming to norms of civic duty.  In other 
words, partisan responsiveness may offer expressive rewards.
5
  Individuals have an 
incentive to see themselves as good citizens whose party allegiances are grounded in the 
issues (Campbell et al. 1960; Kunda 1990).  There is some evidence consistent with this 
idea.  Kam (2007) finds that when citizens are provided subtle reminders of civic duty, 
they are more likely to learn where candidates stand on issues and search for information 
in an open-minded way.  Schudson (1998) traces this norm back to the nation’s founding, 
but argues that its importance was renewed during the Progressive Era.  He explains that, 
in the backlash against the party machines of the early 19
th
 Century, “the new model of 
citizenship called for a voter more intelligent than loyal” (p. 182).  In short, there is 
reason to believe that partisans may update their identities to demonstrate their 
                                               
5 See Fiorina (1976) and Schuessler (2000) for extensive discussions of instrumental versus expressive 
utility.   
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pragmatism and lack of bias even if the expected policy benefits of partisan updating are 
very small.  They do this because “good citizens” consider the issues and not just the 
party.   
Readers familiar with the “paradox of voting” literature will recognize that this 
reformulation of responsiveness motivation builds directly on the Riker and Ordeshook 
(1968) voter calculus model in which the expressive value of affirming one’s civic duty is 
captured by the (in)famous “D-term.”  According to Riker and Ordeshook, if these 
expressive benefits are high enough to offset the cost of voting, then voters will turnout 
on Election Day.
6
  Riker and Ordeshook model the rewards to be derived from voting as 
a function of the probability of casting the decisive vote (p), the policy benefits to be 
gained by the preferred party winning (B), the cost of turning out to vote (C), and the 
expressive benefits of voting (D): 
Rewards DCpB +−=  
To apply this logic to party identification, responsiveness motivation can simply 
be substituted for rewards in the Riker and Ordeshook model.  But, in this case, the D-
term is meant to capture a somewhat broader concept of civic duty—not just the value of 
turning out to vote, but the importance of considering the issues in an unbiased and 
pragmatic manner.  Dalton (2008) refers to this aspect of citizenship as autonomy.
7
  In 
my model, responsiveness motivation (R) is derived from the probability of one’s vote 
determining the outcome of the election (p), the policy benefits associated with the 
                                               
6 While individuals’ misperceptions of their potential for influence (p) may increase the influence of B, 
empirical investigations suggests that one’s sense of civic duty is the dominant driver of turnout in this 
model (Barry 1970; Riker and Ordeshook 1968).   
7 In his analysis of data from the 2004 General Social Survey (GSS) and the 2005 Citizens, Involvement, 
and Democracy Survey (CDACS), he finds that Americans’ ideas about what it means to be a good citizen 
load onto two distinct dimensions—one that picks up norms of participation and deference to the law, and 
another which captures several constructs including autonomy.   
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preferred election outcome (B), and the expressive benefits that come from seeing one’s 
self as a unbiased and pragmatic citizen—an aspect of civic duty (D).  
As noted above, the cost of partisan updating flows from partisan motivation (M).  
To act on responsiveness motivation (R) and update one’s party identity to reflect 
disagreement (D) entails incurring the costs of disloyal partisanship (or foregoing the 
benefits of acting on one’s partisan motivation).  Therefore, C is replaced with M in the 
party identification model.  In the case of agreement (A) with one’s party, to act on one’s 
responsiveness motivation (R) also means acting on one’s partisan motivation (M), so M 
is added (as a benefit) rather than being subtracted (as a cost).  Substituting for R in the 
full model yields: 
ttttt uSBMJDpBDBMJDpBABBS ++−+++++= −13210 )()(   
 
In summary, both responsiveness motivation (R) and partisan motivation (M) 
have the potential to influence party identification ( tS ).  To the degree that 
responsiveness motivation has an influence, agreement (A) and disagreement (D) will 
both affect party identification.  And to the degree that partisan motivation has an 
influence, disagreement will affect party identification less.  Since the probability of 
influencing policy (p) is expected to be low, responsiveness motivation is expected to 
primarily be a function of one’s desire to appear as a good pragmatic citizen (D).  
However, if an individual can convince herself, through rationalization and justification 
(J), that her partisan motives (M) are rooted in pragmatism, then disagreement will not 
undermine party identification.  Next I outline specific hypotheses derived from the 
theory.   
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Hypotheses 
The classic model of party identification suggests that partisan stability stems 
from motivated psychological processing—the famous “perceptual screen” (Campbell et 
al. 1960).  More recently, however, revisionist scholars have demonstrated that partisan 
stability can be theoretically accounted for through a simple Bayesian learning model—
without partisan motivation playing a role (Achen 1992, 2002).  As outlined earlier, to 
accept this account of partisan stability is not merely a move toward parsimony, but a 
significant theoretical departure from the classic model with enormous normative 
implications.  Under this model, party identification functions as a perfectly efficient 
heuristic, and the powerful influence of partisanship on virtually all aspects of political 
life is of no concern.  This places the onus on proponents of the classic model to 
demonstrate the existence and impact of partisan motivation.  To demonstrate the 
stability of party identification is not enough to prove the existence partisan motivation, 
because such findings can be explained through Bayesian learning.  If partisan motivation 
has an influence, we should see evidence of this motivation.  With this in mind, I will 
look for examples of party identity justification in instances when individuals disagree 
with or negatively evaluate their party.  If partisan motivation does not play a role in 
stabilizing party identification, no evidence of identity justification should be found.  
Partisans should simply update their identities to reflect their disagreement. 
  
H1:  Justification Hypothesis:  When partisans disagree with their party, they will attempt 
to justify their existing party identity. 
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 If evidence of party identity justification emerges, this will provide us with 
evidence that partisan motivation exists.  However, the theory not only suggests that 
partisan motivation exists, but that identity stability is contingent on one’s motivation and 
ability to justify her identity.  When partisans disagree with their party, they devote their 
cognitive resources to justifying their existing party identities rather than updating their 
identities to reflect their disagreement.  However, since some citizens are better equipped 
than others to perform these sorts of justifications, the probability of party identity change 
should be greater among those who have the fewest cognitive resources available to 
them.  Political sophistication and experience serve as cognitive resources that make 
some individuals inherently better at justifying their identities, but variable factors such 
as political context and working memory availability are likely to matter as well. 
 
H2:  Cognitive Resources Hypothesis:  When cognitive resources are limited, partisans 
will be more likely to bring their identities into alignment with their attitudes. 
 
 The above hypotheses pertain to partisan motivation, suggesting that party 
identity change occurs when individuals are unable to justify maintaining their identities.  
But what factors might increase responsiveness motivation such that individuals will 
update their party identities to reflect their evaluations?  I hypothesize that responsiveness 
motivation should exert its most powerful influence on party identification when 
individuals’ evaluations of parties are made salient to them prior to considering their 
party identification—as is often the case in public opinion surveys.  Under such 
circumstances, individuals may find it difficult to maintain stable party identities, at least 
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momentarily, as a result of their need for cognitive consistency.  However, any changes 
in party identification should quickly dissipate as individuals seek to justify returning to 
their original identity.  In a survey context, evidence of justification should be evident in 
subsequent responses.     
 While the existing literature on party identification is filled with conflicting 
findings, the dual motivation theory may also help to illuminate the underlying source of 
this conflict.  One important debate is between those who believe that partisans update 
their identities (Highton and Kam 2008; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Jackson 1975; 
Franklin 1992; Carsey and Layman 2006; Fiorina 1981; Page and Jones 1979; Markus 
and Converse 1979) and those who believe that most over time variation in party 
identification is merely attributable to measurement error (Green and Palmquist 1994, 
1990; Green et al. 2002; Green and Schickler 1993). While these findings seem to be 
totally at odds with one another, there may be a good deal of truth to both.   
If individuals adjust their party identities in the short-term to reflect evaluations 
made salient to them in surveys, this constitutes important evidence of responsiveness 
motivation.  Even if such effects are short-lived, such results suggest that partisans have a 
desire to appear pragmatic and a willingness to act on this desire.  Yet, these individuals 
should also be motivated to maintain their party identities, so in the context of a survey, 
their efforts to return to their party identity should also be evident.  While responses 
provided prior to party identification measures are likely to drive partisan updating, 
responses provided after party identification should show evidence of identity 
justification and lead to subsequent identity reversion.   
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If party identification fluctuates within the context of a single survey, such 
variation may reasonably be characterized as measurement error.  But, to do so neglects 
the significance of this variation for understanding the nature of party identification.  
Examinations of partisans’ survey behavior may provide us with a window into the 
partisan mind and the process underlying party identification.  If individuals are 
motivated to maintain consistency between their attitudes and identities in the context of 
a survey, there is no reason why such motivations should not exert themselves in other 
situations as well.  Of course, if identity justification allows individuals to return to their 
prior party identification, this is also likely to occur outside of the survey context. 
 
H3:  Saliency Hypothesis:  Individuals will update their identities to reflect their attitudes 
when these attitudes are made salient prior to reporting their party identity.  However, 
subsequent identity justification—observable in subjects’ responses—will undo these 
changes in party identification. 
 
If partisans feel pressure to update their identities when they are made conscious 
of their discrepant evaluations, the question remains whether this motivation is rooted in 
the incentive to identify with the party that offers the most favorable policies or the need 
to appear pragmatic and unbiased by partisanship.  The dual motivations theory of party 
identification suggests that responsiveness motivation should be rooted much more in the 
latter than in the former.  If there are psychological costs to updating one’s party identity 
and the expected policy payoff of partisan updating approaches zero, consideration of 
policy stakes should have little impact on party identification.  In other words, contrary to 
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conventional wisdom, party identification should not be affected by consideration of the 
policies parties propose to enact upon taking power.  Instead, partisan responsiveness is 
hypothesized to be a social norm associated with civic duty.  Therefore, to act 
responsively and update one’s party identity to reflect evaluations is likely to provide 
expressive rewards in and of itself—independent of any effect partisan updating may 
have on policy benefits. 
 
H4:  Duty Hypothesis:  Responsiveness motivation, and therefore partisan change, will be 
driven by the desire to appear unbiased and pragmatic, thereby conforming to norms of 
civic duty.  Consequently, partisan identity updating will increase when norms of civic 
duty are made salient. 
 
H5: Stakes Hypothesis:  Party identification will not be affected by consideration of the 
policies the parties will attempt to enact upon taking power.  Therefore, partisan identity 
updating will not increase when the policies at stake in an election are made salient. 
 
The hypotheses laid out above will be tested in the chapters that follow.  While 
alternative theories may explain the results of any one of these tests individually, each 
test is designed to build on the last so that, as the dissertation progresses, alternative 
explanations may be ruled out until only the dual motivations theory remains plausible.  
Chapter 2 examines the justification hypothesis through a laboratory experiment and 
analysis of data from the American National Election Studies (ANES).  Chapter 3 tests 
the cognitive resources hypothesis through a national experiment in which disagreement 
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with one’s party and cognitive resources are each manipulated.  In chapter 4 the saliency 
hypothesis is tested in another national experiment—this time focusing on Republican 
identifiers at a time when their attitudes and party identities were particularly likely to 
conflict with one another.  Chapter 5 tests the duty hypothesis and stakes hypothesis in a 
third national experiment in which subjects are either primed to consider what it means to 
be a good citizen, the policies implications at stake in an upcoming election, or nothing at 
all.  The conclusion summarizes these results and considers both normative and empirical 






Justifying Party Identification 
 
 
Are partisans motivated to maintain stable party identities even when their party 
does something they disagree with?  If so, how would we know?  Proponents of the 
classic model of party identification point to the stability of party identification over time 
(Miller and Shanks 1996; Campbell et al. 1960), but revisionist scholars have shown that 
this stability can be accounted for without such motivation (Achen 1992, 2002; Gerber 
and Green 1999; Gerber and Green 1998; Green et al. 2002; Franklin 1984).  Bayesian 
learning models suggest that party identification should stabilize as individuals 
accumulate information about what the parties stand for.  Nonetheless, these models 
assume a willingness to change one’s party identity, given sufficient cause.  They suggest 
that party identity adjustment should be observable, particularly among younger citizens 
who have had less time to accumulate information about the parties.    
Cowden & McDermott (2000) attempt to produce party identification change—
taking the novel approach of directly testing the classic and revisionist models against 
one another in a series of experiments.  In one experiment, the authors test Markus and 
Converse’s (1979) claim that partisans update their identities to reflect their vote choice.  
In another experiment, they test Page and Jones’ (1979) assertion that partisans update 
their identities in light of their candidate evaluations.  Both experiments yield null results, 
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supporting the classic model.  However, as the authors acknowledge, null results do not 
provide conclusive evidence of null effects.  In other words, their experimental stimuli 
may simply have lacked sufficient “punch” to produce a change in party identification.   
I build on this literature by reframing the question.  In order to separate the classic 
model from the null hypothesis, I ask, what mechanism produces stable party 
identification?  If partisan stability results from the motivation to avoid changing one’s 
identity (Campbell et al. 1960), we should see evidence of this in the form of identity 
justification.  On the other hand, if individuals are driven solely to identify with the party 
that best represents their interests, they would have no reason to develop such 
justifications.                 
As outlined in Chapter 1 the notion of partisan justification is rooted in literature 
on motivated reasoning and memory search (see Kunda 1990; Lodge and Taber 2000).  
These works demonstrate that individuals who are predisposed to favor a particular 
conclusion tend to rely on positive test strategies.  In other words, they search their 
memories for confirmatory evidence and then stop once they find it.  Likewise, the dual 
motivations theory of party identification suggests that when one’s party identity is 
challenged, an individual will search for attitudes to justify continued identification with 
her party.   
To understand how partisans use their attitudes to justify their party identities, it is 
helpful to imagine the process in two-dimensional attitude space.  In Figure 2.1, the x-
axis represents attitudes toward one’s own party, and the y-axis represents attitudes 
toward the other party.  Conventional wisdom suggests that a strong negative relationship 
should exist between attitudes toward the two parties.  The more a person likes one party, 
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the less that person should like the other party.  I hypothesize, however, that this pattern 
may be altered as individuals attempt to justify continued identification with their party.  
[Insert Figure 2.1] 
 The 45-degree line running from the bottom left to the top right represents 
indifference between the two parties.  After one’s attitudes cross over this indifference 
threshold, continued party identification is difficult to justify, because the opposition 
party is favored.  Therefore, I hypothesize that partisans will attempt to maintain attitudes 
to the right of this threshold.  However, some individuals will be unable to avoid being 
pushed toward the indifference threshold.  As individuals’ approach indifference, they are 
expected to employ a specific method of identity justification, which I refer to as 
identifying with the lesser of two evils.   
Lesser of two evils identity justification will be the primary focus of this chapter 
because it serves as a concrete and observable example of an identity justification.  This 
justification method is likely familiar to the reader as it is often notable even in casual 
observations of politics.  For example, at a given moment in time, a Democrat may hold 
lukewarm attitudes toward her party.  Yet, she may be able to justify identifying with the 
Democratic Party on the basis of her highly negative attitudes toward the Republican 
Party by reasoning, “It’s not that I particularly like the Democratic Party; I simply detest 
the Republican Party.”  Since the Democratic Party is the lesser of two evils, 
identification with Democrats is justifiable.  This strategy enables partisans to follow 
their partisan motivation, thereby maintaining their party loyalty without demonstrating 
overt biases and thus acting against their motivation to appear responsive.
8
         
                                               
8 While the focus of this chapter will be on lesser of two evils justification, the theory also allows for 
greater of two goods justification.  In other words, partisans may feel pressure to change their identities 
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In a pair of experiments, conducted by Pool, Wood, and Leck (1998) subjects 
experienced lower self-esteem after discovering that their attitudes differed from those of 
a self-relevant valued majority group.  They also experienced lower self-esteem after 
discovering that they agreed with a self-relevant disliked minority group.  This effect 
emerged regardless of whether individuals expressed their attitudes in public or in 
private, suggesting that the observed decrease in self-esteem resulted from individuals’ 
personal desires and not from concerns about social perceptions.  Perhaps most important 
in the current context is the fact that, when given the opportunity to re-interpret the 
groups’ positions prior to reporting their self-esteem, subjects shifted their interpretations 
of those positions.  In the favored majority condition they shifted their interpretation so 
that the group’s position matched their own, and in the derogated minority condition they 
shifted their interpretation so that the group’s position conflicted with their own.  These 
reinterpretations helped subjects to maintain positive self-esteem.   
Interestingly, studies have also shown that stereotyping and outgroup derogation 
can help to protect self-esteem.  In a series of experiments, Fein and Spencer (1997) 
manipulated performance feedback on an intelligence test, thereby threatening subjects’ 
self-images.  As a result of this threat to self-image, subjects’ propensity to employ 
negative stereotypes against outgroups increased.  Moreover, the act of stereotyping 
subsequently brought subjects’ self-esteem back up to baseline by allowing them to 
                                                                                                                                            
when they find themselves liking the opposition party.  However, by rehearsing positive thoughts about 
their own party, individuals can ensure that their attitudes toward their own party remain more positive than 
their attitudes toward the opposition party—thereby avoiding the indifference threshold.  From an empirical 
standpoint, these individuals would appear in the upper right hand quadrant of Figure 1, lining up on the 
same orthogonal dimension as lesser of two evils identifiers.  However, the data, as well as casual 
observation, suggest that greater of two goods justification is uncommon—perhaps not surprising given the 
adversarial nature of media coverage and the tendency for negative information to be weighted more 
heavily (Lau 1985; Kernell 1977; Lau 1982).  Therefore, attention is focused instead on lesser of two evils 
justification. 
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reaffirm their positive self-image relative to the outgroup.  This suggests that if 
partisanship is indeed an aspect of one’s self-image, as many contend (Campbell et al. 
1960; Campbell et al. 1954; Green et al. 2002; Greene 2004), then individuals should 
react to threats to their party identity in a similar manner. 
For instance, an individual who feels that her party has taken the wrong stance on 
a particular issue may call to mind negative stereotypes of the opposition party in order to 
justify continued identification with her own party.  As long as her party remains the 
lesser of two evils, continued identification is justifiable.  Empirically speaking, this 
means that as attitudes approach the indifference threshold, a second attitude dimension 
should emerge.  On this dimension, liking one party less is associated with liking the 
other party less as well—a positive relationship.  Partisan change should be most likely to 
occur when individuals fail to engage in this type of defensive process.   
 
Multidimensional Identity, Measurement Error, or Justification 
 
Various works argue that party identification cannot be adequately measured on a 
single dimension (Alvarez 1990; Weisberg 1980; Valentine and Van Wingen 1980; 
Greene 2005; Kamieniecki 1988).  Proponents of such models often cite the small 
negative and sometimes positive correlations between attitudes toward the Republican 
and Democratic Parties (Alvarez 1990; Weisberg 1980).  However, I argue that what 
appears to some as evidence of multidimensional party identification may actually 
constitute evidence of party identity justification.   
First, attitudes are conceptually distinct from identities (Groenendyk 2008b, 
2008a; Green et al. 2002; Rosema 2006).  While attitudes are evaluative in nature (Eagly 
and Chaiken 1993), identities are rooted in self-conceptualization (Monroe et al. 2000).  
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Therefore, departure from the assumed unidimensional negative relationship between 
attitudes toward the two parties does not necessarily constitute evidence of 
multidimensional party identification.  Instead, it may result from party identity defense.  
As attitudes approach the indifference threshold, a second attitude dimension should 
emerge as a result of individuals’ attempts to justify continued identification with their 
party.  Lesser of two evils identity justification entails a positive relationship between 
attitudes toward the two parties.  Individuals who like their own party less will come to 
like the opposition party less as well.   
In arguing against the claim that party identification is multidimensional, Green 
(1988) points out that deviation from the expected strong negative correlation between 
party feeling thermometers may simply result from measurement error.  Random 
measurement error drives correlation coefficients toward zero, while systematic error or 
“charitability bias” might actually lead to a positive correlation (Green and Citrin 1994; 
Green 1988).  In other words, some individuals are likely to have a more charitable 
nature and therefore rate both parties higher than average, while less charitable 
individuals will rate both parties lower than average.  Since this charitability trait 
dimension is an omitted variable, it may bias correlation coefficients between party 
feeling thermometers in a positive direction.  After accounting for measurement error, 
Green shows that Republican and Democratic Party feeling thermometers are more 
negatively correlated.  However, in a survey context, the type of correlational dynamism 
hypothesized above is indistinguishable from measurement error.  Just as variation in 
respondent charitability may drive the correlation between party feeling thermometers in 
a more positive direction, so might the motivation to justify one’s party identity.     
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I take a multi-method approach to understand whether the relationship (or lack 
thereof) between party feeling thermometers is best explained by a multidimensional 
model of party identification, measurement error, or identity justification.  Experiments 
provide researchers with leverage over both random and systematic error through random 
assignment, ensuring that differences between groups can only be attributed to the 
treatment and not measurement error.  By pairing these tests with aggregate level 
analyses, it is possible to assess how these micro-level processes manifest themselves at 
the macro-level.  When making aggregate level comparisons within a single population 
over time, the effects of measurement error should be greatly reduced.  In large N 
samples, random errors should cancel out.  Moreover, if each cross-section is truly 
representative of the population of interest, then aggregate charitability biases cannot 
explain differences between samples.    
      
Justification Hypothesis:  When partisans disagree with their party, they will attempt to 
justify their existing party identity. 
 
Experiment 
We know from previous experiments that party identification influences political 
attitudes (Cohen 2003; Rahn 1993), but experimenters have not been able to show that 
attitudes shape party identification (Cowden and McDermott 2000).  The following 
experiment builds on knowledge gained from these previous works.  Rather than focusing 
on whether or not subjects’ party identities can be changed, I first concentrate on how 
partisans go about defending their identities when they are threatened—the implication 
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being that partisan change occurs when defenses break down.  More specifically, this 
experiment induces conflict between individuals’ party identities and the issue positions 
they espouse in order to understand how partisans go about reconciling this psychological 
inconsistency.  The design is laid out in Table 2.1.   
In order to induce this conflict, all subjects viewed an issue advocacy 
advertisement endorsing a fictitious bill.  In one condition, subjects were provided with 
partisan cues telling them which party supported (or opposed) the bill.  In another 
condition, subjects were not provided with party cues until after they had taken a position 
on the bill.  If they took the position advocated in the appeal, they discovered that this 
position conflicted with their party identity.  In a control condition, subjects viewed no ad 
at all.  Again, the idea here was to create pressure for partisan change in order to 
determine how subjects react to such pressure.   
 [Insert Table 2.1] 
Method 
 
 Participants.  Two hundred and fifty-four student participants were recruited 
during the fall of 2005 from the campus of a Midwestern college town.  Participants were 
offered five dollars to participate in a thirty minute public opinion study.  No more than 
twelve subjects were allowed to participate at any one time, and there were usually only 
one to four in the lab at a time.  Seven cases were excluded from analysis after reporting 
that they were not citizens of the United States.  Given population demographics and 
logistical considerations, the study was designed for Democratic identifiers.  Therefore, if 
party identification is not found to vary between conditions, Republicans will be 
excluded from further analysis.   
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Materials.  The treatment was administered via a political advertisement created 
by the researcher.  In an informal test, viewers were unable to distinguish the 
advertisement from an authentic political appeal.  The ad appeared to be sponsored by the 
AFL-CIO and focused on a fictitious “Bankruptcy Abuse Bill.”  The Enron, Global 
Crossing, and WorldCom scandals had recently received considerable media attention, 
while legislation related to the issue had received much less attention.  The appeal 
advocated passage of the “Bankruptcy Abuse Bill” and paired Enron, Global Crossing, 
and WorldCom job loss statistics with dramatic audio and visual effects to rouse the 
viewer.  Clips borrowed from actual political ads showed an apparent corporate executive 
pleading his Fifth Amendment rights in front of the U.S. Senate.  Another clip showed an 
apparent middle class man rubbing his forehead as he looked over his bills at the kitchen 
table.  A transcript of the advertisement with screen shots is included in the appendix. 
Information about the parties’ positions came in the form of three fictitious 
newspaper quotations seen below.  These newspaper articles either commented on 
Democratic opposition to the bill or Republican support for the bill.  Within each of the 
three experimental conditions, Democratic opposition and Republican support were 
randomized to insure that any effects would be attributable to inconsistency between 
issue attitudes and party identification and not support versus opposition framing.   
By opposing the bankruptcy abuse bill . . .    
“Democrats let corporate crooks off the hook”—The Washington Post 
“Democrats are simply wrong on bankruptcy abuse”—The Boston Globe 
“Democrats are playing politics with people’s lives”—The New York Times 
or 
 By supporting the bankruptcy abuse bill . . .  
“Republicans are keeping the heat on corporate crooks”—The Washington Post 
“Republicans are right on bankruptcy abuse”—The Boston Globe 
“Republicans are putting people above politics”—The New York Times 
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 Procedure.  Subjects were randomly assigned to one of five groups as they 
entered the lab.  These groups are consolidated into three experimental conditions for 
analysis.
9
  One of these groups viewed a version of the ad (described above) that 
contained partisan cues.  Another group was exposed to a version of the same ad with the 
partisan cues removed.  Subjects in this condition received these cues after viewing the 
ad and reporting their support or opposition for the “Bankruptcy Abuse Bill.”  These cues 
were presented in onscreen text in exactly the same format and for the same amount of 
time as they were in the ads.  The third group viewed no ad at all and served as a control.   
The expectation is that those assigned to the disagreement condition (which 
received no party cues until after taking a position on the bill) will experience the most 
threat to their party identity.  I also expect that some of the people in the party cues 
condition (which received party cues during the ad) will experience partisan identity 
threat as well.  However, most are expected to follow the available party cues and avoid 
disagreement with their party, thereby avoiding identity threat as well.  The control group 
serves as a baseline against which the other groups will be compared.      
 Measures.  Opinions on the Bankruptcy Abuse Bill are assessed on a seven-point 
scale running from strongly oppose (-3) to strongly support (3) with a neutral point at 
zero.  Party identification is measured using the standard NES branching question 
yielding a 7-point scale ranging from (-3) strong Republican to (3) strong Democrat.  
Partisan feeling thermometers allow subjects to rate how warm or cold they feel toward 
                                               
9 As noted above, cues came in two forms—both of which conflicted with Democratic identity.  Either 
Democrats were said to oppose the bill or Republicans were said to support the bill.  Therefore, the 
Republicans support versus Democrats oppose factor will be collapsed to yield two treatment conditions—
one which received party cues prior to taking a position on the bill (party cues condition) and one which 
received party cues only after taking a position on the bill (disagreement condition).  Comparisons between 
the Republicans support and Democrats oppose groups show that effects of both stimuli run in the same 
direction, though Democrats oppose tends to produce larger effects, as one might expect. 
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the Republican Party and the Democratic Party.  Smaller values correspond to colder 
(more negative) feelings and larger values correspond to warmer (more positive) feelings.  
Feeling thermometers are rescaled to run from -50 to 50.  A measure of attitude 
indifference was also created by subtracting the Republican feeling thermometer from the 
Democratic feeling thermometer.  This yielded a single scale running from -100 to 100, 
on which larger values signify attitudes favoring the Democratic Party.  Four additional 
questions ask subjects, "Regardless of who you tend to vote for, how often do you find 
yourself supporting [opposing] what the Democratic [Republican] Party stands for?”  
Subjects are asked to place themselves on a 7-point scale that runs from “never” to 
“always.”  In contrast to the bipolarity of feeling thermometers, these questions allow 
subjects to express occasional support and occasional opposition for the same party. An 
open-ended question is administered toward the end of the study to allow subjects a 
chance to explain, in their own words, why they identify with a particular party.  This 
item reads, “You have already indicated that you usually think of yourself as a 
Republican, Democrat, Independent, or something else.  In a few sentences, please 
explain why you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or something 
else.  The study is nearly complete, so feel free to take your time.”  Responses to this 
item range from 1 to 327 words and were blind coded so that there would be no way to 
determine which subjects had been assigned to which conditions.  These codes are meant 
to capture lesser of two evils identity justification.  To do this, a very simple coding 
scheme was applied.  Subjects who flatly stated that they identified with the lesser of two 
evils or that their identity was primarily based on negative attitudes toward the opposition 
party were coded as lesser of two evils identifiers.  This group also includes subjects who 
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made less overt statements, yet explained their identities largely in terms of their negative 
attitudes toward the opposition as opposed to their positive attitudes toward their favored 
party.  All other subjects were coded as 0 to create a dummy variable for lesser of two 
evils identity justification.  Dummy variables called disagreement and party cues were 
created to correspond to treatment conditions.  Each of these variables is coded “1” for 
treatment and “0” for control condition.  At times, comparisons will also be made 
between treatment conditions, but this will be indicated in the text. 
Results 
 
 Using the standard 7-point measure of party identification, no partisan differences 
emerge between cells (F(4, 244) = .03).  Nor do any significant pairwise differences 
emerge.  Group means range from .75 to .88 on a scale that runs from -3 to 3.  As 
previously mentioned, this study is designed for Democrats.  Therefore, since party 
identification appears very stable across groups, Republicans can be excluded from 
further analyses without concern.  More specifically, I will restrict analyses to those who 
label themselves as a strong Democrat, weak Democrat, Independent leaning Democrat, 
or Independent not leaning toward either political party.
10
  This allows me to focus on 
those subjects for whom the treatment was likely to be threatening.   
                                               
10 Pure independents are included in the analysis in order to avoid losing data on any subjects who may 
have been leaning toward the Democratic Party prior to the treatment and shifted into the pure independent 
category as a result of the treatment.  While no differences in party identification emerge between cells, it is 
possible that changes may have occurred that are too small to detect statistically.  By including pure 
independents in the sample, I avoid improperly excluding these subjects.  In the chapters that follow, 
pretest measures of party identification are available.  Therefore, it will not be necessary to include pure 
independents in analyses conducted in those chapters.  It is also important to note that, in the sample used 
in this chapter, the pure independent category appears to include closet Democrats—as one might expect in 
a college student sample.  Looking at the characteristics of pure independents within this sample of college 
students shows that, on average, they look a great deal like Democrats.  On a feeling thermometer running 
from 50 to -50, pure independents gave the Republican Party an average rating of -11.11 while they give 
the Democratic Party an average rating of 2.04.  Chapters that follow will make use of national samples.   
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Examination of subjects’ opinions on bankruptcy abuse indicates that the 
manipulation worked largely as expected.  Of the 153 non-Republican subjects assigned 
to one of the two treatment conditions, 150 were able to correctly identify the bankruptcy 
abuse bill as the issue on which the ad focused.  Findings also indicate that subjects in the 
disagreement condition (M= 0.90, SD= 1.53) expressed an almost identical amount of 
support for the bill as those in the control group who viewed no ad at all (M= 0.89, SD= 
1.29).  This suggests that while, overall, subjects were supportive of the bill, the ad itself 
did not prove to be particularly persuasive.  However, since subjects tended to support the 
bill anyway, this is of little consequence for the manipulation.  Despite the weakness of 
the appeal, the vast majority of the subjects in the disagreement condition did express 
opinions inconsistent with those of their party.  Moreover, those in the partisan cues 
condition seem to have followed those cues and avoided disagreement with their party—
though they were apparently not able to avoid it completely since, on average, they still 
showed support for the bill.  This means that we should expect to see some degree of 
party identity justification in this group, though probably not as much as in the 
disagreement condition.  Finally, while those in the control group actually expressed 
support for the bill as well, they did not experience disagreement with their party since 
they were never provided with any partisan information (or other political information for 
that matter).  In other words, the experimental manipulation appears to have operated as it 
was designed.     
Given that disagreement was successfully evoked between subjects and the 
Democratic Party, yet no change in party identification appears to have occurred, 
attention can now be directed toward the original question of interest.  Is the observed 
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partisan stability a result of motivated identity justification or was the stimulus simply not 
powerful enough to produce party identification change?  To answer this question, I first 
examine responses obtained through an open-ended measure in which subjects were 
asked to explain why they identify with their party.  As expected, based on the length of 
their responses (number of words), those assigned to the disagreement condition (M= 
70.92, SD= 51.14) appear to have been more motivated to justify their identities than 
those assigned to either the party cues (M= 54.62, SD= 39.00, p< .05) or control 
condition (M= 62.53, SD= 35.61, p= .31).  Moreover, results in Table 2.2 show that those 
who wrote longer responses were able to maintain a significantly greater distance 
between their evaluations of the Republican and Democratic parties despite exposure to 
either treatment condition.  In other words, the more effort individuals put into justifying 
their identities, the farther away they were able to stay from the indifference threshold.  
However, once party identity justifications dropped below fifty words (approximately) 
both treatments appear to have been pushed subjects toward the indifference threshold.  
This effect is indicated by the negative coefficients associated with disagreement and 
party cues in Table 2.2, though these intercept shifts do not reach statistical significance.   
[Insert Table 2.2] 
In order to facilitate comparisons with earlier predictions made in two-
dimensional attitude space, Figure 2.2 accepts conventional wisdom and assumes for a 
moment that individuals’ attitudes toward the two parties negatively reinforce each other.  
The figure illustrates how longer responses (200 words compared to 0 words) help 
individuals in both treatment conditions to maintain a safe distance from the indifference 
threshold.  While those in the party cues condition appeared on average to have been less 
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motivated than those in the disagreement condition to justify their identities (as one 
would expect), the words they did write in justification of their identities appear to have 
helped them maintain their distance from the indifference threshold.  The figure also 
makes evident the surprising reverse pattern on display in the control group.  In this 
group, longer responses are associated with more indifference rather than less.  One 
might speculate that, absent a catalyst for partisan motivation (i.e. conscious 
inconsistency between an issue attitudes and party identification), greater consideration 
of one’s reasons for identification leads to less reliance on partisan stereotypes and other 
heuristics, and this leads to more moderate evaluations.  This possibility will be examined 
more closely in Chapter 4. 
[Insert Figure 2.2] 
Open-ended responses were also coded for whether or not they contained 
evidence of lesser of two evils justification.  When subjects’ attitudes approach the 
indifference threshold, they are expected to avoid crossing over by calling to mind 
negative attitudes and stereotypes of the opposition party to offset negative attitudes 
toward their own party.  Since, the justification process is not necessarily expected to 
occur on the conscious level, this is an extremely blunt measure.  Therefore, observations 
of such overt lesser of two evils identity justification are expected to be low across 
conditions.  Nonetheless, Figure 2.3 shows that subjects in both the disagreement 
condition, as well as those in the party cues condition, were significantly more likely to 
use lesser of two evils justifications to explain their identity than those assigned to the 
control condition.  In fact, not a single subject in the control group was coded as having 
used a lesser of two evils identity justification.       
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[Insert Figure 2.3] 
I now examine attitude correlations within each of the three experimental 
conditions.  If subjects are relying on lesser of two evils identity justification, this should 
also be observable in more positive (less negative) correlations between party feeling 
thermometers.  Again, what may appear in cross-sectional snapshots to be 
multidimensional party identification (Alvarez 1990; Weisberg 1980; Valentine and Van 
Wingen 1980) may actually be party identity justification.  I expect that, in the absence of 
disagreement, attitudes toward parties will line up on a single dimension.  However, 
when inconsistencies arise between issue attitudes and party identification, individuals 
will venture off of this dimension and begin to line up on a second lesser of two evils 
dimension.  Again, this should be reflected in increasingly positive (less negative) feeling 
thermometer correlations from the control group to the party cues condition to the 
disagreement condition.   
Results in Table 2.3 fit this prediction extremely well.  While, in the control 
group, the standard expectation of a large negative relationship appears to hold, this is not 
the case in the other two conditions.  As party identity threat intensifies from the control 
group to the party cues condition to the disagreement condition, the negative relationship 
between attitudes toward the Republican and Democratic parties becomes smaller in 
magnitude and actually passes zero to become (non-significantly) positive.   
[Insert Table 2.3] 
 Are these more positive (less negative) correlations arising as individuals venture 
out onto a new (lesser of two evils) attitude dimension in order to avoid crossing over the 
indifference threshold?  The factor analysis method is extremely useful for answering this 
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question, because it makes it possible to determine whether these correlation differences 
arise as a result of partisan attitudes splitting into two orthogonal dimensions.  If this is 
the case, as I expect it to be, we should see a new justification dimension begin to emerge 
as party identity threat increases from condition to condition.  On this dimension, liking 
one’s own party less should correlate with liking the other party less as well.  Factor 
analyses are conducted separately for each experimental condition to facilitate 
comparison between conditions.  Included in these factor analyses are feeling 
thermometer measures, party support and opposition measures, and strength of party 
identification.  Results are displayed in Table 2.4.   
As hypothesized, a single factor emerges in the control group.  On this dimension, 
liking Democrats more means liking Republicans less—just as conventional wisdom 
suggests.  This factor explains just over 66% of the total variance within the condition. A 
single factor solution also emerges in the party cues condition.  Interestingly, however, 
this factor only accounts for about 48% of the variance in this condition—suggesting that 
subjects’ attitudes no longer line up as well on a single dimension.  Finally, as predicted, 
two orthogonal factors emerge in the disagreement condition.
11
  Prior to rotation, the first 
of these two factors is identical to the factor extracted in each of the other two conditions.  
As in the party cues condition, this factor explains about 48% of the total variance. 
Looking across conditions, it appears that this factor explains less variance as threat to 
                                               
11 Eigenvalue cutoffs are set to 1.0 (Kaiser’s Rule), though the number of unique factors is very clear in 
each condition.  Cattel’s scree test yields the same number of factors.  In the control group, the first factor 
has an Eigenvalue of 4.624 compared to a value of .692 for the second factor.  In the group cues condition, 
a second factor with an Eigenvalue of .953 approaches the threshold of 1.0.  However, this factor still 
explains relatively little variance compared to the first factor with its Eigenvalue of 3.93.  In the 
disagreement condition, the first two factors have Eigenvalues of 3.390 and 1.692 respectively.  The next 




  On the second factor, liking one party less corresponds to 
liking the other party less, and liking one party more corresponds to liking the other party 
more.  In a cross-sectional survey context it is quite understandable how this dimension 
might be interpreted as a unique independence or ambivalence dimension (Greene 2000; 
Dennis 1988; Kamieniecki 1988; Weisberg 1980; Valentine and Van Wingen 1980; 
Alvarez 1990).  However, given that this second factor only arises in the disagreement 
condition and strength of party identification still loads onto the first factor, this 
experiment suggests a very different interpretation—identity justification.  In sum, as 
party identification comes under threat, partisans depart from zero-sum attitude 
reinforcement.  As they approach indifference between the two parties, they call to mind 
negative evaluations and stereotypes of the opposition party in order to justify 
maintaining their party identity.       




Results from the above experiment strongly suggest that motivated reasoning is 
triggered when inconsistencies arise between individuals’ issue attitudes and party 
identities.  Under such conditions, individuals feel the need to justify their party identities 
in order to avoid changing them.  As individuals approach indifference between the two 
parties, they engage in lesser of two evils identity justification.  This entails a departure 
                                               
12 After rotating the matrix to maximize the variance of loadings for each factor, the two dimensions 
extracted in the disagreement conditions come to reflect attitudes toward the Democratic Party and attitudes 
toward the Republican Party respectively.  Strength of party identification is associated with both of these 
dimensions (negatively with the opposition party dimension), though it is associated more strongly with the 
favored party dimension.     
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from the strong negative relationship between attitudes toward the Republican and 
Democratic parties that one might expect.  In fact, in the disagreement condition, we saw 
the emergence of a second attitude dimension on which liking one party less was 
associated with liking the other party less—consistent with the notion of lesser of two 
evils identity justification. 
  In cross-sectional survey analyses, the lack of a strong negative relationship 
between attitudes toward the Republican Party and Democratic Party is often cited as 
evidence of multidimensional party identification (Weisberg 1980; Alvarez 1990), but the 
above results suggest that this interpretation may be off the mark.  These results suggest 
that the lack of a strong negative correlation between attitudes likely results from 
individuals attempting to justify their party identities.  Of course, if this is the case, the 
relationship between attitudes toward the parties should vary over time as circumstances 
require greater and less amounts of identity justification.  Despite the longstanding debate 
over the dimensionality of partisanship, little attention has been paid to over-time 
variation in the correlation between these attitudes.  As is evident in Figure 2.4, 
substantial temporal variation does occur in these correlations.  Notably, the highest 
observed positive correlation appears in 1974, at the height of Watergate, among 
Republican identifiers.  While the negativity of the correlation between attitudes toward 
the two parties may be underestimated due to measurement error (Green 1988), both 
random and systematic measurement error should be relatively constant over time in 
aggregate level analysis.  Therefore, the temporal variation on display in Figure 2.4, 
suggests that measurement error does not tell the whole story. 
[Insert Figure 2.4] 
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Still, in order to determine whether this temporal variation is due to dynamic 
identity justification and not stable multidimensional identification, I examine the impact 
of economic performance on the correlation between attitudes toward the two parties.  
When our ongoing evaluations of party performance are consistent with our party 
identities, attitudes toward the two parties are likely to reinforce one another, yielding a 
strong negative correlation as conventional wisdom suggests.  However, the state of the 
world may sometimes be such that partisan consistent evaluations are difficult to 
maintain.  For instance, objective economic indicators may suggest that one’s preferred 
party has performed poorly while in power.  Recalling Figure 1, this may strain party 
evaluations for some partisans to the point that they are in danger of crossing over the 
indifference threshold.  Under such circumstances, these individuals are likely to turn to 
lesser of two evils identity justification in order to maintain loyalty to their party—
entailing a break from zero-sum evaluations of parties.  From an empirical standpoint, 
this means that when economic performance threatens party identification, we should 
observe a less negative (more positive) correlation between attitudes toward the 
Republican Party and Democratic Party than conventional wisdom suggests.  Since 
economic performance is exogenous to attitudes toward the parties, we can be certain that 
economic performance is affecting the relationship between attitudes and not vice versa.     
Measures.  As discussed, the correlation between attitudes toward the Republican 
Party and Democratic Party serves as my primary dependent variable of interest.  Since 
correlations are, by there very nature, aggregate level assessments, aggregate level 
analysis is required.  These correlations are calculated separately for Republican and 
Democratic identifiers (including leaners) in each of the twenty years in which party 
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feeling thermometers were included in the ANES.  I calculate these correlations 
separately for Republicans and Democrats so that I may distinguish between the effects 
of economic performance by one’s own party versus the effects of the opposition party’s 
performance.  Poor performance by one’s own party threatens party identification, while 
poor performance by the other party reinforces party identification.  Additionally, by 
pooling the observed thermometer correlations among Republicans and Democrats, I 
double the number of observations in my dataset from twenty to forty.   
Economic performance is calculated by determining change from the previous 
year’s unemployment level and change from the previous year’s level of inflation and 
then adding these two values together.
13
  Larger values indicate better economic 
performance.  An incumbency dummy variable signifies which party controlled the 
White House in the year leading up to the election.   
The ANES altered the feeling thermometer questions to ask about the 
“Republican Party” and “Democratic Party” rather than “Republicans” and “Democrats” 
after 1982.  Therefore, a control for question wording is also included.   
Finally, since the point of this exercise is to understand how stable party identities 
are maintained, I control for party identity polarization in order to isolate the variation in 
attitude correlations that occurs independently from variation in the distribution of party 
identification.  Clearly, the correlation between party feeling thermometers should relate 
to the spread of party identification—as a cause, a consequence, or more likely both.  
However, I hypothesize that partisan threat should affect these attitude correlations even 
when partisan identity polarization is controlled.  If economic performance affects the 
                                               
13 Unemployment plus inflation is often referred to as the misery index.  Therefore, this is essentially a 
measure of change in economic misery. 
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relationship between party feeling thermometers independent of party identity 
polarization, then it is clear that these attitude measures do not merely capture the same 
thing as the party identity measure.  The idea is to capture evidence of partisans 
manipulating their attitudes to justify maintaining their identities.  The standard deviation 
of party identification in each year serves as my measure of partisan polarization.
14
   
Results 
The theory is tested using an OLS model with panel corrected standard errors.
15
  
Results are presented in Table 2.5 and represented graphically in Figure 2.5.  First, as one 
would expect, attitudes and identities appear to be powerfully related.  The correlation 
between attitudes toward the parties becomes more negative when partisan polarization 
increases.  In other words, attitudes polarize when party identities polarize.  However, as 
the theory predicts, this is not the whole story.  Economic performance, in interaction 
with own party incumbency, has a substantial effect on the correlation between attitudes 
toward the two parties.  More specifically, Figure 2.5 shows that when one’s own party is 
in power and the economy performs poorly, the correlation between attitudes toward the 
two parties becomes less negative (more positive).  On the other hand, the correlation 
between partisan attitudes becomes more negative when one’s own party is in power and 
the economy performs well, or the opposition party is in power and the economy 
performs poorly.  In other words, zero-sum attitude reinforcement occurs when the 
                                               
14 The standard deviation variable is mean deviated so that the constant will take on a more intuitive value.  
If this step were not taken, the constant would be estimated for the case in which the standard deviation of 
party identification was zero.  Since this is clearly a nonsensical notion, this variable is rescaled so that the 
constant will take on the value it would have when the partisan polarization is at its average level. 
15 Similar models were run to check for robustness.  These include a standard OLS model controlling for 
party fixed effects and GLS models accounting for random year and party effects.  A fixed year effects 
model could not be run, since the economic performance measure is constant across pooled groups.  
Results are nearly identical across models. 
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economy conforms to partisan expectations, but these attitudes cease to reinforce one 
another when economic realities threaten party identification.  This pattern corresponds 
perfectly with the notion of lesser of two evils identity justification.  When their own 
party performs poorly (or the other party performs well), individuals come to hold more 
negative attitudes toward both parties—pushing the correlation in a more positive 
direction.  However, when their own party performs well (or the other party performs 
poorly), partisan expectations are confirmed, no identity justification is needed, and the 
expected negative relationship between attitude dimensions appears.   
[Insert Table 2.5]  [Insert Figure 2.5] 
To illustrate the size of this effect, the predicted attitude correlations among 
incumbent party identifiers and non-incumbent party identifiers differ by .18 when 
economic performance is set to its lowest observed level.  This suggests that while 
attitudes and identities are powerfully related to one another, the relationship between 
attitudes toward the two parties is not determined entirely by party identification, or vice 
versa.  Attitudes and identities are distinct, and the relationship between attitude 
dimensions appears to vary systematically with at least one important exogenous source 
of identity threat: economic performance.  Consistent with experimental findings, when 
economic performance conflicts with partisan expectations, the aggregate level 
complexity of partisan attitudes increases.  Individuals begin to venture off of the single 
dimension presumed by conventional wisdom to explain attitudes toward parties.  This 
finding in conjunction with the experimental results suggests that previously uncovered 
evidence of multidimensional party identification should be reconsidered in favor of a 
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model in which independent attitude dimensions emerge as partisans attempt to justify 




What mechanism produces partisan stability?  Results of a laboratory experiment 
and aggregate level analysis of ANES data suggest that Bayesian learning models cannot 
tell the whole story.  Partisan motivation appears to play an important role.  When 
individuals become aware of inconsistencies between their attitudes and their party 
identities, they do not necessarily bring their identities into alignment with their attitudes, 
but rather generate justifications for maintaining stable party identities.  While there exist 
any number of ways to go about justifying one’s party identity, one specific type of 
identity justification, referred to as identifying with the lesser of two evils, constitutes the 
primary focus of this chapter.  This method of justification has a specific empirical 
signature—a positive relationship between attitudes toward the two parties—and 
therefore serves as an ideal signal of identity justification.   
An experiment intentionally evoked inconsistency between subjects issue 
attitudes and party identities so that their responses could be compared with a control 
group in which such inconsistencies were not evoked.  After exposure to the treatment, 
those who put more effort into identity justification (as indicated by higher word counts 
in open-ended responses) were better able to maintain attitudes toward the two parties 
that were consistent with their party identification (as indicated by greater distance from 
the attitudinal indifference threshold).  Further analyses of both open-ended and closed-
ended measures also demonstrate that responses of subjects exposed to the treatment 
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conditions are consistent with lesser of two evils identity justification.  Finally, an 
aggregate level analysis of national survey data suggests that these experimental results 
generalize to the population at large.  At times when economic conditions are likely to 
threaten party identification (poor performance by one’s own party or impressive 
performance by the opposition party), aggregate level attitudes shift in a pattern 
consistent with lesser of two evils identity justification.
16
  By engaging in identity 
justification, individuals are able to maintain partisan loyalty without appearing 
“irrational” or hopelessly biased.   
These findings conform well with a number of studies demonstrating the 
important role that attitudes toward the opposition party (Maggiotto and Piereson 1977; 
Rose and Mishler 1998) and opposition candidate (Gant and Davis 1984; Gant and 
Sigelman 1985; Sigelman and Gant 1989) play in explaining political behavior.  At times, 
an individual’s attitudes toward her party and even her identification with that party may 
wane.  However, as long as that person holds sufficiently negative attitudes toward the 
opposition party, she can avoid crossing over to the other party and continue voting for 
her own party as she always has.     
These results also shed new light on the longstanding debate over the 
dimensionality of party identification.  By simply maintaining the distinction between 
attitudes and identities, it becomes apparent that party identification is not itself 
multidimensional, but rather justified in two dimensions.  Results suggest that the small 
negative (and sometimes positive) correlations often observed between attitudes toward 
the Republican and Democratic parties result from individuals’ efforts to defend their 
                                               
16 In the case of impressive performance by the opposition party, this may entail greater of two goods 
justification as discussed in Footnote 1. 
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party identities.  A controlled experiment shows that these correlations vary 
systematically as individuals experience disagreement with their party.  This pattern is 
replicated in aggregate level ANES survey analysis.  When indicators of the incumbent 
party’s economic performance do not match partisan expectations, the relationship 
between party feeling thermometers becomes more positive (less negative).  Analysis of 
open-ended measures obtained during the experiment show that this correlational 
variation corresponds to an increased propensity to rely on lesser of two evils identity 
justification.  Moreover, factor analyses demonstrate the emergence of a second attitude 
dimension on which liking one party less is associated with liking the other party less as 
well—also consistent with lesser of two evils identity justification.   
The primary dependent variable of interest in this chapter has been the 
relationship between attitudes toward political parties, but the same process may affect 
other attitudes in similar ways.  We have seen that when party identification is threatened, 
attitudes toward parties cease to reinforce one another, and partisans begin to evaluate 
parties in two-dimensional space.  However, the theory could just as easily be applied to 
attitudes toward policies.  If an individual comes to disagree with her party over a certain 
issue, she may compensate by reporting more positive attitudes toward some other policy 
supported by her party.  Therefore, two policy dimensions that one would expect to be 
positively related may become less positively or even negatively related to one another. 
For instance, a Republican frustrated with her party’s Iraq policy might justify continued 
identification with her party by taking a hard line against illegal immigration or economic 
intervention.  Such counterintuitive attitudinal dynamics might help to explain what 
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appears to be a lack of attitude constraint and a preponderance of non-attitudes in the 
electorate (Converse 1964).    
While debates over party identification have traditionally pitted the irrationally 
loyal partisan against the rationally updating partisan, the results presented here suggest 
that this is a false dichotomy.  Partisans do not necessarily ignore relevant political 
information in order to preserve their identities, nor does party identification appear to 
constitute a perfect running tally of attitudes.  Instead, individuals find ways to 
incorporate inconsistent attitudes into their existing identities without actually changing 
them.   
In sum, voters are certainly not fools (Key 1966), yet they do not appear to be 
perfect stewards of democracy either.  Rather, they are highly adept at justifying their 
identities in an effort to preserve the psychological utility associated with partisan 
loyalty.  The downside of this cognitively creative method of dissonance reduction is that 
it reduces the efficiency of party identification as a voting heuristic.  If individuals are 
motivated and able to resist updating their party identities to reflect their issue attitudes 
and political evaluations, then voting one’s party identity is not the equivalent of voting 
one’s interests.   The next chapter will examine the conditions under which partisan 
identity defenses are likely to fail in order to determine whether stable party identification 
is contingent on identity justification.  
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 Table 2.1: Experimental Design 
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***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Note:  Results are obtained through standard OLS Regression.  Differences between party feeling 
thermometers are calculated by subtracting feelings toward the Republican Party from feelings toward the 






Table 2.3: Correlations between Attitudes toward the Republican and Democratic 
Parties by Condition 
 
  
Correlation between Attitudes Toward 
Republicans and Democrats 
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***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Note:  Significance levels are calculated relative to the control group.  The control group itself is 
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Support Republicans 
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Oppose Republicans 
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Variance Explained 66.20% 48.47% 48.60% 24.28% 
 
 












Note:  Eigenvalue cutoffs are set to 1.0 (Kaiser’s Rule).  Cattel’s scree test yields the same number of factors, as 
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Economic Performance .012 
(.008) 
 
Own Party Incumbent .045** 
(.018) 
 





Party Question -.103*** 
(.028) 
 








***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Note:  Correlations between party feeling thermometers are calculated for each year they are available in 
the ANES.  These correlation coefficients are used as the dependent variable in this aggregate level time-
series analysis.  Correlations are calculated separately for Republican and Democratic respondents 
(includes leaners).  The two partisan groups are pooled in this analysis.     
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Figure 2.1:  Lesser of Two Evils Attitude Dynamics 
 
Note: The figure represents attitudes toward parties in two-dimensional space.  Conventionally, the more a 
person likes one party, the less that person dislikes the other party.  However, partisans come up with 
justification that allow them to avoid crossing over the indifference threshold—at which point they are 
acknowledging that they like the other party more than their own party.  When the indifference threshold is 
crossed, stable identification with one’s party cannot be justified.  Less of two evils justification is one 
common form of identity defense in which—as they approach the indifference threshold—partisans 
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Note:  This figure assumes a perfect negative relationship between attitudes toward the Republican and 
Democratic Parties.  Regression results make it possible to predict the distance from the indifference 
threshold given experimental condition and word count.  However, these points need not line up on a 
perfect diagonal line.  They are merely displayed in this manner to facilitate comparison with Figure 2.1.
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Control (n= 37) Party Cues (n= 74) High Disagreement
(n= 79)
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 (one-tailed Fisher’s Exact Test).   
Note: Cell entries represent percentage of responses coded “1” for lesser of two evils justification.  
Significance levels are based on Fisher’s Exact Tests—a non-parametric test (based on medians) used when 
dealing with dichotomous dependent variables and very low positive outcome frequencies.  Comparisons 
























Figure 2.4: Temporal Variations in Correlation between Attitudes toward Democrats and Republicans 
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Note:  Findings come from OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors.  The dependent variable is 
the correlation between attitudes toward the two parties among Republicans and Democrats in a given year.  
The figure illustrates how these correlations systematically very with political context.  When politics 
conforms to partisan expectations (one’s own party performs well or the other party performs poorly) the 
relationship is strongly negative.  However, the correlation shifts in a positive direction when political 
events challenge partisan expectations (one’s own party performs poorly or the other party performs well).  
This pattern fits with the theory that when party identification is challenged, individuals attempt to justify 
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Cognitive Resources and Resistance to Identity Change 
 
In Chapter 2, we saw that partisans generate identity justifications when their 
identities are threatened.  Presumably, these justifications allow partisans to maintain 
stable identities despite holding attitudes that conflict with them.  In this chapter, I will 
directly test this assumption by again manipulating consistency between subjects’ 
attitudes and party identities, but this time I will also manipulate the cognitive resources 
subjects have available to deal with this inconsistency.  The dual motivations theory of 
party identification suggests that, given inconsistency between their attitudes and party 
identities, individuals will devote their available cognitive resources to justifying their 
exiting identities.  This runs directly against revisionist wisdom which suggests that 
partisans devote cognitive resources to updating their identities to reflect their attitudes.   
To simply change one’s identity to reflect one’s attitudes would satisfy an 
individual’s responsiveness motivation, but it would also mean acting against one’s 
partisan motivation.  In other words, it would entail a psychological cost.  On the other 
hand, if an individual generates a justification for maintaining his or her existing identity, 
that person can maintain a loyal party identity while also appearing to be a unbiased and 
pragmatic citizen—thereby satisfying both partisan and responsiveness motivations 
simultaneously.  Therefore, it follows that partisans should devote their cognitive 
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resources to pursuing this strategy.  Consequently party identification should change most 
often and most significantly when individual lack cognitive resources.   
 
Resource Allocation in Social Cognition 
 When the literature on party identification and the literature on stereotyping are 
placed side-by-side, the parallels are hard to miss.  Traditionally, party identification has 
been characterized as a stable predisposition which biases citizens’ perceptions of their 
political environment and persists as a result of “perceptual screening” (Campbell et al. 
1960).  But many scholars now characterize party identification as a useful heuristic for 
simplifying politics (Huckfeldt et al. 1999; Popkin 1991; Shively 1979; Schaffner and 
Streb 2002; Tomz and Sniderman 2005; Brady and Sniderman 1985).   
Similarly, the stereotyping literature, which was once dominated by theories that 
stressed group biases and ego defense, has taken a more cognitively oriented turn 
(Duckitt 2003; Brewer and Kramer 1985).  As in the party identification literature, one 
line of research examines the role of stereotypes as processing heuristics that free up 
cognitive resources (Macrae et al. 1994).  In these models, stereotypes are thought to 
operate quite efficiently, enabling individuals to reach judgments that are nearly as 
accurate without expending as many resources, though it is acknowledged that directional 
motivation may undermine this efficiency (Sherman et al. 1998). Another line of 
scholarship builds more directly on the traditional view, noting the fact that stereotypes 
are notoriously difficult to change and examining the process of stereotype maintenance 
(Hilton and von Hippel 1996).  Much of this work builds on the premise that stereotype 
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maintenance is rooted in directional motivation, which I refer to as partisan motivation 
for the purposes of this dissertation (Kunda and Oleson 1995; Yzerbyt et al. 1999).   
Interestingly, Walter Lippmann, who brought the term “stereotype” to the social 
sciences in his classic Public Opinion (1922), anticipated the distinction between 
stereotyping as a heuristic and stereotyping as a defensive reaction.   
There is another reason, besides economy of effort, why we so often hold to our 
stereotypes when we might pursue a more disinterested vision.  The systems of 
stereotypes may be the core of our personal tradition, the defenses of our position 
in society (p. 63). 
 
Recently, researchers have begun to integrate these two views of stereotypes by 
taking a context-dependent view of their functionality (Hilton and von Hippel 1996).  To 
the degree that stereotypes facilitate processing efficiency, one would predict that, given 
exposure to information inconsistent with a particular stereotype, an individual should 
update that stereotype in order to maintain its efficiency.  However, studies show that 
when subjects are exposed to individuals who belong to a stereotyped group, yet deviate 
from the group stereotype, they are subtyped or “fenced off” so that the stereotype is 
preserved (Yzerbyt et al. 1999; Kunda and Oleson 1995).  Because stereotypes facilitate 
downward social comparison and bolster self-esteem, individuals are motivated to 
maintain them.  Several experiments have shown that individuals engage in stereotyping 
and other forms of outgroup derogation when their self-esteem is threatened, and this 
brings their self-esteem back up to baseline (Fein and Spencer 1997; Crocker and 
Luhtanen 1990).  In short, while stereotypes may reduce processing effort, individuals 
often fail to update their stereotypes—rendering them inaccurate and therefore 
inefficient.   
75 
Additionally, if stereotypes are tools which exist to facilitate cognitive processing 
when resources are in short supply, then presumably, when cognitive resources are 
available they should be allocated to the honing of these tools.  However, if the 
motivation to maintain a stereotype is greater than the motivation to reach an accurate 
evaluation, the opposite may be true—individuals should devote their cognitive resources 
to defending their stereotypes and only change their stereotypes when cognitive resources 
are insufficient to mount an effective defense.  Classic research into attitude change 
demonstrates that distracted individuals can be persuaded more easily than non-distracted 
individuals (Festinger and Maccoby 1964).  This rather counter-intuitive finding is 
attributed to the inability of distracted individuals to effectively counter-argue a 
persuasive message.  While this theory was originally quite controversial, the 
preponderance of subsequent tests support this conclusion (Baron and Baron 1973).  The 
consensus view now holds that any inhibition of one’s cognitive resources is likely to 
inhibit that individual’s dominant cognitive response—regardless of whether that 
response is to counter-argue or accept the message (Yzerbyt et al. 1999; Petty and 
Cacioppo 1986).   
In applying this logic to stereotypes, Yzerbyt et al. (1999) ran a series of 
experiments in which they manipulated cognitive resources during an encounter with a 
member of a stereotyped group who deviated from that stereotype.  As expected, results 
showed that individuals devote their cognitive resources to stereotype maintenance rather 
than updating their preconceptions to reflect new information.  Most stereotype change 
occurred when subjects encountered deviant individuals but lacked the cognitive 
resources necessary to preserve their stereotypes.     
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When it comes to party identification, an aspect of one’s self-concept (Campbell 
et al. 1960; Campbell et al. 1954; Green et al. 2002), individuals are motivated to 
counter-argue any message that threatens their identity.  While party identification may 
serve as a heuristic, processing efficiency is not a partisans’ only motivation.  When 
partisans discover inconsistencies between their attitudes and their identities, they may 
resolve these inconsistencies without changing their party identity.  And just like 
stereotype maintenance, partisan identity maintenance is likely to require cognitive 
resources.  
Cognitive Resources Hypothesis:  When cognitive resources are limited, partisans will be 
more likely to bring their identities into alignment with their attitudes. 
 
Experiment 
 In order to determine whether partisan stability is, in fact, contingent on one’s 
efforts to defend his or her identity, both the consistency between attitudes and identity 
and the cognitive resources available to reconcile that inconsistency must be varied 
independently.  I achieve this test in a second experiment.  The literature reviewed above 
suggests that party identification is most likely to change when individuals disagree with 
their party, but when they also have insufficient cognitive resources available to justify 




Participants.  During May of 2007, 400 subjects participated in an experiment 
administered over the Internet through YouGov/Polimetrix.
17
  YouGov/Polimetrix 
conducts surveys through their website www.pollingpoint.com.  Based on demographics, 
they match respondents to a target matrix they have developed using voter lists and 
consumer databases.
18
  For this study, 961 respondents were interviewed and matched 
down to a sample of 400 to produce the final data set.  Subjects were matched on gender, 
age, race, education, and party identification.  Sample matching occurred completely 
independently from experimental randomization.    
Materials.  All participants were asked to read a newspaper editorial about a 
fictitious bill entitled “The Common Sense in Outsourcing Bill” soon to be introduced in 
Congress.  The bill proposed to reduce outsourcing through tax incentives and outlaw the 
outsourcing of federal government contracts.  No partisan cues were provided in the 
article.  The issue of outsourcing was chosen because it had received a great deal of 
media attention, yet neither party had taken a united and unambiguous stance on the issue 
at the time of the experiment.  The argument made in the article was carefully crafted to 
avoid partisan or ideological flavoring that might substitute as a partisan cue for readers.  
After reading the article, respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed 
passage of this bill.  Since no cues were provided and the information flow was 
                                               
17 Originally, I intended to only sample 200 respondents.  However, due to an error on the part of 
YouGov/Polimetrix, they offered to re-run my entire study free of charge.  Their error was in neglecting to 
sample Asian participants and allowing four individuals under the age of 18 (2 of 16-year and 2 of 17-
years) to slip into the sample.  However, given the fact that these errors are unlikely to have any significant 
impact on the results of the study, all 400 respondents are used in these analyses.   
18 This regularly updated target matrix is what they use to define a representative sample.  By modeling 
response and participation rates, they also take care to avoid selection effects.  YouGov/Polimetrix samples 
have been found to perform at least as well as other polling methods in predicting election outcomes.  
Information is available at www.polimetrix.com. 
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unidirectional, subjects were expected to express support for the bill.  The articles are 
included in Appendix B. 
Procedure.  The experiment employed a 2 x 2 (disagreement x cognitive 
resources) design.  All participants were randomly assigned to either the disagree 
condition or the neutral condition.  Those assigned to the neutral condition were asked to 
read a second newspaper article stressing the potential electoral significance of “The 
Common Sense in Outsourcing Bill” as well as the notion that the bill had a mixture of 
support and opposition within both parties.  The article also added that none of the 
leading contenders for the 2008 presidential race had yet taken a stance on the bill.  
Those assigned to the disagree condition read an article that was virtually identical 
except for the fact that it stressed that the parties and candidates had taken clear and 
opposite stances on the outsourcing bill.  Republicans and those leaning Republican were 
told that the Republicans opposed the bill and Democrats supported it.  Democrats and 
those leaning Democrat were told the opposite.
19
  In other words, as long as respondents 
expressed support for the fictitious outsourcing bill, they would experience disagreement 
with their party over the bill.     
Cognitive resources were manipulated through a standard cognitive load 
induction in which respondents were asked to recall either a single-digit number (in the 
low cognitive load condition) or a six-digit number (in the high cognitive load condition).  
This technique for manipulating cognitive load has been successfully employed in other 
studies (Yzerbyt et al. 1999; Gilbert and Hixon 1991; Sherman et al. 1998; Gilbert and 
                                               
19 Party identification was determined using the past party identification measure described in the measures 
section.  The measure was obtained from the YouGov/Polimetrix files.  Pure Independents were randomly 
assigned to either get the Republican article or the Democrat article.  However, as will be explained later, 




  Subjects were told that they were participating in a memory study 
designed to determine how well people are able to remember information they read in the 
newspaper.  The idea in providing this cover story was to ensure that subjects would 
make every effort to remember their number while still reading the newspaper article 
carefully.  Subjects were also informed that, in the second part of the study, they would 
be asked to fill out a short public opinion survey.  They were told that, at some point 
during the survey, they would be asked to recall the number they were assigned.  In 
reality, all subjects were asked to recall their number at the same point during the survey.  
Subjects were given their number just after reporting their position on “The Common 
Sense in Outsourcing Bill.”  They were then expected to hold the number in memory as 
they read the second article (which, in the disagree condition, revealed to them that they 
had just taken a position at odds with their own party and consistent with the opposition 
party) and answer the subsequent questions regarding their party identification.  
Immediately after this, they were asked to recall the number.   
Again, the idea behind this manipulation was that partisans should attempt to 
reconcile inconsistency between their issue attitude and party identification immediately 
after realizing the inconsistency.  This pressure to reconcile inconsistency should have 
been particularly acute at the point when subjects were asked about their party 
identification.  The dual motivations theory suggests that partisan identity change should 
become more prominent as the ability to justify maintaining one’s identity decreases.  
When cognitive resources are inhibited through the induction of cognitive load, subjects 
should have a more difficult time constructing a justification for continued identification 
                                               
20 In other studies, subjects have been asked to recall an eight-digit number.  The capacity of working 
memory is thought to be seven “chunks,” plus or minus two (Miller 1956).  This study used a six-digit 
number in hopes of severely reducing but not overloading cognitive capacity.  
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with their party.  Therefore, under cognitive load, disagreement is expected to exert a 
greater degree of party identification change.   
 To further test the theory, I will examine three additional variables likely to be 
associated with one’s ability to justify maintaining her identity: age, political 
sophistication, and Democratic identity.  Age is a well-known correlate of partisan 
stability, but several competing theories have been proposed to explain this empirical 
phenomenon (see Sears and Levy 2003).  The dual motivations theory suggests that 
older, more experienced, partisans may be better able to justify their identities, and this is, 
at least in part, why their identities are more stable.  Likewise, individuals with higher 
levels of political sophistication are expected to have an easier time developing 
justifications for their identities.  Finally, given the political climate in which the study 
was run (May 2007), Democratic identifiers are expected to have had an easier time 
justifying their identities than Republicans—simply due to the salience of positive versus 
negative information about the two parties at the time of the study.  The figures below 
outline the expected pattern of interaction.  
[Insert Figures 3.1] 
 This investigation assumes that the ability to justify one’s identity exists on a 
continuum.  While cognitive load, age, political sophistication, and Democratic identity 
should all affect where an individual falls on this continuum, it is difficult to know at 
what point justification will give way to partisan change.  For instance, partisans of all 
ages may be able to avoid updating their identities in response to disagreement as long 
they have sufficient cognitive resources (see Figure 3.1, Panel A).  However, once 
cognitive load is induced, partisan updating may occur among younger partisans, while 
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older partisans show continued stability (see Figure 3.1, Panel B).  On the other hand, 
disagreement may lead the least politically sophisticated partisans to change their 
identities even if their cognitive resources are unencumbered, while their more 
sophisticated counterparts avoid identity change as long as they are not put under 
cognitive load (see Figure 3.1, Panel B).  After being put under cognitive load, however, 
even the most sophisticated partisans may begin to update their identities in response to 
disagreement (see Figure 3.1, Panel C).  In other words, partisan stability should first give 
way among the most vulnerable and then begin to overtake those who are less 
susceptible.  Vulnerability may stem from youth, low political sophistication, a hostile 
political environment, or a lack of cognitive resources.  If all four variables converge on 
the expected pattern, the likelihood is reduced that any one alternative explanation will 
remain plausible. 
All analyses are conducted using ordered probit regression to account for 
potential variation in the size of intervals between levels of party identification strength.
21
  
In order to facilitate interpretation, results are reported as predicted probabilities.  
Specifically, probabilities pertain to the likelihood of starting off as a strong identifier at 
time t-1 and remaining a strong identifier at time t.  Ordered probit regression tables with 
cut points are included in Appendix A.   
Measures.  A variable measuring past party identification strength prior to the 
stimulus is created by simply folding the standard 7-point party identification measure in 
                                               
21 As explained in more detail below, party identification strength serves as the dependent variable rather 
than the standard 7-point measure of party identification.  The reason for using this measure is that I am 
interested in determining what weakens party identification, not what makes a person a Republican versus 
what makes a person a Democrat.  Therefore, a valence (strong identity to no identity) scale is appropriate 
rather than a bipolar scale (Strong Republican to Strong Democrat).  It is important to note that this is not 
the standard measure of party identification strength, because partisans who crossover from one party to the 
other are coded as having zero strength. 
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half.  The new scale runs from 0 to 3.  Strong Democrats as well as strong Republicans 
are coded as 3, weak partisans are coded as 2, leaners are coded as 1, and pure 
independents are coded as 0.  Because YouGov/Polimetrix uses sample matching to 
obtain nationally representative samples, they have party identification on record for 
everyone in their respondent pool.  Thus, it is possible to avoid the inevitable biases that 
would result if party identification were obtained immediately prior to the treatment. 
Current party identification strength serves as the primary dependent variable of 
interest in this study, and is therefore measured after exposure to the stimulus.  It is coded 
identically to past party identification strength except that those partisans who crossed 
over from one party to the other from time t-1 to time t are coded as having zero 
strength.
22
          
I measure political sophistication using a 7-item battery.  Therefore, the political 
sophistication variable runs from 0 (none correct) to 7 (all correct).  This battery contains 
a variety of multiple choice questions about political figures and institutions.  More 
specifically, respondents were asked to identity the jobs filled by Nancy Pelosi, John 
Roberts, Tony Snow, and Tony Blair.  Participants were also asked how many votes it 
takes to override a veto, which branch has the power to determine whether or not a law is 
constitutional, and which branch has the power of the purse.  Surprisingly, the mean level 
of political sophistication is quite high (M=5.43, SD=1.91), but there is substantial 
variation across the scale.
23
 
                                               
22 Tests were also run using a measure in which crossover partisans were coded as having negative identity 
strength (i.e. a t-1 Republican who identifies as a Strong Democrat in time t is coded -3 to indicate strong 
identification with the other party), and results do not substantively differ.   
23 In a recent experiment, Prior and Lupia (2008) find that subjects score substantially higher on political 
knowledge questions when given more time or monetary incentives for correct answers.  This means that 
online studies such as those administered by YouGov/Polimetrix should yield substantially higher 
knowledge scores than traditional telephone or even face to face surveys in which interviewers are waiting 
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 Dummy variables are created to represent exposure to the treatment, which 
include disagreement and cognitive load.  Subjects assigned to the treatment conditions 
receive a value of “1” and all others receive a value of “0”.   
Results  
 
To start, I examine whether the first article actually persuaded participants to 
support “The Common Sense in Outsourcing Bill.”  To manipulate disagreement with 
one’s party, it was essential for respondents to take a position on the outsourcing bill.  
Results suggest that the article did produce the anticipated outcome.  Support for the bill 
is measured on a 7-point scale ranging from “strongly oppose” to “strongly support.”  
Those who self-identified in the pre-interview as a partisan or an independent leaning 
toward a party tended to support the bill (M= 5.39, SD= 1.67) as did the fifty-two “pure 
Independents” (M= 5.33, SD= 2.02).  In all, 75-percent of the sample expressed support 
for the bill with approximately 35-percent reporting the maximum level of support.  
Support for the bill is not correlated with knowledge (r = -.03) or age (r = .02).  
Democrats were significantly more supportive of the bill (M= 5.65, SD= 1.41) than were 
Republicans (M= 5.11, SD= 1.89), t((df= 345)= 3.03; p<.01).  Nonetheless, means 
suggest that both partisan groups supported the bill.  Democrats’ higher level of support 
means that the manipulation may have been somewhat more powerful for them.  
Therefore, if anything, revisionist theories of party identification would suggest that 
                                                                                                                                            
for participants to respond.  Prior and Lupia argue that such measures are superior because they capture the 
relevant skills necessary to acquire political information.  
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Democrats should have been more likely to update their party identities than 
Republicans.  As you will see shortly, however, this is not the case.
24
 
The cognitive load manipulation appears to have been quite successful.  Just 
under 93 percent of subjects were able to successfully recall their assigned number.  As 
one would expect, more subjects were able to correctly recall their number in the minimal 
cognitive load condition (where subjects were asked to remember the number “7”) than 
in the high cognitive load condition (where subjects were asked to remember the number 
“406391”).  However, even in the high cognitive load condition 89.84 percent (SD= .205) 
of subjects correctly recalled there number compared with 95.65 percent (SD= .303) in 
the minimal load condition t((df= 346)= 2.12; p<.05).  In order to ensure that the 
cognitive load manipulation did not undercut the power of the disagreement 
manipulation, I also examine subjects’ ability to correctly recall which party supported 
and which party opposed the bill in the minimal cognitive load versus high cognitive load 
conditions.  No significant differences in recall of party positions are found between 
respondents in the cognitive load condition (M= .80, SD= .40) versus the no cognitive 
load condition (M= .76, SD= 0.43), t(df= 342)=1.08.  If anything, those in the cognitive 
load condition were slightly better at correctly recalling the parties’ positions.   Nor were 
differences in party position recall found between the no disagreement (M= .78, SD=.42) 
and disagreement conditions (M=.79, SD=41), t(df= 342)=0.16.  Moreover, no significant 
                                               
24 From this point forward, pure Independents will be excluded from analysis unless otherwise indicated.  
The experiment attempts to spark disagreement between partisans and their favored party.  Since pure 
Independents do not indicate a partisan preference, this manipulation is less applicable to them. 
Independents in the treatment condition were randomly assigned to receive either the Republican or 
Democratic stimulus.  Therefore, effects on Independents will be periodically reported in the footnotes.  
Since Independents do not have a party to disagree with, their inclusion in partisan analyses would muddy 
the results.  Given that the debate primarily pertains to whether partisans are motivated to defend or update 
their identities when they disagree with their party, it seems to be a reasonable course of action to focus on 
partisan identifiers and those who lean toward a particular party. 
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disparity appears between Republicans’ (M= .82, SD= .39) and Democrats’ (M= .75, SD= 
.43) ability to correctly recall which party supported and which party opposed the bill 
t(df= 342)= 1.51.  Finally, random assignment appears to have been successful.  No 
differences emerge between conditions in age, political sophistication, party 
identification, or strength of party identification prior to treatment.      
Table 3.1 displays pre and post treatment party identification.  While party 
identification does tend toward stability, variation is apparent.  Since even small amounts 
of aggregate level variation in party identification can have major electoral consequences 
(MacKuen et al. 1989), these dynamics are important to understand.  The question is, of 
course, whether this variation results from partisan updating or random error (Green et al. 
2002; Green and Palmquist 1990, 1994).    
[Insert Table 3.1] 
In order to determine causality, I begin by first examining the effects of 
disagreement on party identification strength while controlling for past party 
identification strength.
25
  Results suggest that when cognitive resources are 
unencumbered, disagreement has no effect on party identification strength.  Thus, results 
appear at first to be consistent with the classic model, which portrays party identification 
as a stable socialized identity.  However, when subjects are placed under cognitive load, 
the results appear more intriguing.  In this group, a reasonably large coefficient (B =         
-.268; SE = .174) emerges for disagreement, but this effect narrowly misses the standard 
threshold for statistical significance (p = .12).   
As discussed above, however, factors such as age, political sophistication, and 
Democratic identity are also expected to affect one’s ability to justify her identity.  When 
                                               
25 See Table 3.1 in Appendix A. 
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these controls are included in the model, disagreement has a significant negative effect on 
party identification strength as long as subjects are placed under cognitive load (p<.10).  
When cognitive resources are unencumbered, the coefficient on disagreement remains 
small and non-significant as predicted.  The predicted probability of maintaining a strong 
party identity is displayed in Figure 3.2.  In the absence of disagreement, those placed 
under cognitive load have a 79% chance of maintaining a strong identity from pre to post 
treatment.  However, when disagreement is experienced under cognitive load, this 
probability drops to 69%. 
[Insert Figure 3.2] 
 While the effect of disagreement under cognitive load is certainly not enormous, 
it is noteworthy given the reputation of party identification as the “unmoved mover” in 
political behavior research.  Consistent with the dual motivations theory, significant 
partisan weakening only occurs when cognitive resources are scarce (See Figure 3.1, 
Panel B).  However, the result is only suggestive, since the moderating influence of 
cognitive load is not statistically significant.  In other words, party identification change 
has been established in the cognitive load condition, but the possibility of an equally 
large change in the absence of cognitive load cannot be ruled out.   
As suggested above, the theory implies that effects should be larger among groups 
who are less able to defend their identities to begin with, such as the young, the 
politically unsophisticated, and those whose justification abilities are impeded by the 
political environment.  Therefore, I now turn to an examination of these potentially 
moderating variables. 
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Age.  Age is a well-known correlate of party identification stability, but this 
empirical regularity has been surrounded by theoretical controversy.  While some favor 
an “impressionable years” model, others favor a “lifelong openness” model (Sears and 
Levy 2003).  Those favoring the impressionable years model suggest that party 
identification is susceptible to change during an individual’s “impressionable years,” but 
party identification crystallizes with age and exposure to successive campaigns 
(Valentino and Sears 1998; Sears and Valentino 1997; Campbell et al. 1960; Alwin and 
Krosnick 1991).  Once partisans reach their thirties, party identification becomes fully 
crystallized and unlikely to change thereafter.  However, revisionist scholars interpret the 
relationship between age and stability quite differently, arguing that, as individuals gain 
experience, they become more confident in their assessments of where they stand relative 
to the parties.  Thus the need for partisan adjustment is reduced, and this is reflected in 
increasingly stable party identities (Franklin 1984; Achen 1992, 2002).  In other words, 
partisans may have a “life-long openness” to identity change, even though their party 
identities become more stable over time.    
The dual motivations model suggests a third possibility.  This model provides a 
role for motivated reasoning, without necessarily contradicting the impressionable years 
or lifelong openness models.  The dual motivations approach suggests that age and 
experience facilitate an individuals’ ability to justify his or her party identity.  Therefore, 
stability increases with age, at least in part, because partisans get better at defending their 
identities against contradictory information as they gain experience.
26
  From this 
                                               
26 The author acknowledges that this relationship is only true up to the point where the experience that 
comes with age is outweighed by the cognitive deterioration that comes with age.  To avoid 
overcomplicating the model, age is simply dichotomized at thirty-five years old in order to focus the 
comparison between those who lack political experience versus those who do not, thereby avoiding the 
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perspective, partisans are most susceptible to change during their impressionable years, 
yet they also possess a lifelong openness to change if their defenses give way.  
To test this proposition, I analyze the combined effects of age and disagreement in 
the presence and absence of cognitive load.  For the purpose of this analysis, age is coded 
as a dummy variable in which those who are thirty-five years old and under are coded as 
a “0,” and those who are over thirty-five are coded at “1” (see footnote 10).  Thirty-five 
serves as a as a rough cutoff for the end of the impressionable years life stage.  When the 
dummy variable “over-thirty five” is interacted with disagreement, no disagreement 
effects emerge among those whose cognitive abilities are unencumbered—even those 
under thirty-five years of age.
27
  However, among those placed under cognitive load, the 
story is much different.  Partisans under thirty-five show substantial partisan updating in 
response to disagreement, while their older counterparts remain significantly more 
steadfast in their identities.  In other words, partisans under the age of thirty-five are more 
vulnerable to disagreement, but they are able to resist updating as long as they have the 
cognitive resources to do so.  It is also noteworthy that this effect seems to occur at the 
expense of past party identification, since the impact of past party identification on 
current party identification drops off dramatically in the cognitive load condition—
particularly among those who are thirty-five or under (p<.01).
28
   
Looking back at the predictions made in Figures 3.1, the observed pattern appears 
to fit expectations extremely well (See Panel A and Panel B).  Disagreement has a much 
larger and more significant effect on younger partisans than older partisans, but only in 
                                                                                                                                            
non-linearity associated with cognitive deterioration in advanced age.  If the model is run with age as a 
continuous variable, and all respondents over the age of sixty are excluded, the effects are nearly identical. 
27 See Table 3.2 in Appendix A. 
28 See Table 3.3 in Appendix A. 
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the presence of cognitive load (p<.05).  In other words, cognitive load appears to be 
particularly disruptive to the justification process among those with the least political 
experience.  This contrasts with existing models that portray age as either a proxy for life 
stage or information acquisition.  These theories cannot account for different effects in 
the “cognitive load” versus “no cognitive load conditions.”  These results suggest that 
partisans devote their cognitive resources to identity defense.  The predicted probability 
of maintaining a strong party identity is broken down by age and displayed in Figure 3.3.  
[Insert Figure 3.3] 
Once again, however, while the disagreement effects that emerge under cognitive 
load are significantly different from zero, these results are not significantly different from 
the null results obtained in the absence of cognitive load—though they are in the 
expected direction.  This is indicated by the interaction between cognitive load and 
disagreement in the full triple interactive model (p = .23).
29
  Again, we are left with 
results that are suggestive, but not incontrovertible. 
Political Sophistication.  The correlation between party identification and issue 
attitudes is known to increase with political sophistication (Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996).  But, do these more knowledgeable citizens bring their party identities into line 
with their issue attitudes, or do they bring their issue attitudes into line with their party 
identities?  Zaller (1992) argues that individuals with higher levels of political 
sophistication are able to avoid accepting information that runs counter to their party 
identity, but what happens when acceptance cannot be avoided or when acceptance 
occurs prior to finding out where the parties stand?  This is the central question in the 
debate over the relationship between attitudes and party identification.  Political 
                                               
29 See Table 3.3 in Appendix A. 
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sophistication is interacted with disagreement in order determine whether it moderates 
the relationship between disagreement and party identification.   
Predicted probabilities in Figure 3.4 show that political sophistication does indeed 
have a substantial moderating effect on the relationship between disagreement and party 
identification strength even in the absence of cognitive load.  Those at the lowest end of 
the political sophistication scale drop from a 68% probability of continuing to report a 
strong party identity to a 17% probability of reporting a strong party identity when 
exposed to disagreement.  This is compared to an increase from 92% to 96% probability 
of continuing to report strong party identification among the most sophisticated members 
of the sample.  This extremely large effect among the least sophisticated partisans again 
suggests that partisan updating occurs predominantly among the most vulnerable 
members of the electorate.  However, since the effect emerges without inducing cognitive 
load, proponents of the revisionist model of partisanship might argue in favor of an 
alternative explanation.  Instead of defending their identities, highly sophisticated 
partisans may simply not be swayed by disagreement with their party over a single issue 
when there are many others on which they agree.   
When placed under cognitive load, the enormous effect of disagreement on the 
least sophisticated appears to drop off.  The effect of disagreement on the least 
knowledgeable is no longer statistically distinguishable from zero,
30
 though the 
coefficient remains negative and this shift is not statistically significant.
31
  While it might 
appear as though cognitive load is undermining reception of the disagreement stimulus, 
this possibility was ruled out in the manipulation check.  Therefore, this pattern, though 
                                               
30 See Table 3.4 in Appendix A. 
31 See Table 3.5 in Appendix A. 
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non-significant, would seem to support the revisionist model of party identification over 
the dual motivations theory.  It appears that cognitive load may have inhibited the ability 
of the least sophisticated individuals to adjust their party identification in response to 
disagreement.  It is noteworthy, however, that more sophisticated partisans appear to 
have moved in the opposite direction, becoming slightly more susceptible to identity 
change in response to disagreement.  Though this slope shift does not reach statistical 
significance either (p = .19),
32
 this pattern favors the dual motivations theory over the 
revisionist model (See Figure 3.1, Panel B and Panel C).  The probability of maintaining 
a strong identity in response to the disagreement treatment is displayed for the highest 
and lowest in political sophistication in Figure 3.4.        
[Insert Figure 3.4] 
While cognitive load may inhibit updating among the least sophisticated 
partisans, it may also increase partisan updating among the most sophisticated subjects.  
This suggests that cognitive load may first reduce defensive abilities, but once cognitive 
resources drop below a certain threshold, partisans are no longer able to defend or update 
their party identities.  This conclusion is, of course, merely speculative.        
Democratic Identity.  Given that this experiment was conducted during May 
2007, these data provide a perfect opportunity to examine the moderating effect of 
political context.  The second term of George W. Bush’s administration appears not to 
have been an easy time to maintain a Republican identity.  According to a report released 
by The Pew Research Center, identification with the Republican Party dropped from 29% 
in 2005 to 25% in 2007 (Kohut et al. 2007).  During the same period, Republicans’ 
“satisfaction with the way things are going in the country today” plummeted from near 
                                               
32 See Table 3.5 in Appendix A. 
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70% satisfied in 2005 to only 58% satisfied by 2007.  According to Gallup poll data, 
presidential job approval ratings also dropped sharply among Republicans leading up to 
this experiment.  As recently as September of 2006, 86% of Republican approved of the 
job President Bush was doing, but by the beginning of June 2007, his approval rating had 
dropped to only 70% among Republicans.  This decline continued into July when 
Republicans approval ratings finally bottomed out at 65% (Gallup 2008).  While these 
polls support the notion that partisans do hold their own party accountable for its 
performance (Gerber and Green 1999), at least to some degree, the fact that Republicans 
attitudes do not actually converge with those of Democrats suggests that partisan biases 
do play a role (Bartels 2002).  From the perspective of the dual motivations theory, such a 
pattern suggests that Republicans may have been susceptible to partisan change during 
this period, yet still motivated to maintain their identities.  In other words, it would have 
likely been difficult to devise a justification for maintaining one’s Republican identity 
upon encountering disagreement over yet another issue—this time the “Common Sense 
in Outsourcing Bill.” 
It is noteworthy that neither the classic model of party identification nor the 
revisionist model would predict this type of partisan asymmetry in a controlled 
experiment.  While proponents of the revisionist model would certainly expect to see 
more identity change among Republicans than Democrats in a survey context, this is not 
the case in an experiment in which all partisans either received the same disagreement 
stimulus or no disagreement stimulus.  The classic model of party identification predicts 
minimal change in either partisan group.  The dual motivations model is the only model 
93 
of the three that can account for these types of asymmetries in an experimental context, 
because the political context should affect one’s ability to justify her identity. 
Results confirm the prediction derived from the dual motivations theory.  When 
cognitive resources are uninhibited, a large and significant disagreement effect emerges 
among Republicans (p<.05).
33
  Democrats, on the other hand, are significantly less likely 
than Republicans to change their identities in response to disagreement (p<.05).  
However, when placed under cognitive load, Democrats join Republicans in updating 
their identities in response to disagreement and become significantly more likely to report 
weaker party identities (p<.10).
 
 The predicted probability of maintaining a strong party 
identity is displayed in Figures 3.5.  The pattern displayed here matches almost perfectly 
with the predictions made in Figures 3.1 (See Panel B and Panel C), and the moderating 
effect of cognitive load is statistically significant (p<.10).
 34
 
[Insert Figure 3.5]          
 
Discussion 
In all, while some findings appear to support the cognitive resources hypothesis 
more strongly than others, the overall pattern of findings appears to conform quite well to 
predictions.  Considering the reputation of party identification as the “unmoved mover” 
in behavior research, to produce variation at all in an experimental context is quite 
striking.  In the very few instances in which researchers have attempted to produce 
partisan change in a controlled environment, party identification has appeared to remain 
very stable (Cowden and McDermott 2000).  The inevitable question in response to such 
                                               
33 See Table 3.6 in Appendix A. 
34 See the triple interaction term in Table 3.7 in Appendix A.   
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findings is of course whether they constitute evidence of partisan stability or merely 
amount to a null result stemming from insufficient stimulus power.  The experiment 
presented here represents an attempt to move beyond dichotomous predictions in which 
party identification must either be responsive or highly stable.  The results suggest that 
partisan stability is conditional, and given the convergence of patterns across a number of 
tests, partisan stability seems to be conditional on the ability to justify one’s identity in 
the face of disagreement.  
Rather than devoting their cognitive resources to updating their party identities so 
that they reflect their attitudes, partisan identifiers devote their resources to identity 
maintenance.  Cognitive resources are directly manipulated in the experiment through 
cognitive load induction in order to demonstrate their causal importance.  However, these 
resources appear to vary within the population.  Youth, lack of political sophistication, 
and context all appear to function as cognitive loads—making it more difficult to justify 
maintaining a stable party identity after experiencing disagreement with one’s party.   
Partisans over the age of thirty-five, those with higher levels of political sophistication, 
and Democratic identifiers all appear to have an easier time maintaining their identities 
after experiencing disagreement with their party.  However, even these individuals—rich 
in cognitive resources—appear not to be immune to the effects of the cognitive load 
manipulation.  In other words, once their resource advantage is taken away, they appear 
to react to disagreement by updating their party identities just like those who had fewer 




Table 3.1:  Cross-tabulation of Past Party Identity and Current Party Identity 
 
 






























Weak Dem 12.1% 82.8% 0.0% 3.4% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 
Lean Dem 9.1% 9.1% 65.9% 15.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Indep 5.8% 7.7% 17.3% 57.7% 5.8% 3.8% 1.9% 
Lean Rep 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.5% 66.0% 15.1% 11.3% 

















Strong Rep 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 13.0% 85.5% 
 
Note: Percentages are calculated so that rows sum to 100%.   
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Figure 3.1: Stages of Party Identity Change 
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Few er Cognitive Resources More Cognitive Resources
 
Note: Each panel represents a stage in the hypothesized progression of party identification change. The 
figures illustrate how those with the fewest cognitive resources will be the first to change their party 
identities in response to disagreement, but they will eventually be matched by those with more cognitive 
resources. The figures are not meant to reflect actual patterns in the data, but merely predictions about what 
these patterns will look like.   
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No Cognitive Load Cognitive Load
 
Note: The figure illustrates predicted probabilities obtained from the ordered probit regressions with 
controls reported in Appendix Table A.1.  For the purpose of prediction, pretest party identification 
strength  = 3, over thirty-five = 1, knowledge = mean, and Democrat = 1.  Therefore, results represent the 
probability of maintaining a strong party identity from pre to post. 
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Note: The figure illustrates predicted probabilities obtained from the ordered probit regressions reported in 
Appendix Tables A.2 and A.3.  For the purpose of prediction, pretest party identification strength  = 3. 
Therefore, results represent the probability of maintaining a strong party identity from pre to post. 
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Figure 3.4: The Effect of Disagreement on Party Identity Moderated by Political 




























































Low Sophistication High Sophistication
 
Note: The figure illustrates predicted probabilities obtained from the ordered probit regressions reported in 
Appendix Tables A.4 and A.5.  For the purpose of prediction, pretest party identification strength  = 3. 
Therefore, results represent the probability of maintaining a strong party identity from pre to post.  High 
sophistication means that predicted values are calculated with political sophistication set to 7, while low 
sophistication means that predictions were calculated with political sophistication set to 0.   
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Figure 3.5: The Effect of Disagreement on Party Identity Moderated by Previous 





























































   
Note: The figure illustrates predicted probabilities obtained from the ordered probit regressions reported in 
Appendix Tables A.6 and A.7.  For the purpose of prediction, pretest party identification strength  = 3. 
Therefore, results represent the probability of maintaining a strong party identity from pre to post.  Party 
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***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 











Table A.2:  The Effect of Age and Disagreement on Strength of Party Identification 
  
No Cognitive Load 
B 
(SE) 






































































***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Note: Results were obtained using ordered probit regression.
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Table A.3:  The Effects of Cognitive Load, Age, and Disagreement on Party 
Identification 
  
Party Identification Strength 
B (SE) 






































Cognitive Load*  




Cognitive Load*  




Cognitive Load*  




Cognitive Load*  




Cut 1 1.92 (.605) 
Cut 2 3.33 (.615) 
Cut 3 4.83 (.635) 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Note: Results were obtained using ordered probit regression. 
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Table A.4:  The Effect of Political Sophistication and Disagreement on Strength of 
Party Identification  
  
No Cognitive Load 
B 
(SE) 



































































***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Note: Results were obtained using ordered probit regression.
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Table A.5:  The Effects of Cognitive Load, Political Sophistication, and 
Disagreement on Party Identification 
  
Party Identification Strength 
B (SE) 














































Cognitive Load*  




Cognitive Load*  




Cut 1 -.141 (1.04) 
Cut 2 1.29 (1.04) 
Cut 3 2.83 (1.05) 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Note: Results were obtained using ordered probit regression.
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Table A.6:  The Effect of Democratic Identification and Disagreement on Strength 
of Party Identification  
  
No Cognitive Load 
B 
(SE) 


































































***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Note: Results were obtained using ordered probit regression.
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Table A.7:  The Effects of Cognitive Load, Democratic Identity, and Disagreement 
on Party Identification 
  
Party Identification Strength 
B (SE) 















































Cognitive Load*  




Cognitive Load*  




Cut 1 .926 (.398) 
Cut 2 2.37 (.408) 
Cut 3 3.87 (.436) 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Note: Results were obtained using ordered probit regression. 
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Figure B.1: Outsourcing Editorial 
EDITORIAL 




By LARRY STOCKTON 
Published: April 17, 2007 
 
 
WASHINGTON, April 16--As globalization continues, Americans are becoming 
increasingly worried about job security.  Though outsourcing originally 
concerned blue collar sectors of the economy, white collar jobs are now being 
shipped overseas as well.  With many college educated workers in countries like 
India willing to work for near minimum wage, companies stand to save millions 
through outsourcing.  Moreover, those businesses that choose not to engage in 
outsourcing will simply not be able to compete.   
 
Once a single firm begins to outsource, other companies face a huge competitive 
disadvantage 
if they do not 
do the same.  
Companies 









this cheap labor.  In other words, we cannot simple ask firms not to outsource.  
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Without legislation, their hands are essentially tied.  This is why the U.S. 
government needs to step in and pass the Common Sense in Outsourcing Bill to 
give companies an incentive to keep jobs in the U.S.   
 
This is not a conspiracy theory, but a simple application of Economics 101.  
Liberals and conservatives are nearly in universal agreement on these facts.  Over 
the coming years, millions of Americans will lose their jobs to outsourcing.  The 
question is how to deal with this growing problem.  The Common Sense in 
Outsourcing Bill would provide tax incentives for corporations to keep jobs on 
American soil.   
 
Opponents of this bill argue that outsourcing is just an inevitable part of the 
globalization process, and we should not attempt to get in its way.  However, 
supporters argue that this bill is in no way anti-globalization legislation.  It 
merely provides incentives for companies to continue to employ American 
workers.   
 
While nearly everyone agrees that there are long-term benefits to globalization, it 
is the short-term costs that have many Americans concerned.  Future generations 
will likely benefit from a globally integrated economy, but that does not mean 
that this generation and the next should be forced to pay all the transition costs.  
If globalization is left completely unimpeded, economists agree that we are likely 
to face record unemployment levels over the next 20 years.  The Common Sense 
in Outsourcing Bill is simply an attempt to avoid such massive unemployment 
and ease the transition into a globally integrated economy. 
 
The Common Sense in Outsourcing Bill would also prevent the U.S. government 
from contracting with foreign companies.  Since foreign companies are able to 
take advantage of cheaper labor, they are often able to underbid U.S. firms for 
contracts with the federal government.  For obvious reasons, defense contracts 
are already regulated in this way.  However, many less publicized government 
contracts are increasingly going to foreign firms.  For example, the federal 
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government spends millions of dollars on paper each year, but this paper comes 
from Canada.  Additionally, as the federal government continues to expand, 
bureaucratic work is being sent oversees.  For instance, the internal revenue 
service is currently looking into contracting with an Indian telecommunications 
company to outsource phone calls.  Soon you may have to talk to someone in 
India to get a question answered about your taxes. 
 
Clearly something needs to be done to provide Americans with economic security 
during this initial phase of globalization.  These are clearly tumultuous times in 
politics, and there are many important issues to consider.  Nonetheless, as we 
listen to the 2008 presidential candidates laying out their platforms, we must 
keep jobs in mind.  Without legislation, companies will have an ever increasing 
incentive to send American jobs overseas.  Therefore, passing the Common Sense 


























Figure B.2: Control Group 
Congress Considers Outsourcing Bill 
 
By ARNOLD HENSON 
Published: April 24, 2007 
 
WASHINGTON, April 23—Legislation entitled the “Common Sense in 
Outsourcing Bill” will soon come up for a vote in the Senate.  If passed, the bill 
would provide tax incentives for companies to employ American workers rather 
than outsourcing jobs to foreign shores.  Supporters of the bill contend that 
market based solutions through tax incentives are the way to go in easing the 
transition into a global economy.  To date, the bill has received a mixture of 
support and opposition from Republicans and Democrats alike.   
 
The bill’s sponsors argue that outsourcing is a growing problem that deserves our 
attention.  “American workers need our support, and if we don’t do something 
soon the problem will only get worse,” said Jack Phillips, founder of a bi-partisan 
advocacy group called the Business and Labor Partnership for America’s Future.  
Supporters also point out that the bill is not a tax cut for corporations, but rather 
a restructuring of the corporate tax code.  In other words, the bill would shift the 
tax burden to companies that outsource the most jobs.  This essentially amounts 
to a tax cut for firms that outsource the fewest jobs and a tax increase for 
corporations that outsource the most jobs.    
      
Asked where they stand on the outsourcing bill, respondents in a recent Gallup 
poll appear supportive.  What impact this bill will have on the 2008 presidential 
election is a point of debate among media pundits.  Since none of the contenders 
for the Republican and Democratic nomination have yet taken a public stance, its 








Figure B.3: Democratic Opposition Article 
Democrats to Oppose Outsourcing Bill 
 
By ARNOLD HENSON 
Published: April 24, 2007 
 
WASHINGTON, April 23—The Republican sponsored “Common Sense in 
Outsourcing Bill” will soon come up for a vote in the Senate, and Democrats are 
digging their heals in for a fight.  If passed, the bill would provide tax incentives 
for companies to employ American workers rather than outsourcing jobs to 
foreign shores, but Democrats complain that there is no room in the budget.   
 
Republicans, on the other hand, argue that outsourcing needs to be a priority, 
and the bill would cost the federal government very little in tax revenue.  
“American workers need our support, and if we don’t do something soon the 
problem will only get worse,” said Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R).  
Republican supporters also point out that the bill is not a tax cut for corporations, 
but rather a restructuring of the corporate tax code.  In other words, the bill 
would shift the tax burden to companies that outsource the most jobs.  This 
essentially amounts to a tax cut for firms that outsource the fewest jobs and a tax 
increase for corporations that outsource the most jobs.     
 
Asked where they stand on the outsourcing bill, Democratic presidential hopefuls 
appear to be towing the party line.  Hillary Clinton, Barrack Obama, and John 
Edwards have all pledged that they will vote no when the bill reaches the floor.  
What impact this will have on their presidential aspirations is a point of debate 
among media pundits.  Still, with Republican contenders united in support of the 
bill, things could be building toward a showdown over outsourcing in the 2008 








Figure B.4: Republican Opposition Article 
Republicans to Oppose Outsourcing Bill 
 
By ARNOLD HENSON 
Published: April 24, 2007 
 
WASHINGTON, April 23—The Democrat sponsored “Common Sense in 
Outsourcing Bill” will soon come up for a vote in the Senate, and Republicans are 
digging their heals in for a fight.  If passed, the bill would provide tax incentives 
for companies to employ American workers rather than outsourcing jobs to 
foreign shores, but Republicans complain that there is no room in the budget.   
 
Democrats, on the other hand, argue that outsourcing needs to be a priority, and 
the bill would cost the federal government very little in tax revenue.  “American 
workers need our support, and if we don’t do something soon the problem will 
only get worse,” said Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D).  Democratic 
supporters also point out that the bill is not a tax cut for corporations, but rather 
a restructuring of the corporate tax code.  In other words, the bill would shift the 
tax burden to companies that outsource the most jobs.  This essentially amounts 
to a tax cut for firms that outsource the fewest jobs and a tax increase for 
corporations that outsource the most jobs.    
 
Asked where they stand on the outsourcing bill, Republican presidential hopefuls 
appear to be towing the party line.  Rudi Giuliani, John McCain, and recent 
contender Fred Thompson have all spoken out against the bill.  What impact this 
will have on their presidential aspirations is a point of debate among media 
pundits.  Still, with Democratic contenders united in support of the bill, things 















In the 1950’s, Angus Campbell and his colleagues developed the concept of party 
identification because they believed that partisanship was rooted in self-classification and 
not merely evaluation (Campbell et al. 1954; Campbell et al. 1960).  While they 
acknowledged that partisanship could change, they observed that such change was 
infrequent.  From their point of view, party identification arises as individuals develop 
affective attachments to political parties during early socialization.  In arguing that 
partisanship constitutes an identity, they assume self-categorization has more to do with a 
person’s self-image and less to do with how that person evaluates political parties.  While 
individuals are expected to feel pressure to bring their party identities into alignment with 
their attitudes, the reverse influence of party identification on attitudes was thought to be 
much stronger.  
In the half-century since this seminal work was published, the concept of party 
identification has been revised to place much greater emphasis on evaluation and change 
over time (See Chapter 1).  While party identification is quite stable relative to other 
concepts, revisionist works have shown that partisans do update their identities to reflect 
various types of attitudes.  Some have gone so far as to argue that party identification 
approximates a “running tally” of evaluations (Fiorina 1981), and partisan stability is not 
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rooted in motivation but instead results from the accumulation of information about 
where the parties stand (Achen 1992, 2002; Franklin 1984).   
Recently, however, the revisionist scholarship has come under question for failing 
to account for measurement error (Green et al. 2002; Green and Palmquist 1990, 1994).  
Green and Schickler (1993) show that subtle variation in party identification occurs even 
when measured multiple times in a single survey.  Since one would not expect short-term 
forces to cause party identification change within the context of a single survey, they 
conclude it is due to measurement error.  When measurement error is accounted for in 
panel surveys, party identification appears far more stable than the revisionist accounts 
suggest (Green and Palmquist 1990; Green et al. 2002; Green and Palmquist 1994).  
However, this method remains controversial given that substantive identity change may 
be misidentified as measurement error.  In short, the nature and stability of party 
identification remain hotly contested subjects (see Johnston 2006).   
This chapter explains measurement error differently.  While remaining agnostic 
with regard to the degree of partisan stability, let us assume for a moment that Green and 
colleagues’ (2002; 1990; 1994) specification is appropriate, and party identification is 
highly stable once measurement error is taken into account.  Moreover, let us focus our 
attention on party identity variation within a single survey, a context in which Green and 
colleagues’ methods are much less controversial.  What might an examination of this 
measurement error tell us about the nature of party identification?   
Green and colleagues (2002) focus on random measurement error in party 
identification, attributing it to “subtle variations in the ways that these questions are read, 
interpreted, and recorded” (p. 53).  However, as these authors acknowledge, measurement 
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error may also be systematic, as survey responses are often influenced by the questions 
that precede them (see Schuman and Presser 1981; Schwarz 1999).  More specifically, 
survey responses are often affected by the considerations brought to mind by preceding 
questions.  For instance, party identification might be influenced by political attitude 
measures asked immediately prior.  This does not necessarily mean such changes are 
enduring.  In fact, question order effects are likely to be fleeting, and may reasonably be 
characterized as measurement error.  
The important thing to realize, however, is that even fleeting effects offer a 
window into the mind of the voter.  They imply that partisans are motivated to update 
their identities to reflect their attitudes even if they do not always act on these 
motivations.
35
  So why are these effects short-lived?  Do individuals return to their 
original party identities once the accessibility of these attitudes—primed momentarily by 
the survey—recede?  If so, chronically accessible attitudes should have more lasting 
effects on party identification.  On the other hand, individuals might return to their 
original identities because they are motivated to do so—finding ways to justify 
identification with their party despite holding attitudes that are not wholly consistent with 
that identity.   
The dual motivations theory suggests that partisan motivation should drive 
partisans back to their original party identities if they can come up with a justification for 
doing so.  Again, assuming for a moment that Green and colleagues are correct that party 
identification is stable after accounting for measurement error, such a result would 
                                               
35 This type of question order effect might be driven by the need for cognitive consistency or it may simply 
be that individuals use the information that is salient to them at the time of their response party 
identification questions.  Either way, such an effect would suggest a motivation to bring one’s identity into 
line with his or her attitudes. 
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suggest a very different implication.  If partisan stability is driven by the accumulation of 
information about what the parties symbolize (Green et al. 2002), then partisan voting is 
roughly compatible with democratic ideals.  However, if stable party identification results 
from partisan motivated identity defense, then parties are not being held accountable for 
their performance or issue positions.   
Studies have shown that survey questions sometimes capture respondents’ 
attempts to justify their behaviors (Rahn et al. 1994).  For example, a respondent might 
be disinclined to acknowledge strong identification with the Republican Party 
immediately after reflecting on her lukewarm evaluations of the Republican Party’s 
performance (or her positive evaluations of the Democratic Party’s performance).  
However, the act of reconsidering one’s partisan ties should trigger partisan motivation.
36
  
Therefore, we should expect to see evidence of identity justification in response to 
attitude priming.  And if party identification change has occurred, this justification should 
lead individuals back to their original identity.  In short, subtle variation, which might 
otherwise be dismissed as harmless measurement error, may provide insight into the 
empirical controversy surrounding party identification.  I suspect some of this variation 
results from the motivational interplay that goes on in the mind of a partisan when her 
evaluations challenge her identity.  An understanding of these motivations is critical to 
determining the implication of the powerful association between party identification and 
political attitudes.   
 
Saliency Hypothesis:  Individuals will update their identities to reflect their attitudes 
when these attitudes are made salient prior to reporting their party identity.  However, 
                                               
36 This should occur regardless of whether or not the act of reconsidering weakens party identification. 
118 
subsequent identity justification—observable in subjects’ responses—will undo these 
changes in party identification. 
 
Experiment 
Through a national survey experiment, I examine how partisans react when they 
are asked about their attitudes toward parties prior to reporting their party identification.  
This study takes advantage of political context by examining Republican identifiers 
during a time of declining attitudes toward, and identification with, the Republican Party.  
Employing a simple question order manipulation, I examine how partisans (particularly 
Republicans) react when primed to consider their attitudes toward one of the two parties 
prior to reporting their party identification.  In doing this, I view the survey as a 
microcosm of political life.  As individuals experience politics, various attitudes become 
salient just like they do in surveys, and, undoubtedly, sometimes some of these attitudes 
conflict with party identity.  Since the 1950’s, researcher have wrestled with whether or 
not citizens update their identities to reflect these attitudes.  However, while there is 
disagreement in the literature with regard to substantive party identification change, even 
the most ardent proponents of a stable party identification model acknowledge that it 
varies over time.  However, they believe this variation is mostly due to measurement 
error and not substantive change (Green et al. 2002; Green and Palmquist 1990, 1994).   
But, if the psychological pressures at work in a survey are analogous to the 
psychological pressures partisans experience every day, this variation may tell us a great 
deal about the inner-workings of the partisan mind—even if these changes are fleeting.  It 
also means that by manipulating question order, systematic variation in party identity 
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may be induced.  Then, if partisans revert back to their original identities by the end of 
the survey, the questions obtained between the two measures of party identification may 
be examined for evidence of identity justification.  Presumably, if partisans are motivated 
to return to their identities, the identity justification process should be evident in their 
responses.  Finally, if such evidence is uncovered, mediation tests can be run to 
determine whether justification is necessary for identity reversion.  In other words, it may 
be possible to document the full dual motivations theory in action.   
Methods    
Participants.  The salience hypothesis is tested though a national survey 
experiment of 300 adults administered by YouGov/Polimetrix on February 18-19, 2008.
37
   
However, the 118 respondents who identified as Republicans or Independents leaning 
toward the Republican Party will be the focus of the analysis.  At the time the study was 
in the field, vigorous primary battles were going on in both the Democratic and 
Republican parties. On the Democratic side, Hillary Clinton was up against Barrack 
                                               
37 This experiment was originally a 600 subject study with a 3x2 design.  The second experimental factor 
induced disagreement between individuals and their party using the same method as in the previous 
chapter.  Subjects read two mock newspaper articles.  The first article was an editorial arguing in favor of a 
fictitious balanced budget amendment.  Subjects were then asked to take a position on the bill.  In the 
disagreement condition, the second article informed subjects that their party (as determined by their pre-test 
party identity) had opposed the bill.  In the no disagreement condition, the second article discussed the 
potential political importance of the amendment and the fact that the amendment had not yet become a 
partisan issue.   The question order primes were originally meant to provide partisans with an opportunity 
to justify their party identity after exposure to disagreement and prior to reporting their party identity.  
However, the primes themselves turned out to stimulate party identification change (for reasons explained 
above), and justification did not occur until after party identification was reported.  Interaction effects 
between the two experimental factors offered little additional insight.  Therefore, the decision was made to 
exclude the disagreement treatment groups and focus on the question primes, because they actually turned 
out to be a more effective stimulus to party identification change than the disagreement treatment.   In the 
excluded portion of the experiment, Republican did report significantly weaker party identities after 
exposure to the disagreement stimulus (p<.05), whereas disagreement had no significant effect on 
Democrats.  Results from ordered probit regression show that the predicted probability of maintaining a 
strong Republican identity from time 1 to time 2 drops from .96 to .84 after exposure to disagreement.  This 
study is entirely distinct from those discussed in other chapters.  Polimetrix interviewed 759 respondents in 
order to match down to a sample of 600.  Respondents were matched on gender, age, race, education, party 
identification, and political interest. 
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Obama, and on the Republican side, Mike Huckabee was pitted against John McCain.  
While Democratic identifiers viewed theirs as a choice between two excellent candidates, 
many Republicans were less enthusiastic about their options.
38
  At the same time, 
Republican president George W. Bush faced a 31% approval rating due in large part to 
dissatisfaction over the Iraq War and a slowing economy.
39
  Therefore, this moment in 
time provided an excellent opportunity to examine party identification under threat.  How 
would Republicans react when primed to consider their party evaluations immediately 
prior to reporting their party identification?  
Procedure.  The salience hypothesis suggests that when attitudes are primed prior 
to reporting party identity, subjects will feel psychological pressure to update their party 
identities to reflect these attitudes.  To test this hypothesis, a 3-celled experiment primed 
attitudes toward the Republican Party, Democratic Party, or neither (control), as subjects 
considered how to answer the party identification questions.  The study is laid out in 
Table 4.1.  The treatment was delivered via a straightforward question order 
manipulation.  Attitude primes consisted of a series of three questions about the 
Republican Party or the Democratic Party.  The first of these questions asked about the 
party’s performance in Congress.  The second question asked subjects how much they 
trusted the party to handle the nation’s problems.  And the third question asked subjects 
for their feelings toward the party in general.  Those who received the Republican Party 
attitude prime were asked about their attitudes toward the Democratic Party immediately 
                                               
38 A Gallup poll conducted from February 8-10, 2008 asked, “Compared to previous elections, are you 
more enthusiastic than usual about voting, or less enthusiastic?” Among Democrats, 80% answered “more 
enthusiastic” compared with only 42% of Republicans.  On the other hand, 50% of Republicans responded 
that they were “less enthusiastic” compared with only 30% of Democrats (http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 
103531/Monitoring-Campaign.aspx).   
39 Approve ratings taken from a Gallup Poll run Feb 11-14, 2008 (www.gallup.com) 
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after the party identification question, and vice versa for those who received the 
Democratic Party attitude prime.  Those assigned to the control condition were asked the 
same questions after reporting their party identification.  In the control condition, the 
order of the question batteries was randomized so that some of the subjects were asked 
about the Republican Party before they were asked about the Democratic Party, and 
others were first asked about the Democratic Party before being asked about the 
Republican Party.   
Measures.  Treatment groups are coded as dummy variables: Republican Party 
prime and Democratic Party prime.  Three measures of party identification were 
obtained, including a pre-test measure of party identification acquired from YouGov/ 
Polimetrix.  As in the previous study, the pretest measure was not obtained during the 
survey, since this would likely have biased results.  Instead, it was attained from the 
YouGov/Polimetrix records.  Since YouGov/Polimetrix uses a sample matching 
procedure, they have party identification on record for all of the respondents in their pool.   
The second party identification measure was obtained using this same procedure 
immediately after exposure to the treatment.  Both of these measures made use of the 
standard branching question from the American National Election Studies (ANES) which 
yields a 7-point scale running from strong Democrat to strong Republican.  A third and 
final party identification question was asked near the end of the study.  In order to avoid 
consistency bias, the 7-point self-placement measure of party identification was used. 
This item has been found to be similarly reliable to the standard ANES party 
identification measure (Green and Schickler 1993). The 7-point self-placement measure 
is a Likert-type scale rather than a branching question.  Each of the seven points is 
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labeled so that the scale runs from Strong Democrat to Strong Republican.  Responses to 
all three of the party identification questions were re-scaled to run from strong 
Republican (3) to strong Democrat (-3).  In the previous chapter, Republicans and 
Democrats were examined together in all analyses.  Since this dissertation examines the 
forces that weaken party identification (as opposed to focuses that move the electorate 
toward a particular party), it was necessary to rescale the party identification items into 
measures of party identification strength.  In this chapter, however, all analyses are 
conducted separately for Republicans and Democrats.  Therefore, rescaling is not 
necessary, and I simply use the full party identification measures.      
 As mentioned earlier, attitudes toward parties are measured using an index of 
three questions regarding each of the two major parties.  These questions are taken from 
the ANES.  Factor analysis of these six items shows that they line up on two distinct 
dimensions:  attitudes toward the Republican Party and attitudes toward the Democratic 
Party.
40
  Indexes called attitudes toward Republican Party and attitudes toward 
Democratic Party are created by recoding each of the three items to run from -1 to 1 and 
then averaging across the three items.  The end result is two indexes that each run from -1 
(negative attitudes) to 1 (positive attitudes).  The first item reads, “Do you approve or 
disapprove of the way that the [Republicans/ Democrats] are handling their job in 
Congress?”  Responses range from “disapprove strongly” to “approve strongly” on a 7-
point scale.  The second item asks respondents, “How much trust and confidence do you 
have in the [Republican/ Democratic] Party when it comes to handling the nation’s 
problems?”  Response options range from “no confidence at all” to “a great deal of 
confidence” on a 7-point scale.  The final item reads, “We would like to get your general 
                                               
40 See Appendix A, Table 4.2 
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feelings about the [Republican/ Democratic] Party.  Please rate the [Republican/ 
Democratic] Party with what we call a feeling thermometer by typing a number from 0 to 
100.  On this feeling thermometer, ratings between 0 and 49 degrees mean that you don't 
feel favorably toward the party and that you don't care too much for that party.  Ratings 
between 51 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorably and warm toward the party.  If 
you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the party you would rate it at 50 degrees.”  
Those who answer “don’t know” are set to the scale’s midpoint for all three questions in 
the index.     
 Finally, the emotions respondents felt toward each party were measured through a 
series of seven questions.  Subjects were asked, “How [angry, afraid, frustrated, hopeful 
enthusiastic], do you feel when you think about the [Republican/ Democratic] Party?  
Responses were then added to form indexes of positive (hopeful + enthusiastic) and 
negative (angry + afraid + frustrated) emotions, and each was rescaled to run from 0 to 1.  
The negative emotion index was then subtracted from the positive emotion index to form 
additional measures of global emotion toward each party that each ran from -1 to 1.  
Factor analysis shows that the ten emotion items line up on two distinct factors 




Table 4.2 illustrates the degree to which party identification changed between the 
time YouGov/ Polimetrix obtained the first observation (t1) and the time the second 
observation was obtained in this study (t2).  Shaded cells represent partisans whose party 
identities did not weaken from time 1 to time 2.  Clearly, party identification varies over 
                                               
41 See Appendix A, Figure 4.3 
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time, but the question remains whether this variation is random or systematic.  Moreover, 
to the degree it varies within surveys, what are the causes of this change and why do 
partisans tend to revert back?  Experiments are extremely useful when such dilemmas 
arise, since experimental manipulation with random assignment ensures exogeneity.   
[Insert Table 4.2] 
This experiment is built on the premise that, in February of 2008, Republicans’ 
own evaluations of the Republican and Democratic parties would put pressure on their 
party identity when made salient.  Therefore, I begin by first examining Republicans’ 
attitudes toward the two parties relative to Democrats’ attitudes toward the two parties.  
The idea is to determine whether Republicans’ own attitudes were likely to threaten their 
party identification.  As expected, when obtained prior to party identification (t2), 
Republicans attitudes toward their own party (M= .131, SD= .399) were less positive on 
average than Democrats’ attitudes toward their own party (M= .339, SD= .414, p<.01).  
Republicans’ attitudes toward the Democratic Party (M= -.569, SD= .367) were also less 
negative than Democrats’ attitudes toward the Republican Party (M= -.681, SD= .305, 
p<.10), so priming either of these attitude dimensions was likely to put pressure on party 
identification.   
Table 4.3 displays the effects of the attitude primes on party identification among 
Republicans, Democrats, and Independents.
42
  While Democrats and Independents do not 
seem to have been affected, the priming manipulation does appear to have put pressure 
on Republican identities, just as expected.  In particular, priming attitudes toward the 
Democratic Party weakened Republicans’ identification with their own party.  The 
                                               
42 Republicans and Democrats include those who initially identified as Independents but admitted to 
leaning toward one party or the other.  Independents, therefore, refers to “pure” Independents. 
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coefficient on the Republican Party attitude prime is in the right direction, but is not 
statistically significant (p= .50).  As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the predicted probability of 
maintaining a strong Republican identity from time 1 to time 2 drops from 90% in the 
control condition to 72% in the Democratic Party attitude prime condition.    
Perhaps surprisingly, these priming effects do not appear to be moderated by the 
attitudes solicited in the priming stimuli.
43
  This suggests that the effect elicited from the 
Democratic prime was not driven by those Republicans whose attitudes toward the 
Democratic Party were most positive, but was instead driven by an equal weakening of 
party identity across all Republicans.  However, this null moderating effect may mask the 
moderating effect of attitude change.  In other words, the priming effect may be driven 
by those Republicans whose attitudes toward the Democratic Party changed the most 
from time 1 to time 2 rather than being driven by those Republicans who had the most 
positive attitudes toward the Democratic Party at the time of the study.  Unfortunately, 
YouGov/ Polimetrix does not keep measures of attitudes toward parties on record, so the 
potential moderating effect of attitude change cannot be tested.  All we know is that 
Republicans’ attitudes toward each of the parties were less extreme than those held by 
their Democratic counterparts, as reported above.  In other words, though we cannot be 
certain, the between-party comparison suggests that Republicans’ attitudes are likely to 
have changed from time 1 to time 2.  
[Insert Table 4.3] [Insert Figure 4.1] 
Perhaps the most important question is how partisans reacted to the psychological 
pressure that was apparently induced by the question order manipulation.  As outlined 
above, when asked to report their attitudes prior to reporting their party identification 
                                               
43 See Appendix A 
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(t2), Republicans expressed attitudes toward both parties that were less consistent with 
their party identification than those of their Democratic counterparts.  We saw in Table 
4.3 that reporting these attitudes prior to reporting their party identification made 
Republicans feel pressure to update their identities to reflect these attitudes.  Therefore, I 
now examine the differences between attitude measures obtained prior to party 
identification (t2) versus attitude measures obtained after party identification.  The 
saliency hypothesis suggests that attitudes obtained after party identification should show 
evidence of identity justification.  Table 4.4 illustrates how the simple question order 
manipulation affected Republicans’ attitudes toward the parties.  Results suggest that 
attitude priming triggered attitudinal bolstering on whichever dimension was measured 
immediately after party identification.  Specifically, on a scale that runs from -1 to 1, 
subjects report attitudes toward the Democratic Party that are .161 lower when reported 
after party identification than when reported prior to party identification.  Likewise, they 
report attitudes toward the Republican Party that are .094 higher when asked after 
reporting their party identification, though this effect does not reach statistical 
significance. 
[Insert Table 4.4] 
In short, it appears that the priming manipulation triggered accuracy motivation.  
In order to maintain the belief that their identities were rooted in pragmatism, 
Republicans felt that they must update their identities to reflect these attitudes, and they 
did so significantly in the Democratic Prime condition.  However, this conflicted with 
their directional motivation to maintain a stable party identity.   Therefore, in order to 
justify their identities, Republicans bolstered their attitudes on whichever dimension was 
127 
obtained after party identification—particularly in the Republican Prime condition.  
Given findings in Chapter 2, it is also worth drawing attention to the fact that, though 
effects were in the same direction across conditions, Republicans’ dominant response to 
the Democratic Party prime was to update their party identity whereas their dominant 
response to the Republican prime was to derogate the Democratic Party.  In other words, 
subjects may have been more adept at using their attitudes toward the opposition party to 
justify their identity despite their attitudes toward their favored party (lesser of two evils 
justification) as opposed to vice versa (greater of two goods justification).  No such 
effects emerge among Democratic respondents, which makes sense given that their 
attitudes were more partisan to begin with and they did not report weaker party identities 
in response to those attitudes being primed.   
Still, while these effects provide clear support for the theory, another indicator of 
identity justification would make the case even stronger.  Therefore, I turn my attention 
to emotions toward parties.  In addition to their cognitive component, attitudes also have 
an emotional component or affective tag (see Eagly and Chaiken 1993), and this may be 
the part an attitude that is most susceptible to the motivational forces that constitute the 
focus of this dissertation.  In a study of social context effects on cognitive dissonance, 
Cooper and Mackie (1983) produced cognitive dissonance in members of a Republican 
student group by asking them to write a positive statement about a Democratic candidate.  
Typically, in this paradigm, subjects reduce cognitive dissonance arousal by changing 
their attitudes so that they are consistent with the statement that they have written.  In this 
case, however, since changing their attitudes to make them consistent with their statement 
would have conflicted with their Republican identity (and membership in the Republican 
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student group), these students instead resolved their cognitive dissonance by reporting 
more negative feelings toward Democrats.   
With this study in mind, Table 4.5 displays the effects of attitude priming on 
emotions toward the two parties.  As suspected, the emotional bolstering pattern appears 
strikingly consistent with the attitude bolstering pattern from above.  When attitudes 
toward the Democratic Party were primed, Republicans reported more positive emotion 
(B= .100, SE= .049, p<.05) and less negative emotion toward their own party (B= -.091, 
SE= .053, p<.10).  When attitudes toward the Republican Party were primed, Republicans 
reported less positive emotion (B= -.103, SE= .035, p<.01) and more negative emotion 
toward the Democratic Party (B= .075, SE= .047, p=.12)—though the negative emotion 
effect narrowly misses the threshold for statistical significance at the p<.10 level.  When 
the emotion items are combined into a single measure of total affect, the Democratic 
prime leads to a significant positive shift in total affect toward the Republican Party (B= 
.184, SE= .063, p<.05), and the Republican prime significantly shifts total affect toward 
the Democratic Party in a negative direction (B= -.178, SE= .071, p<.05).  In other words, 
whichever dimension did not serve as the basis for partisan updating served as the basis 
for partisan justification.  The effect of the Republican prime is particularly interesting, 
since it did not produce significant party identification change.  Nonetheless, it appears 
that the prime did arouse cognitive inconsistency, which Republican subjects dealt with 
by derogating the Democratic Party.  By simply bringing attitudes to bear on party 
identification, partisan change was induced and efforts to justify ones’ party identification 
followed.  
[Insert Table 4.5] 
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Given Republicans’ efforts to justify their identities in response to priming and 
partisan change, the question remains as to whether these efforts were successful in 
producing a rebound in party identification by the end of the study.  Results from Table 
4.6 suggest that they were indeed successful.  Controlling for both of the prior party 
identification measures, both attitude primes are positively associated with party 
identification at time 3—though only the effect of the Democratic attitude prime reaches 
statistical significance.  Recall that this was also the prime that significantly weakened 
party identification from time 1 to time 2.  Substantively speaking, this finding suggests 
that these primes produce a strengthening of party identification from time 2 
(immediately after the attitude prime) to time 3 (at the end of the fifteen-minute study).  
In other words, after initially weakening in response to these attitude primes, 
Republicans’ identities appear to have rebounded by the end of the study. The predicted 
probability of reverting back to strong Republican identification after initially weakening 
one’s identity is presented in Figure 4.2.  The figure shows that, once their identities 
began to weaken, most Republicans in the control group maintained their weak identity 
(first observed at time 2) or weakened their identity further.  The probability of reverting 
back to strong party identification in the control group is only 7.8%.  On the other hand, 
those in the two treatment conditions, and particularly those exposed to the Democratic 
prime, show a higher probability of reverting back to strong identification with their 
party.  Those exposed to the Democratic prime rebounded back to strong identification 
18.3% of the time, and those exposed to the Republican prime rebounded 12.3% of the 
time. Presumably this identity rebound resulted from the attitudinal and emotional 
bolstering demonstrated in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. 
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[Insert Table 4.6] [Insert Figure 4.2] 
In order to establish that emotional bolstering mediates this rebound in party 
identification, the emotion measures obtained between the time 2 and time 3 party 
identification measures are included in the model.  As expected, inclusion of the measure 
of total affect toward the Republican Party reduces the size of the coefficients associated 
with the exposure to the Democratic Party prime.  A Sobel test for mediation establishes 
that emotions toward Republicans significantly mediate the relationship between the 
Democratic prime and party identification at time 3 (p<.10) (see Baron and Kenny 1986).  
Turning to the other treatment, there is little room for identity rebound to occur, since 
exposure to the Republican Party prime did not significantly weaken party identification 
in the first place.  However, when total affect toward the Democratic Party is included in 
the model, the non-significant coefficient associated with exposure to the Republican 
prime drops substantially.
44
   
Figure 4.3 illustrates the size of the effect that emotional bolstering had on party 
identity.  More specifically, the figure shows the predicted probability of rebounding to 
strong Republican identification at time 3 after weakening from a strong to a weak 
identification from time 1 to time 2.  In both the control group and the Democratic prime 
condition, this probability increases with positive affect toward the Republican Party.  
However, the impact of positive affect is clearly much greater in the Democratic prime 
condition, where the probability of strong identification at time 3 increases from a 2.1% 
to 32.7% as affect goes from most negative to most positive.  In the control group, this 
probability only increase from .9% to 21.5%.  In short, when party identification change 
                                               
44 This drop is so large that a Sobel test suggests that a significant portion of the non-significant effect is 
carried to the dependent variable by the mediator.  In the other words, if the rebound effect were 
significant, we could be confident that the effect was mediated by affect toward the Democratic Party. 
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was produced by priming attitudes toward the Democratic Party, Republicans were able 
to undo this change by bolstering their emotions toward the Republican Party. 




 This chapter examined “measurement error” in party identification in order to 
gain a better understanding of the processes driving identity variation.  Past research has 
posited that party identification varies as a result of measurement error, and not, for the 
most part, as a result of short-term forces (Green et al. 2002; Green and Palmquist 1990, 
1994).  And this stability is thought to arise from accumulation of information about what 
the parties symbolize and not partisan motivation (Green et al. 2002; Gerber and Green 
1998; Gerber and Green 1999).  While this dissertation remains agnostic with regard to 
the degree that party identification changes, it takes a strong position in favor of a dual 
motivations model of party identification.  In other words, stable party identification 
results from partisan motivation and not merely from the accumulation of information 
about the parties.  Yet, accuracy motivation may, at times, stimulate party identification 
change. 
Over the course of the past three chapters, I have provided evidence of partisan 
motivation in a variety of ways and across a variety of circumstances.  In this chapter, we 
have seen that, under the right circumstances, mere attitude priming can trigger 
responsiveness motivation and lead to party identification change.  However, when one’s 
attitudes toward a particular party pressure a person to change her identity, she may 
relieve that psychological pressure by bolstering her attitudes (cognitively and/ or 
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affectively) toward the other party.  Just as in Chapter 2, partisans avoid changing their 
identities (at least in the long-term) by justifying their identities in two dimensions.  As 
long as a person has more positive feelings toward her own party than toward the 
opposition party, stable party identification can be justified. 
In previous chapters, I experimentally induced disagreement between individuals 
and their party.  This chapter, on the other hand, made use of the real world political 
context to show how one’s own attitudes can both threaten and stabilize party 
identification.  By running this study during the 2008 primary election season, I was able 
to capitalize on the growing disaffection with the Republican Party which culminated in 
their stunning defeat in the general election and a drop in Republican identification across 
25 of 26 demographic groups (all but frequent churchgoes) from 2001 to 2009 (Etheridge 
2009).  While results strongly suggest that partisan motivation plays an important role in 
explaining the stability of party identification, it also appears that partisans do feel an 
obligation, at least under the right circumstances, to bring their identities into alignment 
with their attitudes.  The question remains, however, as to whether this responsiveness 
motivation is rooted in the desire to identify with the party that best represents one’s 
policy interests or whether it is embedded in the desire to conform to norms of civic duty 
and pragmatic partisanship.  This question will be taken up in Chapter 5.   
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Party Identification (t2) 
 
Party Identification (t2) Party Identification (t2) 







Emotions Toward  
Both Parties 
 
Emotions Toward  
Both Parties 
Emotions Toward  
Both Parties 
Party Identification (t3) 
 
Party Identification (t3) Party Identification (t3) 
Note:  The dotted line represents the start of the study.  Party identification  at time 1 comes from YouGov/ 
Polimetrix records. 
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Table 4.2: Post-test Party Identification by Pre-test Party Identification 
 
 






























Weak Dem 5.1% 79.7% 11.9% 1.7% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 
Lean Dem 9.4% 0.0% 87.5% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Indep 2.0% 0.0% 15.7% 74.5% 5.9% 0.0% 2.0% 
Lean Rep 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9.1% 66.7% 6.1% 18.2% 

















Strong Rep 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.1% 6.1% 89.8% 
 




























































































***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10 
Note:  Results come from ordered probit regression.  Republican, Democrat, and Independent are 
determined using party identification at time 1.  “Leaners” are included with Republicans and Democrats, 






Table 4.4: Republicans’ Attitudes toward Parties 
  








































***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10 
Note:  The table shows mean differences between attitudes measured before party identification versus 
those measured after party identification.  Differences in means are calculated using T-tests.  The attitude 
dimension obtained before party identification served as the prime.  
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***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10 



















































































Total Emotions Toward 
Democrats 
 










***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10 
Note:  To facilitate interpretation of mediation effects, results come from standard OLS regression.
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Democratic Prime Republican Prime Control
 
 
Note: The figure illustrates the probability of each level of Republican Party identification at time 2 after 
identifying as a strong Republican at time 1.
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Note:  The figure represents the predicted probability of reporting each level of Republican Party 
identification at time 3 after reporting a strong Republican identity at time 1 and a weak Republican 
identity at time 2.  
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Figure 4.3: The Impact of Emotional Bolstering on the Predicted Probability of 












































Note:  The figure represents the predicted probability of identifying as a strong Republican at t3 after 
reporting a strong Republican identity at t1 and a weak Republican identity at t2.  The intention is to 
illustrate the larger impact of emotions toward the Republican Party on this probability in the Democratic 




Table A.1:  The Moderating Effect of Attitudes on the Relationship between 
Attitude Priming and Party Identification among Republicans 
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Democratic Party Prime*  


































2.92 (.414) 3.10 (.536) 

















Trust Republican Party 
 
-.319 .886 
Approve of Republicans in Congress 
 
-.200 .816 
Democratic Feeling Thermometer 
 
.828 -.410 
Trust Democratic Party 
 
.931 -.277 

















 Note:  Eigenvalue cutoffs are set to 1.0 (Kaiser’s Rule).  Cattel’s scree test yields the same number of 
factors, as indicated by the Eigenvalues.  Extractions are based on principal axis factoring with varimax 
rotation.   
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 Note:  Eigenvalue cutoffs are set to 1.0 (Kaiser’s Rule).  Cattel’s scree test yields the same number of 
factors, as indicated by the Eigenvalues.  Extractions are based on principal axis factoring with varimax 















Over several chapters, it has been established that partisans are motivated to 
maintain their identities. Party identity change is psychologically costly, so people only 
update their identities if they cannot avoid it.  This chapter considers the implications of 
these costs for responsiveness motivation.  In particular, if there is a cost to updating 
one’s party identity, when is responsiveness motivation likely to be strong enough to 
produce identity change?      
The biological roots of group attachment are outlined by Darwin in The Descent 
of Man (1890).  He theorizes that natural selection led humans to become social animals, 
because “those who cared least for their comrades, and lived solitary, would perish in 
greater numbers” (p. 105).  He hypothesized that the pleasure we get from social group 
membership likely developed as an extension of familial affection.  Social psychologists 
have demonstrated that this social identification instinct may be awakened by merely 
dividing individuals into arbitrary groups.  Studies show that to do so biases individuals’ 
behavior in favor of the group to which they were assigned relative to the outgroup 
(Tajfel et al. 1971).  Intergroup competition only serves to solidify these identities and 
heighten group oriented behavior (Sherif 1956).  Therefore, given the ongoing rivalry and 
perpetual antagonism between political parties, it is not surprising that individuals 
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develop strong party allegiances that are costly to change.  Experiments have shown that 
high identifiers will often maintain group allegiances even when it means incurring 
individual costs, suggesting that to change their group allegiances is even more costly 
(Van Vugt and Hart 2004).  And these psychological costs may be compounded by social 
sanctions for disloyalty.  
Of course, under the right circumstances, it seems that individuals change their 
party identities despite these costs. Partisans sometimes update their identities to reflect 
their issues positions (Jackson 1975; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Franklin 1992), party 
performance evaluations (Fiorina 1981; MacKuen et al. 1989; Brody and Rothenberg 
1988), and attitudes toward the candidates parties run for office (Page and Jones 1979; 
Brody and Rothenberg 1988).  Most assume that individuals are driven to update their 
identities because they have a stake in political outcomes.  It follows that, if partisans are 
motivated to update their identities for this reason, party identification may serve an 
instrumental function by providing voters with a reliable heuristic that helps them make 
sense of politics while reducing information costs (Tomz and Sniderman 2005; Shively 
1979; Schaffner and Streb 2002; Huckfeldt et al. 1999; Popkin 1991).   
However, while it may seem perfectly innocuous to assume that party 
identification is driven by an individuals’ incentive to attain policy benefits, we should be 
very careful about doing so.  Specifically, if there is any social or psychological cost to 
changing one’s party identity, the motivation to attain policy benefits is unlikely to be 
sufficient to overcome this cost.  In other words, the well known paradox of voting may 
be a paradox of partisan responsiveness as well. 
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Downs (1957) explains that, in large-scale elections, abstention may be rational 
even for individuals who greatly prefer the policies of one party over another.  Since each 
person can only cast a single vote, the probability of influencing the outcome of an 
election is extremely small.  Therefore, the expected policy returns from voting are 
miniscule and unlikely to outweigh the cost of turnout (time, effort, etc.).   
Likewise, if there is any cost to updating one’s party identity, it may be rational to 
maintain a stable party identity regardless of the parties’ issue positions, performance, 
and candidates for office.  Again, since the probability of casting the decisive vote in any 
large-scale election approaches zero, the expected policy benefits to be derived from 
policy-oriented voting approach zero.  Therefore, the expected policy benefits to be 
derived from updating one’s party identity to reflect one’s policy interests also approach 
zero.   
Still, we have seen in previous chapters that, under the right circumstances, 
individuals do update their identities. But what motivates this responsiveness?  Downs 
solves the “paradox of voting” by arguing that there is a benefit to voting per se:  
“Rational men in a democracy are motivated to some extent by a sense of social 
responsibility relatively independent of their own short-run gains and losses” (p. 267).  
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) refer to this as the benefit of fulfilling one’s civic duty, and 
designate it as the “D-term” in their voter calculus model.  They model the rewards to be 
derived from voting as a function of the probability of casting the decisive vote (p), the 
policy benefits to be gained by the preferred party winning (B), the cost of turning out to 
vote (C), and the expressive benefits of voting (D).  Therefore, as long as CDpB >+ , a 
citizen will turnout to vote. 
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Rewards DCpB +−=  
The same solution can be applied to the paradox of partisan responsiveness.  
Partisans update their identities not because they want to identify with the party that 
offers the most policy benefits but because they feel that it is their civic duty to conform 
to societal norms of pragmatism over partisanship.  In Chapter 1, responsiveness 
motivation (R) is derived from the probability of one’s vote determining the outcome of 
the election (p), the policy benefits associated with the preferred election outcome (B), 
and the expressive benefits that come from seeing oneself as a pragmatic citizen—an 
aspect of civic duty (D).  The cost of partisan updating comes from acting against one’s 
partisan motivation (M), given the ability to justify acting on that motivation (J).  In 
short, responsive motivation is thought to be driven primarily by the desire for expressive 
benefits.     
Therefore, partisan identity weakening should only occur when MJDpB >+ .  In 
Chapter 2, the J-term is experimentally manipulated to illustrate that individuals are more 
likely to report weaker party identities in response to disagreement with their party when 
their ability to justify (J) acting on their partisan motivation (M) is reduced.  This chapter 
examines the other side of the inequality.  Given a very small and constant p, party 
identification should be relatively unaffected by the policy benefits (B) at stake in a given 
election.  However, increasing the salience of civic duty (D) should increase the 






An experiment was designed to make salient the types of considerations that are 
likely to increase responsiveness motivation, thereby amplifying the influence of issue 
positions on party identification.  If party identification is responsive, this would support 
revisionist claims.  However, while revisionist models portray party identification as 
serving an instrumental function in the quest for policy benefits, the dual motivations 
model suggests that the incentive to appear pragmatic and unbiased is likely to drive the 
relationship between party identification and issue positions.  In other words, partisan 
updating serves an expressive function.  The implications of this distinction are highly 
relevant to our understanding of democratic accountability.  If partisan responsiveness is 
driven, not by concerns over policy, but by civic duty and pragmatism, we cannot simply 
assume that self-interest will drive citizens to hold parties accountable.  And, if citizens 
are reluctant to hold parties accountable, this raises serious doubt about the efficiency of 
party identification as a heuristic.  While we know that party identification has an 
incredibly powerful influence on behavior (see Campbell et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 
2008), it is simply not clear whether this helps or harms democracy.  
 
Duty Hypothesis:  Responsiveness motivation, and therefore partisan change, will be 
driven by the desire to appear unbiased and pragmatic, thereby conforming to norms of 
civic duty.  Consequently, partisan identity updating will increase when norms of civic 
duty are made salient. 
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Stakes Hypothesis:  Party identification will not be affected by consideration of the 
policies the parties will attempt to enact upon taking power.  Therefore, partisan identity 
updating will not increase when the policies at stake in an election are made salient. 
Method 
 
Participants.  The sample is composed of 1,098 adult partisans and partisan 
“leaners” from across the United States and was attained over the Internet though 
YouGov/Polimetrix between July 29, 2008, and August 3, 2008.  YouGov/Polimetrix 
matched subjects down to the known marginals of the general population of the United 
States on gender, age, race, education, and political interest.  However, partisan “leaners” 
are under-represented in the sample by a substantial margin relative to strong and weak 
partisans.
45
  As in Chapter 3, “pure” independents are excluded from analysis, since the 
purpose of the study is to determine what conditions lead partisans to defect from their 
party.  Since “pure” independents claim no partisan allegiance, it cannot be determined 
whether movement in their party identification constitutes movement toward or away 
from a favored party. 
Procedure.  This experiment employs a three-celled design in which subjects are 
primed to consider the policy stakes of an upcoming election (i.e. instrumental concerns) 
or the norms of civic duty and pragmatism (i.e. expressive concerns).     
                                               
45 The full sample is composed of two sub-samples of 600 people conducted from 7/20/08 through 7/31/08, 
and 8/1/08 through 8/3/08 respectively.  After collecting the first sample, it was realized that partisans 
“leaners” were mistakenly left out of the sample.  There was also concern over the length of subjects’ 
responses to the stimulus.  Therefore, a sentence was added to both treatment conditions asking participants 
to “please explain your answer in a few sentences.”  The study was put back into the field the following 
day, and a new sample was collected—this time including partisan “leaners.”  For the purposes of analysis, 
the two sub-samples are combined.  Neither the sampling issue nor the additional wording affected random 
assignment, so the treatment conditions remain uncorrelated with any other variable (i.e. they remain 
exogenous).  Therefore, any differences that arise between experimental conditions can only be attributed 
to the priming stimuli and no other factor.     
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Both priming treatments were carried by a survey question administered near the 
beginning of the study.  In all three conditions, subjects read the following introduction: 
“Experts predict that nearly 200 million people will vote in the November 
election.  In addition to the presidential race, they will be casting votes for 
representatives and senators who will represent them in Congress.   
 
Most voters think of themselves as either a Republican or a Democrat, and 
most candidates are affiliated with one of those two parties.” 
   
In the control condition, respondents were not asked to comment.  However, in 
the policy stakes condition, this introduction was followed up with an open-ended 
question: 
“Think about what’s at stake in the upcoming election.  Do you believe the 
country and you personally will be seriously affected by which party wins 
this election?  Please explain your answer in a few sentences.” 
 
In the duty priming condition, participants were asked: 
 
“Think about what it means to be a good citizen.  Do citizens have a duty 
to consider the issues, or is it okay to just vote based on party?  Please 
explain your answer in a few sentences.”     
  
Measures.  A variable corresponding to past party identification strength is 
created by simply folding the standard 7-point party identification measure in half.  The 
new scale runs from 0 to 3.  Strong Democrats as well as strong Republicans are coded as 
3, weak partisans are coded as 2, leaners are coded as 1, and pure independents are coded 
as 0.  Because YouGov/Polimetrix uses sample matching to obtain nationally 
representative samples, they have party identification on record for everyone in their 
respondent pool.  Thus, it is possible to avoid the inevitable biases that would result if 
party identification were obtained immediately prior to the treatment. 
The primary dependent variable of interest in this study is current party 
identification strength.  This variable is coded identically to past party identification 
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strength except that those partisans who crossed over from one party to the other from 
time 1 to time 2 are coded as having zero strength.     
The measure of issue distance is based on subjects’ assessments of the party 
differential across a number of issues.  The party differential is calculated using a series 
of measures preceding party identification in the post-test instrument.  Participants are 
asked to take positions on taxation, guaranteed jobs, the Iraq War, healthcare, illegal 
immigration, abortion, gun control, and school vouchers.  They are then asked to place 
the Republican Party and Democratic Party respectively on identical 7-point scales.  
These items are either taken directly from the ANES or are modeled after ANES 
questions.
46
  Later in the survey, subjects are asked to rate the importance of each of these 
issues on a 7-point scale ranging from “not that important” to “extremely important.” 
The party differential is calculated using the standard method which considers 
individuals’ issue positions relative to those of the two parties.  However, in this case, the 
measure is oriented toward whichever party the respondent identifies with or leans 
toward in the pretest.  Each issue position is weighted by the importance rating (rescaled 
to run from 0 to 1) assigned to it by the respondent (Carsey and Layman 2006).  These 
weighted values are then added together to form a single summary measure of issue 
positions.
47
  The eight 7-point measures yield an index which is rescaled to run from -1 to 
1.  Individuals whose weighted issue positions are equidistant from the two parties 
receive a value of zero.  Those who favor their own party’s positions relative to the 
opposition party’s positions receive positive values.  Those who favor the opposition 
party’s positions receive negative values.           
                                               
46 The actual wording of the measures appears in the Appendix. 
47 Principal axis factor analysis of the seven issues resulted in a unidimensional solution with an Eigenvalue 
of 4.40. 
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 Dummy variables are created to represent exposure to the duty prime condition 
and policy stakes prime condition.  Subjects assigned to a treatment condition receive a 
value of “1” and all others receive a value of “0”.  
Results 
 
I begin by examining subjects’ responses to the two priming questions.  The 
experiment is built on the assumption that subjects assigned to the stakes condition would 
say that there was, indeed, something important at stake in the 2008 election.  In the 
norms condition, they were expected to endorse the norm of voting on the issues as 
opposed to simply voting for one’s party.  As expected, 82.6% of subjects assigned to 
stakes priming condition and 85.0% of respondents assigned to the norms priming 
condition responded in this manner.  
Next, I check random assignment to determine whether any chance associations 
exist between the treatment and any other exogenous determinant of current party 
identification strength.  While no significant differences in previous party identification 
strength or political sophistication emerge between experimental conditions, random 
assignment appears to have failed for age and Democratic identification.
48
  More 
specifically, prior to treatment, those assigned to the policy stakes condition show a 
higher propensity to report party identities on the Democratic side of the scale (M = .585, 
SD = .026) than those assigned to the control condition (M= .484, SD = 0.251, p<.01).
49
  
                                               
48 Political sophistication is measured using a 7-item battery.  Therefore, the political sophistication 
variable runs from 0 (none correct) to 7 (all correct).  This battery contains a variety of multiple choice 
questions about political figures and institutions.  Respondents are asked to identity the jobs filled by 
Nancy Pelosi, John Roberts, Dana Perino, and Gordon Brown.  Participants are also asked how many votes 
it takes to override a veto, which branch has the power to determine whether or not a law is constitutional, 
and which branch has the power of the purse. 
49 Democrat is a dummy variable.   
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In addition, subjects assigned to the duty prime are older on average (M = 49.21, SD = 
14.62) than subjects assigned to both the control group (M = 47.15, SD = 15.64, p<.05) 
and the policy stakes prime (M = 46.71, SD = 14.71, p<.05).  These variables will 
therefore be included as controls in analyses to follow.  Those assigned to the duty prime 
(M = 23.54, SD = 15.83) also wrote approximately three more words in response to the 
stimulus question than those assigned to the policy stakes prime (M = 20.19, SD = 18.62, 
p<.01).
50
  Therefore, in order to ensure that findings cannot be attributed to response 
intensity, word count will be controlled as well.  Predicted values will be estimated with 
age and stimulus word count set to their means, while party identification strength will be 
set to strong and (bipolar) party identification will be set to strong Republican. 
Past party identification and current party identification are cross tabulated in 
Table 5.1.  Results suggest that while there is a clear tendency toward stability, there does 
appear to be variance in party identification to explain.  However, the question is, of 
course, whether this variation constitutes real change or random measurement error 
(Green and Palmquist 1990, 1994; Green et al. 2002).   
[Insert Table 5.1] 
The first step is to examine the effect of both primes on current party 
identification while controlling for past party identification.  The expectation is that the 
duty prime will weaken party identification while the stakes prime will have little effect.   
The probability of maintaining a strong party identity across experimental conditions is 
displayed by condition in Figure 5.1.  As in previous chapters, these estimates were 
obtained using ordered probit regression to account for potentially inconsistent intervals 
in party identification strength.  Results in Table 5.2 show that, consistent with 
                                               
50 Words counts are capped at 255 characters. 
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expectations, those exposed to the duty prime show a much lower likelihood of 
maintaining a strong identity than those assigned to the control group (p<.01).  The 
coefficient on the policy stakes prime runs in the same direction but falls short of 
statistical significance (p = .11).  This effect is significantly smaller than the effect of the 
duty prime (p<.05) 
[Insert Table 5.2] [Insert Figure 5.1] 
While this result provides compelling evidence in favor of the duty hypothesis, it 
is possible that the duty prime simply encouraged closet partisanship.  To be more 
specific, participants may have simply reported weaker party identities in order to avoid 
the appearance of partisan bias.  They may not have actually brought their identities into 
alignment with their issue positions.   
In order to determine whether the duty prime truly increased responsiveness 
motivation rather than merely eliciting closet partisanship, I examine whether issue 
positions moderate the effect of the duty prime.  To do this, the issue distance variable is 
interacted with each of the two treatment variables.  Results in Table 5.3 indicate that the 
duty prime, but not the stakes prime, moderates the influence of issues positions on party 
identification.  The results displayed in Figure 5.2 suggest that exposure to the duty prime 
led partisans to bring their identities into line with their issue positions.  Those partisans 
whose issue positions were close to the positions of their own party, relative to the other 
party, tended to maintain their party identities regardless of condition.  However, 
substantial differences emerge between conditions among those people who tended to 
disagree with their own party on the issues.  Amazingly, subjects in the stakes condition 
and control group who expressed more agreement with the opposition party than with 
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their own party across a number of issues still managed to maintain stable party identities 
approximately one-third of the time.  This probability dropped to approximately one-
twentieth of the time in the duty priming condition.  In sum, by priming considerations of 
duty and the virtue of pragmatism over partisanship, accuracy motivation was increased 
and partisans brought their identities into alignment with their issue positions.
51
  
[Insert Table 5.3] [Insert Figure 5.2] 
On one hand, these results strongly support revisionist models of party 
identification by showing that, at least under certain conditions, partisans will change 
their identities to reflect their issues positions.  Findings suggest that the “unmoved 
mover” portrayal of party identification is a mischaracterization.  On the other hand, 
these results provide a striking contrast with the general assumption that party 
identification is instrumental to the attainment of policy benefits.  From these results, it 
appears that consideration of policy stakes has little influence on party identification 
relative to the incentive to express one’s civic duty and pragmatism.  While the 
instrumentality of party identification cannot be ruled out on the basis of a single null 
finding, this result is nonetheless noteworthy.  One might argue that individuals’ party 
identities already reflected their concerns over policy stakes coming into the experiment, 
so there was variation possible to observe additional identity change.  However, the 
substantial effect of the duty prime suggests that partisans had plenty of room to move.  
Clearly, party identification was not in perfect alignment with issue positions coming into 
                                               
51 The idea that issue positions might mediate (rather than moderate) the relationship between the treatment 
and party identification was also considered.  In the full sample, a small but significant mediation effect 
appears.  The treatment causes subjects to take less partisan issue positions, and this difference in issue 
positions carries a portion of the treatment effect to party identification.  However, recall that 82.6% of 
subjects in the stake prime condition believe that there was something important at stake in the election, 
and 85.0% of subjects in the duty prime condition endorsed the norm of issue based voting.  When analyses 
are run using only these subjects, the moderation effect becomes even clearer and mediation disappears.   
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the study, and only in the duty priming condition did this relationship increase in 
strength—leading to weaker party identification.   
While individuals are motivated to see themselves as loyal partisans (and avoid 
the cost of partisan disloyalty), they are also motivated to believe that their identities are 
issue-based and not merely rooted in partisan bias.  These results describe a voter who is 
concerned with avoiding the appearance of partisan bias, but not so concerned with 
maintaining the functionality of her party identity to facilitate the attainment of policy 
benefits.
52
               
 
Discussion 
 This chapter has asked, to whatever degree partisans update their identities, what 
is their motivation for doing so?  While a great number of studies have examined the 
degree to which party identification changes, few give much attention at all to the 
motivations underlying party identification change.  It is generally assumed that, because 
citizens have a stake in political outcomes, they will want to identify with the party that 
offers them the most policy benefits.  This paper points out, however, that if there is any 
psychological cost associated with party identification change, expected policy benefits 
are unlikely to be great enough to outweigh this cost.    
Since the American voter’s innate motivation to attain policy benefits may not be 
sufficient to overcome her motivation to remain loyal to her party, we should, by 
                                               
52 The parallel between the above findings and those in the literature on racial prejudice is worth 
mentioning.  While racial attitudes can have a substantial influence on individuals’ policy positions 
(Mendelberg 2001; Valentino et al. 2002; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Devine 1989), these influences are 
diminished when racial implications are made explicit, because they conflict with norms of egalitarianism 
(Mendelberg 2001; Devine 1989).  In the cases of both party identification and racial prejudice, the 
influence of group bias appears to be reduced when conflict between biases and norms is made salient. 
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implication, be wary of assuming that democratic accountability is guided by the 
invisible hand.  Ironically, it appears that we may not be able to count on voters to act in 
their own policy interest.   
This also means that party identification may not function as an efficient heuristic. 
For instance, consider a purely instrumental model, in which party identification develops 
out of the need to make accurate political evaluations while minimizing information costs 
(Shively 1979).  For party identification to function efficiently, allowing relatively 
uninformed individuals to vote as if they had objectively weighed the available 
information, partisans would need to update their identities to reflect their issue positions.  
These results suggest policy incentives are not great enough to offset the cost of partisan 
updating.  Instead, it appears that the heuristic efficiency of party identification depends 
on instilling norms of civic duty through cultural socialization and civic education.  
Without such norms, partisans would have little incentive to hold their party accountable 
for its policies.  To the degree that voters rely on their party identification to make 
decisions, these decisions would not accurately reflect their true preferences, and short-
term democratic accountability may be threatened.   
With this said, my intention has not been to argue that party identification is 
devoid of heuristic value.  These results merely suggest that we should carefully consider 
how efficient party identification actually operates as an information shortcut (Bartels 
1996).  If there were no cost to updating one’s party identity, we might safely assume that 
identification with responsible parties promotes democratic accountability by enabling 
relatively uninformed citizens to make sense out of a complicated political landscape.  
However, given the psychological cost of partisan updating, norms of civic duty may be 
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the only thing preventing party identification from hopelessly biasing political 
assessments and undermining citizens’ incentive to hold parties accountable.   
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Table 5.1:  Cross-tabulation of Past Party Identity and Current Party Identity 
 
 













































































0.9% 0% 0.3% 0.9% 2.1% 14.6% 81.2% 
 
Note: Percentages are calculated so that rows sum to 100%. 
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Table 5.2:  The Effects of Duty Prime and Stakes Prime on Party Identification 
  
Party Identification Strength 
B 
(SE) 





















Democrat (t-1) .122 
(.075) 
 





















***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Note:  Results are based on ordered probit regression. 
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Party Identification Strength 
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(SE) 










































Democrat (t-1) .155** 
(.077) 




Cut 1 1.33 (.248) 
Cut 2 2.36 (.248) 
Cut 3 3.84 (.264) 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Note:  Results are based on ordered probit regression.
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Control Group Duty Prime Policy Stakes Prime
 
Note: The figure illustrates the predicted probability of maintaining a strong party identity from pre to post.  
Predicted probabilities are based on ordered probit regression.  For the purpose of prediction, past party 
identification strength = 3 (strong), Democrat =0, age = 47.54, and word count = 14.35. 
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Figure 5.2:  The Predicted Probability of Strong Party Identification Given Issue 







Max Negative Issue Distance Neutral Issue Distance Max Positive Issue Distance
Control Group Duty Prime Policy Stakes Prime
 
Note:  The figure illustrates the probability of maintaining a strong party identification from pre to post 
given one’s issue positions.  Predicted probabilities are based on ordered probit regression.  For 
the purpose of prediction, past party identification strength = 3 (strong), Democrat =0, age = 
47.54, and word count = 14.35.  Max negative issue distance = -.518, and max positive issue 
distance = .857.  These were the most extreme observed values in the data.  Neutral issue distance 














Issue Positions Battery: 
 
There is much concern about taxes.  Some people argue that people should be taxed at 
higher rates as their income increases, because people who make more money can more 
easily afford to pay taxes than people who make less money.  This is known as a 
graduated tax system.  Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.  Others 
argue that everyone should be taxed at the same rate. This is known as a flat tax system.  
Those who favor a flat tax argue that a graduated tax system reduces the incentives to be 
productive and therefore hurts the economy.  Suppose these people are at the other end, at 
point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at 
points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself [the Republican Party, the 
Democratic Party] on this scale? 
 
There is much concern about jobs.  Some people feel the government in Washington 
should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Suppose these 
people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others think the government should just let 
each person get ahead on their own. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. 
And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 
5, or 6. Where would you place yourself [the Republican Party, the Democratic Party] on 
this scale? 
 
There is much concern about the War in Iraq.  Some people feel that we should stay and 
fight until order is restored and Iraq can govern itself.  Suppose these people are at one 
end of a scale, at point 1. Others argue that the war cannot be won through military 
means, and we should withdraw from Iraq immediately.  Suppose these people are at the 
other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in 
between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.  Where would you place yourself [the Republican 
Party, the Democratic Party] on this scale? 
 
There is much concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs. Some people 
support a government insurance plan which would cover all medical and hospital 
expenses for everyone. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others 
feel that all medical expenses should be paid by individuals through private insurance 
plans like Blue Cross or other company paid plans. Suppose these people are at the other 
end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, 
at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself [the Republican Party, the 
Democratic Party] on this scale? 
 
There is much concern about illegal immigration.  Some people feel that we should 
provide illegal immigrants who already live in the United States with a path to 
citizenship.  This would bring illegal immigrants out of hiding so that the government 
could keep track of them and tax their income.  Suppose these people are at one end of a 
scale, at point 1. Others argue that that citizenship should not be granted to anyone who 
166 
has come into the country illegally.  They argue that illegal immigration is a crime and it 
should be punished not rewarded.  Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. 
And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 
5, or 6. Where would you place yourself [the Republican Party, the Democratic Party] on 
this scale? 
 
There is much concern about abortion.  Some people feel that unborn infants have a 
fundamental right to life and that abortions should be illegal.  Suppose these people are at 
one end of a scale, at point 1.  Others feel that women should have the right to choose 
whether or not to have an abortion, and that this is a private matter that the government 
should not interfere with.  Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of 
course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. 
Where would you place yourself [the Republican Party, the Democratic Party] on this 
scale? 
 
There is much concern about gun control.  Some argue that greater restrictions should be 
placed on gun ownership.  They argue that assault rifles and armor piercing bullets 
should be banned, and they support a waiting period before a gun can be purchased.  
Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.  Others argue that Americans 
have the right to own guns and that restrictions on gun ownership violate the Second 
Amendment of the Constitution.  Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. 
And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 
5, or 6. Where would you place yourself [the Republican Party, the Democratic Party] on 
this scale? 
 
There is much concern about education.  Some people feel that the best way to improve 
our education system is to promote competition between schools.  They feel that if 
parents were provided with school vouchers that could be used to send their children to 
any public or private school, schools would be forced to compete.  Suppose these people 
are at one end of a scale, at point 1.  Others argue that public funds should only be used 
for public schools and not private schools.  They feel that school vouchers would just 
funnel money away from public schools that need the funding.  Suppose these people are 
at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere 
in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself [the Republican 








Conclusion   
 
To whatever degree party identification is stable, why is it stable?  To the degree 
party identification changes, why does it change?  After a number of tests, this 
dissertation arrives at the conclusion that party identification is shaped by often 
competing motives.  While partisans feel compelled to hold parties accountable for their 
issue positions and performance, they are also motivated by party loyalty.  As long as an 
individual can generate a justification for maintaining her identity despite disagreements 
she may have with her party, this clash of motives results in stable party identification.  
Identity change occurs when continued identification cannot be justified or when 
responsiveness motivation is simply greater then partisan motivation.   
In Chapter 2 we saw that, after experimentally inducing disagreement between 
subjects and their party, individuals developed justifications for maintaining stable party 
identities.  Rather than ignoring the induced disagreement, subjects found ways to adjust 
their attitudes to allow for it.  This resulted in the emergence of a distinct partisan attitude 
dimension—a justification dimension.  While liking the Democratic Party is generally 
associated with disliking the Republican Party and vice versa, this justification dimension 
captured subjects’ propensity to report more negative attitudes toward the opposition 
party as their attitudes toward their own party declined.  In popular political discourse, 
this is generally referred to as a lesser of two evils justification.  This same pattern is then 
shown to emerge across data from the 1964-2004 American National Election Studies.  
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When the economy performs poorly and the opposition party is in office, negative 
attitudes toward the opposition party are associated with positive attitudes toward one’s 
own party.  However, the relationship between attitudes weakens when the economy 
performs poorly during the tenure of one’s preferred party.  In this case, as in the 
experiment, partisans report more negative attitudes toward the opposition party as their 
attitudes toward their own party decline.  Again, this suggests the emergence of an 
identity justification dimension.   
Chapter 3 examined whether partisan stability is contingent on partisans’ ability 
to justify their identities.  If partisans maintain stable identities as a result of justification, 
then presumably, party identity change should occur when subjects lack the cognitive 
resources necessary to develop justifications for continued identification after disagreeing 
with their party.  Results of a national experiment support this hypothesis.  When 
disagreement was induced, the most vulnerable partisans (i.e. those lacking cognitive 
resources) began to change their identities.  This included subjects with low levels of 
political sophistication and Republicans—as their identities were already under pressure 
at the time of the study.  When cognitive resources were experimentally inhibited, 
younger citizens and Democrats began to shift their identities as well.  These results 
contrast strikingly with the revisionist theory that individuals devote their cognitive 
resources to updating their identities so that they will reflect their issue positions.  
Instead, these findings suggest that while partisans sometimes update their identities to 
reflect their issue positions, this tends to happen despite their best efforts to avoid it.  
The issue of measurement error is considered in Chapter 4 where a simple 
question order experiment capitalized on real world context.  The experiment was run 
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with a national sample during the 2008 primary season, a time of Republican Party 
disaffection and infighting.  Therefore, it was hypothesized that simply priming 
Republicans to consider their attitudes toward parties might trigger their motivations.   
Sure enough, the attitude primes administered at the start of the survey caused a chain-
reaction of responses—which, in a standard survey context, would likely be discounted as 
measurement error.  Priming Republicans attitudes toward the Democratic Party 
weakened their party identity.  Subsequently, however, subjects exposed to either 
experimental prime reported more partisan attitudes and emotions on whichever party 
attitude dimension was not primed.  In other words, when their attitudes toward their own 
party were primed, Republicans attempted to justify their identity by reporting more 
negative attitudes and emotions toward the Democratic Party and vice versa when their 
attitudes toward their own party were primed.  These effects mediated a rebound in party 
identification that occurred by the end of the survey.  In short, when Republicans’ 
attitudes were made salient to them, they felt compelled to update their party identity (i.e. 
motivated to be responsive).  However, since this conflicted with their partisan 
motivation, subjects attempted to justify maintaining their identities by bolstering their 
attitudes on whichever party dimension was not already primed. 
Chapter 5 examined the incentives underlying responsiveness motivation through 
a national experiment.  The dual motivations theory suggests that responsiveness 
motivation is not likely to be driven by policy interests, because individuals understand 
that their actions are unlikely to affect policy.  Therefore, to faithfully update one’s party 
identity to reflect political evaluations entails a psychological cost—disloyalty to one’s 
party—but offers little or not policy benefit.  Why then are partisans ever motivated to 
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update their party identities?  The dual motivations theory suggests that partisans want to 
appear unbiased and pragmatic, as these are norms associated with civic duty.  In other 
words, partisans need to believe that their party identities are rooted in objective 
evaluation even if this is not entirely true.  These two potential sources of responsiveness 
motivation—considerations of civic duty and policy stakes—were primed separately in a 
national experiment.  As predicted, partisans brought their identities into closer alignment 
with their issue positions when primed to consider civic duty but not when primed to 
consider the policy stakes of the election.  This finding suggests that party identification 
serves an expressive function as opposed to an instrumental function.  While party 
identification has the potential to operate as an efficient heuristic, this potential does not 
arise naturally from the desire to attain policy benefits, but rests instead on the salience of 
civic duty and pragmatism norms in society.     
In reflecting on these data, it is important to remember that identities are 
conceptually distinct from attitudes.  While our identities are a reflection of our self-
concept, attitudes represent our evaluations of specific people and objects around us.  
Nonetheless, when conflict between a particular attitude and identity becomes salient, an 
individual must change her identity, change the attitude, or find a way to justify 
maintaining them both in order to preserve cognitive consistency.  In the realm of 
politics, these options are limited by norms of civic duty that discourage overt partisan 
bias.  While identities certainly shape attitudes, individuals are unlikely to openly change 
their attitudes to conform to their party’s position.  Instead, a good democratic citizen is 
expected to change her party identity to reflect her attitudes about important issues of the 
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day.  The salience of these norms, therefore, plays an important moderating role in party 
identification stability and change. 
Nonetheless, given these conclusions, some important questions still remain.  
What are the implications of these findings for researchers and policy makers?  How will 
a dual motivations model of party identification improve our understanding of public 
opinion and political behavior?  If other models can predict most of the variance in party 
identification without modeling the biases I have explored, are they not superior?   
Democratic theory rests on the assumption that, through government, citizens will 
pursue their interests.  In a republic, they must do so by holding their representatives 
accountable for their actions—including the positions they take on issues.  In short, the 
system depends on citizens’ motivation to be responsive to new information and 
willingness to change course when their party fails.  If partisan motivation acts as a drag 
on this responsiveness, accountability is threatened.  Models that fail to account for 
partisan motivation risk drawing erroneous conclusions about the impact of party 
identification on democratic politics.  If party identification is highly stable even when 
individuals disagree with their party, then its enormous effect on political behavior 
warrants reinterpretation.  If partisans fail to hold parties accountable for their actions, the 
responsibility falls disproportionately on Independents—who are, on average, far less 
knowledgeable and politically involved (Campbell et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008).  
Moreover, if the partisan biases of those to the left and right of the median voter do not 
cancel out (and they are not likely to), then public opinion will show a bias even in the 
aggregate. 
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Partisan bias provides each party with a great deal of latitude. Given that electoral 
outcomes often turn on small margins, the rose-colored glasses of loyal partisans may 
permit their party to be elected and re-elected even if a significant number of 
Independents and opposition party identifiers see important faults.  If partisans find ways 
to justify maintaining stable identities, essentially disregarding useful information, and 
continue to vote for their party’s candidates, it may have important electoral 
consequences.  Would Harry Truman have been re-elected in 1948 had it not been for the 
Democratic Party loyalties developed during Franklin Roosevelt’s tenure?  Would 
George W. Bush have been re-elected in 2004 if not for Republican Party loyalties 
developed during the Ronald Reagan era?  Yet, how well did either of them perform with 
respect to these legacies?  While data show that the electorate has moved away from the 
Republican Party from 2000 to 2009 (Etheridge 2009), this change has occurred slowly.  
And this dissertation’s findings suggest that, if not for partisan motivation, partisan 
change would have occurred more rapidly, perhaps resulting in different election 
outcomes.  Ongoing investigation of data that are only now becoming available will 
undoubtedly help us to better understand these recent trends in light of the dual 
motivation model.  For now, it appears that Republicans remain motivated to maintain 
their identities, and the observed shift in party identification has resulted from 
Republicans’ inability to justify acting on their motivations.  With George W. Bush out of 
office and a new Democratic administration to criticize, Republicans may now find it 
easier to justify returning to their party.  An enduring partisan realignment seems unlikely 
unless Republican defectors lose the motivation to return.                  
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By developing a dual motivations theory of party identification, this dissertation 
has taken the first steps toward determining the conditions under which party 
identification may be helpful versus harmful to democracy.  This final chapter will 
consider how the intuition gained from this dual motivations model of party identification 
might affect the role we see for parties in American government.  In the pages that 
follow, I will revisit two relevant literatures and discuss how partisan motivation might 
affect their conclusions. 
 
Parties as Shortcuts 
Simon (1979) developed the notion of bounded rationality, arguing that 
individuals seek to maximize cognitive efficiency by expending the least amount of effort 
necessary to make approximately correct decisions.  Building on Simon’s work, political 
scientists have investigated how citizens use information shortcuts, or heuristics, to 
achieve low-information rationality in political decision-making (see Sniderman et al. 
1991; Popkin 1991; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Lupia et al. 2000).  Given the relatively 
uninformed state of American public opinion (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), and the 
fact that political ignorance is rational from a theoretical perspective (Downs 1957), this 
is an important task.  Still, while cognitive shortcuts give us great hope for the prospect of 
overcoming rational ignorance, we should also be cognizant of the limitations that 
heuristics might pose—a point that is central to the psychological literature on heuristics 
yet often overlooked by political scientists  (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974).   
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 Before delving deeper into this literature, however, it is helpful to begin with a bit 
of conceptual clarification.  Lupia et al. (2000) emphasize that citizens rely on heuristics, 
not because they are “irrational,” but because they are rationally attempting to reduce 
information costs.  Humans have evolved the capacity for heuristic processing because it 
tends to be efficient.  Dual processing capacity—the ability to engage in heuristic 
processing or systematic processing (see Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Petty and Cacioppo 
1986)—allows humans to adapt to complex environments.  Humans have an incentive to 
rely on heuristics in order to save energy when there is no urgent need for extremely 
accurate information.  However, when threats arise, our emotions tell us to devote more 
resources to information processing (Marcus et al. 2000; Brader 2006).  While heuristics 
entail a loss of accuracy relative to more careful processing strategies, this loss of 
accuracy is offset by the reduction in information costs.  In fact, if the defining 
characteristic of a heuristic is its efficiency, any loss in accuracy must be offset by an 
equally large or larger reduction in information costs.     
If individuals appear to be sacrificing information processing accuracy to such an 
extent that it can no longer be justified by information cost savings, these individuals’ 
motives and the heuristics they are using should be questioned.  Such an “irrational” 
sacrifice of information is likely to be motivated by the desire to reach a particular 
decision rather than an accurate one, and therefore should be distinguished from heuristic 
processing.  As discussed in the previous chapter, partisan motivation is likely to be 
rooted in the evolutionary incentive to develop group bonds and preserve these bonds by 
avoiding disloyalty—a purpose quite distinct from that of heuristics.           
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The question of whether party identification acts as an efficient heuristic is 
particularly important, given the centrality of both party identification and heuristics to 
our understanding of public opinion and political behavior.  Some of the early work on 
partisanship implies a heuristic role quite clearly.  Berelson, Lazarzfeld, and McPhee 
(1954) characterize partisanship as a “standing decision,” a voting habit on which citizens 
rely in the absence of other information, and Downs (1957) suggests that parties help 
citizens to overcome their rational ignorance.  Campbell et al. (1960) draw an analogy 
between the uninformed consumer and the uniformed voter: 
 Like the automobile buyer who knows nothing of cars except that he prefers a 
given make, the voter who knows simply that he is a Republican or Democrat 
responds directly to his stable allegiance without the mediating influence of 
perceptions he has formed of the objects he must choose between (p. 136).  
  
Still, Campbell and colleagues are clear in their contention that party 
identification may provide uninformed voters with a basis on which to cast their ballots, 
but if the end goal is to cast a vote that represents one’s “true” policy interests, party 
identification is not necessarily a good proxy.  The authors explain:  
. . . the influence of party identification on attitudes toward the perceived elements 
in politics has been far more important than the influence of these attitudes on 
party identification itself (p. 135). 
 
More recently, scholars have directly engaged the question of whether party 
identification functions as a heuristic.  Shively (1979) asks why citizens develop party 
identification, theorizing that individuals with a desire to participate in politics and a 
motivation to reach accurate voting decisions identify with parties in order to reduce 
information costs.  If citizens can determine which party generally represents their 
interests, they can avoid the cost of constantly monitoring politics.   
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It seems more plausible, however, that the motivation to identify with parties—
and groups in general—results from natural selection, itself a utility maximization 
process that takes place over many generations.  We identify with groups today because 
group bonds increased the likelihood of survival for our ancestors (Darwin 1890).  
Therefore, while party identification may potentially serve a heuristic function, it seems 
unlikely that it develops specifically to fill this need.   
Still, Shively’s very clear and parsimonious model helps us to understand how a 
partisan heuristic might ideally operate.  If partisan motivation is incorporated into 
Shively’s model, party identification functions just as it does in the dual motivation 
model—serving as a useful voting heuristic—as long as one’s responsiveness motivation 
is greater than ones’ partisan motivation.  However, when the opposite is true, party 
identification serves as a source of bias.  
More recent work has attempted to empirically demonstrate the heuristic utility of 
partisanship.  In an innovative experiment, Rahn (1993) shows that when party cues are 
available, individuals rely less on issue positions and more on party identification to help 
them evaluate candidates.  She finds that this is even true when candidates take positions 
that conflict with their party’s ideology.  Subjects dismiss these inconsistencies and 
evaluate candidates on the basis of their party affiliation.  Rahn views these results as 
evidence that party cues serve as useful heuristics.  However, given that individuals 
appear not to reach approximately correct evaluations in the inconsistency condition, one 
might interpret these results as evidence that party identification biases candidate 
evaluations rather than serving as an effective shortcut.  This interpretation is bolstered 
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by results from a similar experiment by Cohen (2003), in which party cues appear to 
trump issues regardless of subjects’ cognitive effort.   
While the above models clearly assume that citizens are motivated to be 
responsive, Sniderman and colleagues explicitly allow partisan motivation to play a role 
in heuristic processing (Sniderman et al. 1991; Brady and Sniderman 1985).  They 
emphasize that citizens’ feelings toward parties can act as a likeability heuristic that helps 
them determine on which side of an issue each party stands.  In particular, citizens’ 
motivation to agree with their favored party and distance themselves from the positions 
of the disfavored party serves as the basis by which many people attribute issue positions 
to parties.
53
  In arguing that individuals’ biases help them to understand politics, this 
work is both innovative and controversial.  Others have built on this idea by, 
demonstrating that party cues (Schaffner and Streb 2002) and accessible party identities 
(Huckfeldt et al. 1999) facilitate the formation and durability of survey responses.   
However, while empirically innovative and theoretically more plausible than 
models that assume an absence of partisan motivation, such models stretch the definition 
of a heuristic.  While party identification may help to constrain belief systems, it seems 
less plausible that partisan bias allows individuals to behave more efficiently—the 
defining characteristic of a heuristic.  For heuristic processing to function efficiently, 
individuals must, at a minimum, make use of all of the relevant information they 
                                               
53 Individuals are thought to find a “balance” between their estimates of parties’ true positions and their 
desire to believe that parties hold particular positions.  In essence, Brady and Sniderman take a dual 
motivations approach to understanding how citizens attribute issue positions to parties.  Under their model, 
the “balance” of these motivations is affected by a citizen’s level of knowledge—those with less knowledge 
about the parties’ true positions relying more on their feelings toward parties.  They, therefore, view these 
feelings as a heuristic that citizens can fall back on in the absence of knowledge.  However, though the 
issue receives little attention, this model also allows for well-informed citizens to take positions that they 
know to be incorrect simply because they are motivated to do so.  By framing partisan bias as a heuristic, it 
is implied that only those with low knowledge levels will act on these biases, but this is not necessarily the 
case.    
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possesses.  If partisans disregard information they know to be correct in favor of 
information they wish to be correct, they cannot be said to be using information 
efficiently.  Over time, if individuals infer party positions from the partisan biases they 
developed in their childhood, rather than taking into account the information that they 
have actually acquired, changes in parties’ positions would go unnoticed.    
For example, to place the Democratic Party to left of the Republican Party on 
social welfare policy has been approximately correct for more than a century, but over 
this span of time, party positions have changed in important ways.  In the 1990’s, the 
Democratic Party’s position on social welfare policy became more conservative.  For 
party identification to function as an efficient heuristic, citizens who support liberal social 
welfare policy cannot simply ignore this fact.  Not every citizen needs to be perfectly 
informed on the issue, but it seems troubling for democratic accountability if interested 
constituents allow their partisan biases to cloud their understanding of parties’ issue 
positions. 
Popkin (1991) provides a concise and persuasive argument for why heuristic 
reasoning is essential to American government, and in so doing also suggests exactly why 
heuristics are likely to have limited utility if they induce partisan biases.   
Given the many gaps in voters’ information about government, and their lack of 
theory with which to make connections between government actions and their 
benefits, governments concerned primarily with gaining as many votes as possible 
have little incentive to maximize benefits to voters (p. 13).   
 
Popkin’s intent is clearly to point out why it is important for citizens to hold 
opinions, but he also makes the case for why these opinions must accurately represent 
voters’ interests and not merely their partisan biases.  If voters simply assume that their 
favored party supports their issue positions, then elected officials can take any position 
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they wish with little fear that their constituents will notice.  In other words, a heuristic 
rooted entirely in one’s biases does nothing to improve democratic accountability over 
the circumstances of a citizenry which learns no new information after socialization.   
In an effort to determine whether heuristics allow uninformed citizens to function 
as if they are informed, Bartels (1996) examines actual public opinion in comparison to a 
hypothetically fully-informed version of public opinion imputed from demographic data.   
He finds that heuristics do not allow relatively uninformed individuals to act as if they 
were fully informed.  Of course, some suggest that such a high standard is not necessary 
for the individual voter, since errors in opinion should cancel out in the aggregate (see 
Page and Shapiro 1992; Converse 1990).  Therefore, Bartels also conducts an aggregate 
level examination and finds that, while aggregation closes the gap between observed and 
fully informed public opinion, incumbents and Democrats still perform better than they 
would in a fully informed electorate.  Party cues might help to supplement information, 
but they do not appear to substitute for it (Bartels 1996; Althaus 1998).  Of course, since 
motivational biases prevent individuals from updating heuristics to reflect the information 
that they do receive, this should not be surprising. 
In short, that individuals follow party cues is not enough to warrant referring to 
party identification as an effective shortcut.  While party identification certainly has the 
potential to function as a heuristic, the group biases that tend to come along with 
identification undermine its utility.  Rather than allowing individuals to function 
efficiently—as if they were fully informed—party identification may lead well-informed 
partisans to vote as if they were relatively uninformed.   
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Parties and Interest Groups 
 Since the founding, Americans have generally been skeptical of parties.  James 
Madison famously rails against the tyranny of faction (which, for Madison, included 
parties) in Federalist 10 (Madison 2003), and George Washington used his farewell 
address to warn against the danger of parties—which he witnessed developing within his 
own cabinet (Washington 2008).  Yet, in striking contrast, political scientists have 
developed an almost universal “commitment to the desirability, if not the absolute 
necessity of parties in a democratic system” (Epstein 1986).  In the famous words of E. E. 
Schattschneider (1942), democracy is “unthinkable save in terms of parties.”  But why is 
this so?   
Aldrich (1995) explains that parties solve three fundamental problems in 
democracy.  They regulate competition between ambitious office seekers; they facilitate 
social choice; and they mobilize citizens to take collective action.  This dissertation draws 
attention to an important shortcoming of parties:  They create a source of political bias 
which undermines citizens’ motivation to hold candidates accountable.   
In the United States, at least in the current era, politics are candidate-centered.  
Parties provide labels for candidates to run under, but parties have little control over their 
“brand” (Aldrich 1995; Epstein 1986).  In other words, while parties have official 
platforms, their candidates are not bound to them.  Whichever candidate wins the party’s 
primary gets to carry the party’s label regardless of his or her issue positions.  Therefore, 
while party labels provide some information about a candidate’s stances, there remains a 
substantial amount of uncertainty.  Moreover, separation of powers, checks and balances, 
and the federated structure of American government make it difficult to determine who is 
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ultimately responsible for the passage or failure of legislation.  This allows parties and 
elected officials to point fingers when things go badly and claim credit when things go 
well.  In short, the American system of government is characterized by a substantial 
amount of ambiguity.   
While such ambiguity poses a clear concern for citizens’ ability to obtain the 
information necessary to hold officials accountable, it is even more troubling if we take 
into account that partisans may actually be motivated to avoid holding their party 
accountable in the first place.  For the motivated partisan, ignorance is bliss.  There is 
little pressure to change one’s party identity when it is unclear what parties actually stand 
for.  In such a system “false consensus effects” (Ross et al. 1977) can run rampant as 
citizens assume that their party and its candidates favor the positions that they themselves 
favor.  And, when confronted with hard evidence that a candidate of one’s own party has 
taken a position with which one disagrees, that individual can plausibly assume the 
candidate is not representative of the party as a whole (Marques and Yzerbyt 1988).  
Even when things have gone badly during a party’s time in power, officeholders denials 
of responsibility remains quite plausible (Fiorina 1980)—particularly for a motivated 
partisan.   
Proponents of the “doctrine of responsible party government” view stronger 
parties as the cure to this problem (see Ranney 1954).  These scholars see separation of 
powers, checks and balances, and federalism as anti-majoritarian, and argue that majority 
rule is the essence of democratic government.  They propose a system in which 
government would be centered around at least (and preferably only) two unified and 
disciplined parties.  Under such a system, they argue, a majority party would be directly 
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accountable for all legislation passed while it was in power, and officials would be 
directly tied to the party.  Therefore, the system would be simple and unambiguous, 
allowing the public to hold officials responsible.  To this end, they advocate reforms that 
would increase the discipline, influence, and centrality of parties in the American 
government (Committee on Political Parties 1950a, 1950b, 1950c). 
Implicit in the doctrine of responsible party government is the notion that citizens 
are motivated to be responsive to parties’ actions and not always loyal to their party.  In 
other words, proponents of responsible parties take a very similar approach to those who 
write on the heuristic value of party identification, except these scholars focus on party 
institutions as opposed to voters.  They view parties as a way to simplify voters’ decision-
making process.  Moreover, by decreasing the ambiguity in politics, a responsible party 
system would likely increase the pressure to update one’s identity.  If it is clear where 
candidates and parties stand, it is more difficult to ignore inconsistencies between one’s 
own issue positions and the stances of one’s party.  Finally, such a system would also 
facilitate collective responsibility, making it somewhat more difficult for parties and 
candidates to deny responsibility when things go badly and claim credit when things go 
well (Fiorina 1980)—possibly making identity defense more difficult for citizens as well. 
Still, this type of party system may well pose as many problems as solutions. 
When political debate is divided along a single well-defined cleavage, it facilitates 
partisans’ ability to avoid ever taking positions that differ from those of their party in the 
first place.  Survey analyses suggest that public opinion is strongly influenced by this 
type of behavior (Bartels 2002; Zaller 1992; Converse 1966), and these effects are 
particularly strong among those who are most informed about where their party stands on 
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the issues (Zaller 1992; Converse 1966).  Such findings are corroborated by experiments 
showing that ideology informs political evaluations unless party cues are available 
(Cohen 2003; Rahn 1993).  In short, despite their apparent shortcomings, citizens do 
appear able to make use of information when it is available, but tend to disregard that 
information when it conflicts with their party identity.   
Moreover, in addition to allowing partisans to avoid ever disagreeing with their 
party, by ensuring that political competition would occur repeatedly along a single 
cleavage, responsible party government would likely intensify intergroup conflict, 
partisan polarization, and partisan biases (Sherif 1956).  In fact, recent research has also 
shown that, in democratic systems with fewer and more disciplined parties, the 
propensity to identify with parties is greater—particularly among the least educated 
(Huber et al. 2005).  The question remains, however, whether higher rates of 
identification produce legislative outcomes more or less in line with citizens’ “true” 
interests.  The findings of this dissertation suggest that it may well be the latter.  While 
party identification may help those with less education understand politics, it may also 
bias those who are otherwise best equipped to hold parties accountable.     
How then might we decrease the ambiguity of politics without exacerbating 
partisan biases?  Perhaps it is worth taking a second look at the role of interest groups in 
American politics.  We tend to bemoan the influence of these groups, reminiscing about 
bygone eras in which parties, if not perfectly responsible, were at least more responsible 
than their current manifestations.  However, we might better serve our purpose by 
considering how realistic reform proposals could improve accountability in the system as 
it currently exists.  While parties are as ideologically distinct as they have ever been, they 
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are now more than ever composed of interest groups alliances (Rae 2007).  Since the 
influence of interest groups has increased so dramatically relative to party institutions, we 
should consider how we might harness the power of these groups in a way that benefits 
democracy.  
In contrast to the literature on responsible party government, some scholars favor 
a more pluralistic approach, believing that American parties have evolved to fit the 
circumstances of American government.  While these scholars promote reforms aimed at 
decreasing the candidate-centered nature of political campaigns and increasing the role of 
parties, they emphasize that these reforms must take into consideration political culture 
and American party traditions if they have any hope of success (Epstein 1986).  Epstein 
focuses on what he refers to as the “institutionalized porousness” of American parties.  
By allowing entrance by individuals and groups who want to make use of their label 
rather than rigid conformation to a particular platform, “indigenous” American parties 
bring together various interests in an effort to build winning coalitions.  Herring (1940) 
argues, “the very fluidity of our national party organization offers an opportunity for 
intelligence to compete freely for a hearing.” 
On the other hand, proponents of responsible parties contend that this porousness 
or fluidity is the source of the problem.  By empowering interest groups relative to 
parties, the indigenous party system favors moneyed factions over the will of the 
majority.  Schattschneider (1975) famously argues, “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is 
that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent.”  And Lowi (1979) 
contends that “interest group liberalism” has corrupted American government by 
allowing interest groups to govern through their influence in bureaucracy.   
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However, it is important to remember that interest groups are a reasonably diverse 
lot.  Walker (1991) divides interest groups into four categories: profit sector, mixed 
sector, non-profit sector, and citizen groups.  As of his 1985 survey, 56.4% of groups 
were either nonprofit (32.5%) or citizen groups (23.9%), while only 37.8% were profit 
sector groups, and 5.8% were mixed sector.  Moreover, these groups attempt to influence 
politics by different means.  While profit sector groups engage mostly in inside 
lobbying—directly petitioning legislators—citizen groups mostly engage in outside 
lobbying—attempting to affect legislation via the public.  And public sector groups tend 
to take a strategy somewhere in between.  Therefore, the most pertinent question seems 
not to be how to reduce the influence of interest groups across the board, but rather how 
to even the playing field and channel interest group influence through the public rather 
than through inside lobbying.      
Sartori (1976) claims that a party is “part of a whole attempting to serve the 
purposes of the whole, whereas a faction is only a part for itself.”  But it is critical to 
remember that parties exist not necessarily to promote issues but to help office seekers 
win power (Aldrich 1995; Schumpeter 1942), while interest groups, on the other hand, 
exist specifically to promote polices.  While proponents of responsible party government 
see the narrowness of these interests as a bad thing, this does not have to be so.  
Democracy benefits from a reduction in ambiguity when interest groups force parties and 
candidates to take clear issue positions and then hold them accountable for those 
positions.  If individuals come to identify with and show biases toward a particular 
interest group, this does not undermine the heuristic value of the interest group cue as it 
does with parties, because interest groups necessarily represent policy interests.  
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Therefore, unlike party identification, interest group identification poses little threat to 
the quality of voting, because voting one’s interest group identity is necessarily voting 
one’s policy interests.  And, in fact, interest group endorsements have been shown to 
function efficiently as information shortcuts (Lupia 1994).   
Moreover, interest groups may actually help to check partisan biases by cross-
pressuring citizens (Campbell et al. 1960).  When favorably viewed interest groups 
criticize one’s party or its candidates, such criticisms not only provide voters with highly 
credible information, but are also motivationally neutral.  Take for instance, a 
circumstance in which the Democratic Party criticizes the Republican Party.  Not only 
does such communication constitute “cheap talk” as a results of the electoral incentives at 
play (Sobel 1985; Lupia and McCubbins 1998), but partisan motivation will drive 
Republicans to counter-argue against such criticisms even if they do find them credible.  
On the other hand, if the United States Chamber of Commerce criticizes the Republican 
Party or its candidates, it is likely to carry much greater weight with Republican voters.   
Schattschneider (1942) argues that parties are like businesses in that laws are no 
more needed to make parties serve people than they are to make businesses serve 
consumers.  The problem with this analogy is that laws are needed to regulate business, 
because the goal of business is not to provide consumers with high quality goods and 
services, but to make a profit.  Likewise, the goal of a party is to gain votes by whatever 
means feasible, not necessarily to act in the public good.  Given the fact that partisans 
develop attachments, this is quite problematic.  If voters’ brand loyalties are so strong 
that they will “buy” whatever policy package their party offers, parties are likely to take 
advantage of this fact.   
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Since neither parties nor partisans have a particularly strong incentive to concern 
themselves with issues, interest groups have a vital role to play in infusing politics with 
issues.  Just as a well-regulated capitalist system harnesses the self-interest of individuals 
to promote the public interest, a well-regulated democratic government may benefit by 
harnessing the self-interest of interests groups.  The key is of course in effective 
regulation.  Again, if interest group influence can be channeled through the public—
outside lobbying as opposed to inside lobbying—interest groups may help to perform a 
vital service to democracy by informing the public about issues and mobilizing them to 
action.  The tentative conclusion then is that we should not be so quick to extol parties 
and condemn interests groups.  While democracy may be “unthinkable” (Schattschneider 
1942) or at least “unworkable” (Aldrich 1995) save parties, short-run party accountability 
may just be unattainable save interest groups.  
 
A Statement on Motivation 
 Understanding motivation is absolutely critical if we hope to build effective 
democratic institutions. Yet, far too often, we seem to make overly simplistic 
assumptions about motivation—even when the literature has already shown these 
assumptions to be faulty.  For instance, we know that voters have little incentive to 
become informed and that there are few policy benefits to be gained from political 
participation (Downs 1957).  So, why then, do we so often assume that political behavior 
is driven by voters’ policy interests?  If many voters do not even know what their policy 
interest are, and those who do have little incentive to act on those interests, other sources 
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of motivation must drive political behavior.  But without a clear understanding of 
motives, it is impossible to harness those motivates in pursuit of democratic outcomes. 
This is particularly critical given the fact that the assumptions we make about 
citizens’ motivations shape our judgments of institutional effectiveness.  If citizens are 
driven to attain policy benefits, and parties aid them in this pursuit, then parties serve a 
useful function.  However, if citizens are motivated to get involved in politics because 
they want to be part of something larger than themselves, and parties aid them in this 
pursuit, then we may want to be careful how we regulate these institutions.  When 
citizens unconsciously place party loyalty above party accountability, they risk becoming 
puppets of party elites.  And if party identification affects issue preferences to a greater 
degree than issue preferences affect party identification, then parties are not held 
accountable.  With the rise of the Nazi regime, we witnessed what can happen when 
citizens get swept up in party movements led by charismatic politicians.  This dissertation 
is certainly not meant as an indictment of the public’s qualifications for sovereignty.  It is 
merely a plea to take into account citizens’ competing motivations as we attempt to 
understand their behavior in politics.     
 
Future Directions 
While this dissertation has focused exclusively on the American two-party 
system, future work will consider how a multi-party context might affect the motivational 
dynamics underlying party identification.  As mentioned during the discussion of 
responsible party government, intergroup conflict is likely to be intensified when political 
competition occurs repeatedly along a single cleavage as it does in two party systems 
189 
(Sherif 1956).  And, recent research suggests that the propensity to identify with parties 
decreases with the effective number of parties—particularly among those with less 
education (Huber et al. 2005).  Therefore, one might speculate that partisan motivation is 
weaker in multi-party systems.  Additionally, lesser of two evils identity justification is 
certainly a less applicable defense for those who are motivated to maintain their party 
identities in such systems—though numbers of other identity justification strategies 
remain viable.     
Still, when one looks within multi-party systems and focuses on traditional 
cleavage parties, partisan attachments appear stronger, and hostility toward opposition 
parties is more pronounced (Richardson 1991).  Therefore, partisan motivation may vary 
between parties in multi-party systems.  If this is the case, given disagreement with their 
party, cleavage party identifiers should show a greater propensity to avoid identity 
change and instead seek a justification for their existing party identity—just like their 
counterparts in the United States.  This should allow traditional cleavage parties to have 
greater policy and performance latitude than their non-cleavage party counterparts.  
Future work will, therefore, examine the relative ability of cleavage and non-cleavage 
parties to retain seats during periods of poor performance.    
Additionally, while I have focused largely on individual level dynamics in party 
identification, it is important to understand how these processes aggregate.  In 
particularly, how does the dual motivation theory help us to understand realignments in 
party identification?  As suggested earlier, I suspect that an important part of the story 
may be explained by fluctuations in partisan motivation among large segments of society.  
Green and colleagues (2002) suggest that realignments occur, not as a result of changing 
190 
political attitudes, but rather as a product of changing social group imagery associated 
with parties.  During the civil rights era, and particularly after the 1964 election, the 
image of the Democratic Party held by many southerners began to change.  As this 
occurred, the South drifted gradually in a Republican direction until finally becoming a 
Republican stronghold.   
Green and colleagues’ account meshes quite nicely with the framework of the 
dual motivation theory.  Throughout this dissertation, partisan motivation has been 
assumed to exist among partisans.  However, there is no reason that such motivation must 
be constant.  As party symbolism evolves, the motivation to maintain one’s party 
allegiance may change as well.  This imagery is critical to the motivation to maintain 
one’s identity.  After all, if partisanship is truly an identity, the images associated with 
one’s party are associated with the self.     
With regard to the realignment of the American South, the very fact that so many 
conservative Southerners identified with the Democratic Party for so many years despite 
their ideological differences with the party speaks to the power of partisan motivation.  
As long as the image of the Democratic Party remained associated with Southern culture 
and pride, many Southerners remained motivated to maintain their loyalty to the party.  
However, during the 1960’s this symbolism was forever altered, and so the partisan 
motivation of many Southern Democrats declined.  While Southern Democrats had 
maintained their partisan allegiance despite important differences prior to the Civil Rights 
Era and the 1964 election, these differences had not fundamentally changed the party’s 
image in the minds of Southerners.  This decline in partisan motivation in the 1960’s left 
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Southerners open to persuasion on issues across the board and allowed full-scale regional 
realignment to occur.       
In the current political landscape, as we watch Republican identification weaken 
across much of the electorate (Etheridge 2009), it will be interesting to see whether this 
change is lasting.  If the Republican Party allows its brand to become too closely 
associated with NASCAR and country music, then it may risk permanently losing many 
of its wealthy northern constituents.  Future studies will continue to investigate these 
trends and tease out causal processes through experiments.  Of particular interest is 
whether priming associations between parties and certain social groups weakens partisan 
motivation and makes it easier it persuade partisans on unrelated issue dimensions.        
In addition to investigating partisan realignment, I am also interested in 
examining the effects of partisan justification.  I am especially interested is the effect of 
justifications offered up by party elites—often in the form of “talking points”—which 
allow partisans to maintain support for their party and its policies.  Might the justification 
process shape voters’ attitudes on other issues and perhaps even their ideology?  As the 
justification for the Iraq War shifted from the need to eliminate weapons of mass 
destruction to the need to protect the Iraqi people from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein, 
did Republicans attitudes toward nation building change?  If so, has this affected 
Republicans’ foreign policy attitudes more generally, and how might acceptance of the 
Bush administration’s justification for war affect Republicans’ attitudes on future foreign 
policy issues?  Likewise, has Democrats’ opposition to the war affected their attitudes 
toward nation building?  And how will this affect their future attitudes on foreign policy 
matters?   
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While the justification for the Iraq War provides a useful example of how such 
justifications may have long-term repercussions for public opinion and political ideology, 
this is only one example of a more common theme.  Politicians must justify their actions, 
and their supporters have a strong incentive to accept these justifications in order 
maintain their loyalties.  Therefore, to the degree that it exists, attitude constraint may be 
shaped in important ways by partisan justification.  Future experiments will examine 
whether justification can have a domino effect on other attitudes, thereby shaping voter 
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